Validation and Improvement of Reliability Methods for Air Force Building Systems by Deering, Patrick A.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-24-2016
Validation and Improvement of Reliability
Methods for Air Force Building Systems
Patrick A. Deering
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Risk Analysis Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deering, Patrick A., "Validation and Improvement of Reliability Methods for Air Force Building Systems" (2016). Theses and
Dissertations. 388.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/388
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELIABILITY METHODS FOR AIR 
FORCE BUILDING SYSTEMS 
 
THESIS 
 
Patrick R. Deering, Capt, USAF 
AFIT-ENV-16-M-143 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRUBTION UNLIMITED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government.   This Material is declared a work of the United States Government 
and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
 
AFIT-ENV-16-M-143 
 
 
 
VALIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELIABILITY METHODS FOR AIR 
FORCE BUILDING SYSTEMS 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Engineering Management 
 
 
 
 
Patrick R. Deering, BS 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
March 2016 
 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, DISTRUBTION UNLIMITED 
 
 
  
AFIT-ENV-16-M-143 
 
 
 
VALIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELIABILITY METHODS FOR AIR 
FORCE BUILDING SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
Patrick R. Deering, BS 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
Committee Membership 
 
 
 
Maj Vhance V. Valencia, PhD 
Chair 
 
 
Maj Jason K. Freels, PhD 
Member 
 
 
Dr. Edward D. White 
Member 
 
 
Capt Sarah Bodenheimer, MS 
Member 
 
AFIT-ENV-16-M-143 
iv 
 
Abstract 
The United States Air Force manages its civil infrastructure resource allocation 
via a two-dimensional risk model consisting of the consequence of failure and reliability.  
Air Force civil engineers currently use the BUILDER® Sustainment Management 
System to estimate and predict reliability at multiple levels within its civil infrastructure 
systems.  Alley (2015) developed and validated a probabilistic model to calculate 
reliability at the system level.  The probabilistic model was found to be a significant 
improvement over the currently employed BUILDER® model for four major building 
systems (electrical, HVAC, fire protection, and electrical).  This research assessed the 
performance and accuracy of both the probabilistic and BUILDER® model, focusing 
primarily on HVAC systems. 
This research used contingency analysis to assess the performance of each model 
for HVAC systems at six Air Force installations.  Evaluating the contingency analysis 
results over the range of possible reliability thresholds, it was found that both the 
BUILDER® and probabilistic model produced inflated reliability calculations for HVAC 
systems.  In light of these findings, this research employed a stochastic method, a 
Nonhomogenious Poisson Process (NHPP), in an attempt to produce accurate HVAC 
system reliability calculations.  This effort ultimately concluded that the data did not fit a 
NHPP for the systems considered but posits that other stochastic process can provide 
more accurate reliability calculations when compared to the two models analyzed. 
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VALIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELIABILITY METHODS FOR AIR 
FORCE BUILDING SYSTEMS 
 I.  Introduction 
Background 
In 2003, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a 
report highlighting the poor management of federal real property.  The GAO went as far 
to designate federal real property management as a “high risk area” (Teicholz, Noferi, & 
Thomas, 2005).  The findings of the 2003 report ultimately led to the publishing of 
Executive Order (EO) 13327, Federal Real Property Asset Management.  The order 
required the implementation of a federal real property asset management program.  The 
intent of the program was to focus on the efficient and economical use of real property 
assets.  The EO also required each department within the executive branch to determine 
what assets they owned, what assets they needed, and what it costs to manage those 
assets (Teicholz et al., 2005).  Each department was also responsible for developing and 
monitoring real property performance criteria. 
Given the requirements defined in EO 13327, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and subsequently the United States Air Force (USAF) initiated the implementation of 
asset management principles in 2007.  Major General Del Eulberg, The Air Force Civil 
Engineer at the time, published a letter discussing the transition for USAF civil engineers 
into an asset management culture.  General Eulberg defined asset management as the 
“systematic and integrated process to manage natural and built assets and their associated 
performance, risk, and expenditures over their life cycles to support…organizational 
goals” (Eulberg, 2007).  General Eulberg’s primary objective for Air Force asset 
 2 
management was to provide strategic direction by answering the similar questions 
highlighted in EO 13327: What assets does the USAF currently have?  What assets does 
the USAF need? What are the gaps? And, how do we optimize those assets, from both a 
cost and performance standpoint? 
To implement a program that answered these questions, the USAF published Air 
Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 32-10 Installations and Facilities.  AFPD 32-10 directs 
the employment of a sustainable asset management approach centered on providing 
effective mission support at the lowest possible life-cycle cost (Office of the Secretary of 
the Air Force, 2010).  The policy directive requires civil engineers to consider the return 
on investment and an asset’s mission support capability when developing asset 
investment strategies.  Additionally, engineers are required to determine how condition 
impacts the ability of an asset to adequately provide mission support.  Engineers must 
also develop a process to monitor mission support through the use of performance 
indicators (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 2010).  Although the directive 
outlines numerous requirements,  it creates a central theme for Air Force civil 
engineering: engineers need to manage their assets in a way that effectively support the 
the Air Force’s mission while minimizing asset life-cycle costs. 
BUILDER® 
AFPD 32-10 requires civil engineers to understand asset condition and monitor 
performance over the life cycle of an asset.  Additionally, Gen Eulberg highlights the 
central objectives to implementing an asset management program as understanding what 
 3 
assets the USAF has in their inventory, the condition of those assets, the performance of 
those assets, and determining an optimal investment strategy.   
In order to more effectively manage assets that provide effective support while 
minimizing asset life-cycle cost, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) mandated 
the Air Force to implement the use of BUILDER®.  BUILDER® is a Sustainment 
Management System (SMS) developed by the United States Army Engineer Research 
and Development Center (ERDC) Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 
(CERL).  CERL created BUILDER® to provide engineers an established, objective 
standard to quantify and communicate asset condition, risk, and mission readiness.  In 
order to accomplish this, BUILDER® provided a standardized framework encompassing 
five areas: determining asset inventory, quantifying asset Condition Indices (CIs), 
predicting future CIs, generating work plans, and analyzing investment courses of action 
(COAs) (United States ARMY Corps of Engineers (USACE), 2015a).  Of these five 
areas the Air Force is primarily utilizing BUILDER® to determine asset inventory, 
quantify asset CIs, and predict future CIs.  Thus, the system allows engineers to track 
assets in their current portfolio and assess asset life-cycle performance. 
The Air Force uses CI to measure life-cycle performance.  Chapter II will explain 
the calculation of CIs at the various level within an asset’s hierarchy.  However, the basic 
principle of the BUILDER® model uses CI and replacement costs at lower levels of the 
system to calculate a CI at the system level.  It is important to note CI and reliability are 
thought to be “proportionally similar” (Grussing, Uzarski, & Marrano, 2006). That is to 
say that a system having a CI of 50 is assumed to have an approximate reliability of 50 
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percent.  Thus, CI is used to approximate an asset’s reliability, and subsequently it’s 
probability of failure 
Probabilistic Assessment of Failure 
In an attempt to improve the BUILDER® CI model, Alley (2015) proposes an 
alternate model for calculating the probability of failure at the system level within the 
BUILDER® hierarchy.  In contrast to the use of replacements cost, Alley calculates 
probability of failure at higher levels through the use of fault trees with fuzzy logic and 
importance weighting.  
Alley (2015), validates her model through the use of work order (WO) data 
contained in the Interim Work Information Management System (IWIMS) database.  This 
validation equates a WO coded as Emergency (E) or Urgent (U) to a failed state as these 
actions are not planned or preventive in nature, but reactive and corrective to a failed 
system.  Alley uses contingency analysis to both compare the models to one another and 
determine which model possessed more predictive capability for system level failures.  
When comparing the two models to one another, Alley determined that both models 
found similar results in only 10 out of 46 component-sections analyzed.  Leading to the 
conclusion that each model differs in their ability to calculate system level probability of 
failure.  Subsequently, Alley analyzed each model’s ability to predict system level 
failure.  Still using contingency analysis, Alley states that the BUILDER® model 
possessed little to no predictive ability, while the alternate model was able to predict 
probability of failure with a statistical significance of 0.12 (Alley, 2015). 
 5 
Problem Statement 
The United States Air Force is concerned with providing assets that effectively 
support the mission while simultaneously minimizing life cycle costs.  Air Force 
engineers currently employ the BUILDER® Sustainment Management System to track 
civil infrastructure asset condition indices.  Engineers use these indices as a proportional 
measure of asset reliability and likelihood of failure (Air Force Civil Engineer Center 
(AFCEC), 2015).  The models discussed above focus on providing an accurate estimation 
of civil infrastructure reliability.  This research aims to further improve these reliability 
calculations by assessing the performance and accuracy of both models.  In doing so, this 
research focuses primarily on investigating underlying assumptions associated with each 
model.  Specifically, both models use a reliability threshold of 37 percent as a 
representation of a system level failure.  Additionally, Alley assumes a Weibull 
distribution and parameters to quantify the probability of failure at the component-section 
level of the probabilistic model.  Lastly, the original validation performed by Alley 
assessed the models at only a single Air Force installation.  By addressing these concerns, 
the objective of this research is to further improve civil system reliability estimation for 
Air Force civil engineers. 
Research Objectives and Investigative Questions 
This research investigates the BUILDER® and probabilistic model in order to 
more accurately predict the probability of failure at a building’s system level.  In order to 
accomplish this, this research will focus on reducing the underlying model assumptions 
 6 
and perform further model validation and statistical analysis.  This research will 
accomplish these objectives by answering the following questions: 
1. What assumptions associated with the original research effort can be reduced or 
eliminated through data collection and analysis? 
a) Is the assumption that a reliability threshold of 37 valid for the systems 
analyzed?  If not, does the model indicate a reliability threshold for these 
systems? 
b) Can probabilistic distributions and associated parameters be estimated for 
system components? 
2. After further model validation, do the models still present statistical significance 
for predicting the probability of failure at the system level? 
3. After further model validation, do the models accurately predict the probability of 
failure at the system level? 
4. Can alternative methods be used to assess system reliability for Air Force civil 
infrastructure systems? 
Overview 
This document follows a traditional five chapter thesis format.  Chapter I provides 
the context for this research and the research objectives and question.  Chapter II 
provides a literature review of topics relevant to this research.  Chapter III provides the 
methodology of the research, specifically discussing methods for assessing the 
performance and accuracy of both the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) and 
System Condition Index (SCI) models.  Chapter IV discusses the data and data collection 
process and discloses the results of the study.  Finally, Chapter V will present discussion 
of these results, conclusions for Air Force asset management, and recommendations for 
follow on research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This literature review presents topics pertinent to this research effort.  In order to 
lay the foundational understanding of assessing failure and reliability of building systems, 
this review begins with an understanding of systems.  It subsequently introduces the 
technical civil infrastructure elements and further details how these elements comprise 
civil engineering systems.  This discussion specifically highlights architectural, or 
building, systems as an area of focus.  Next, this literature review explains reliability with 
respect to civil infrastructure systems and further explains how performance is linked to 
reliability.  Additionally, this review introduces how United States Air Force Civil 
Engineers assess reliability through the sustainment management system BUILDER®.  
Finally, the chapter closes with an explanation of the model under consideration, the 
Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) Model (Alley, 2015). 
Systems Thinking  
For ease of transition through the chapter, and prior to explaining what 
compromises a system, this review will introduce systems thinking.  Systems thinking is 
a tool for understanding or mentally visualizing systems.  Originally, technology and 
technological development focused primarily on the technical artifact.  In contrast to this, 
systems thinking requires a holistic approach to understanding how all components 
within a system interact and work together (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011; De Weck, 
Roos, & Magee, 2011; Labi, 2014).  The next two paragraphs introduce the concepts of 
“level of abstraction” and “viewing angle” as tools for holistic understanding of systems. 
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Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) discuss the utility of a “top-down” approach to 
systems thinking.  In this approach, systems are decomposed in a hierarchical nature.  De 
Weck et al. (2011) discuss the same approach, but build on it by adding that a person can 
and should change their “level of abstraction” when using a top-down approach.  Level of 
abstraction defines at what level of detail a person is analyzing the system.  For example, 
if viewing a system through a microscope, the zoom on the microscope represents the 
level of abstraction.  Zooming out, the system is possibly seen as a large system with 
multiple sub-systems.  Zooming in, system thinking allows for a more detailed view 
limiting the view to a single system or single component therein. 
De Weck et al. (2011) also introduces the concept of changing “viewing angles” 
in systems thinking.  Using the microscope example, if the zoom is the level of 
abstraction, the viewing angle can be thought of as the lens from which the system is 
“viewed”.  In systems thinking, one lens might represent the energy input and output into 
a system, another might represent the economic input and output, and yet another might 
represent the functional output of a system (De Weck et al., 2011).  The intent of thinking 
about systems through multiple lenses is to incorporate a multidisciplinary understanding 
of the system (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011; De Weck et al., 2011).  By doing this, one 
gains a broad but detailed understanding of the systems. 
Systems thinking provides a way to think about a system from a holistic 
perspective.  But to what end?  The intent is to provide a framework for holistic 
understanding of a system in order to more effectively manage a system.  The next few 
sections will introduce the characteristics of a system in generic terms and then introduce 
civil infrastructure systems.  The intent is for the reader to understand the complex nature 
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of systems, specifically civil systems, and comprehend the need for systems thinking in 
order to effectively manage those systems.  
Attributes of Systems 
Almost everything in our world is a part of a system and the quantity and types of 
systems are numerous.  Examples of a few types of systems are natural, like the earth’s 
tectonic plates, social, such as the communities in which we live, and technical, like a 
countries electrical system.  But what comprises a system?  Due to the complexity of 
answering this question with respect to the numerous types of systems, this review will 
narrow its focus to technical systems.  Therefore, when using the word system, note that 
this review discusses technical systems only.   
Systems are largely the result of technology and technological advancement.  
Traditionally, the focus of technology was on singular a technical device, or technical 
artifact (Joerges, 1988).   Hughes (1987) describes an artifact as a physical or non-
physical functioning invention.  Emphasizing the words function and singular, a technical 
artifact is a single invention designed to perform a desired function (De Weck et al., 
2011).  As the world’s population grew and humans continued to shape the world in 
which they lived, technical artifacts became prevalent and interconnected (De Weck et 
al., 2011).  These interconnections are what gave birth to the concept of systems.   
The general understanding of a system is defined as a collection of components 
interacting to meet a desired goal (De Weck et al., 2011; Hughes, 1987; Labi, 2014).  
This definition implies at least three requirements of a system: components, interactions, 
and a purpose.  Labi (2014) incorporates these three requirements of a system and also 
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includes individual component roles, governing rules and procedures, system structure, 
system boundary, and surrounding environment.   De Weck et al. (2011) further expands 
the requirements for systems by concluding that systems are dynamic and change over 
time.  Hughes (1987) adds that human interaction plays a crucial role in the creation and 
feedback loop of the system.  Additionally, systems require resources in order to achieve 
the specified system objective.  Given the commonalities that appear when defining a 
system, the attributes of a system include: objective, resources, rules and procedures, 
components and their roles, component interactions, system structure, system boundary, 
surrounding environment, dynamic, human interaction.  Understanding general systems 
concepts will aid in the understanding of civil systems in addition to the BUILDER® and 
PoF model discussed later, therefore Table 1 and Table 2 further explain the common 
system attributes listed above. 
 
 
Figure 1: System Attributes 
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Table 1: System Attributes 
Objective 
Systems and their components are the product of human intervention and are 
constructed or procured for a purpose (De Weck et al., 2011).  In an organizational 
context, the system's purpose is often aligned with the objectives of the organization or 
system owner (Labi, 2014).  Sage and Armstrong (2000) classify systems into three 
functional objective categories: service-oriented, product-oriented, and process-
oriented.  De Weck et al. (2011) expands on the process of systems.  System processes 
are divided into five categories of objectives: transform, transport, store, exchange, and 
control. 
Resources 
A system requires resources to perform its intended function (Hughes, 1987).  
Resources can come in the form of energy, material, finances, labor, time, etc.  Thus, 
system output is the product of all of its resource input.  System components can also 
receive input and produce output.  The output of one component may become the input 
of another.  These input/output linkages help define component interactions (Hughes, 
1987). 
Components 
Components are the foundation on which the system is constructed (De Weck et al., 
2011).  Components can be physical or non-physical.  A physical component might be a 
transformer in an electrical distribution system while a non-physical component might 
be a regulatory law under which the transformer or distribution system must operate 
(Hughes, 1987).  Similar to the overall system objective, each component performs a 
specific function within the system and requires resources in order to aid in achieving 
the system objective. 
Component Interactions 
Component interactions transform a collection of individual components into an 
interrelated system with an overarching objective.  To achieve this objective, 
components trade inputs and outputs with one another (Labi, 2014).  This trading of 
inputs and outputs is component interaction.  These interactions can be both positive 
and negative in nature and become more complex as thy system grows (Joerges, 1988).  
Identifying which components interact and the nature of their interaction defines the 
system structure (Hughes, 1987).  
System Structure 
Systems are often decomposed into some sort of structure (hierarchical, distributed, 
network, etc.).  The purpose for decomposing systems into a structure is to better 
understand the individual components and how they interact with other components in 
the system (De Weck et al., 2011; Labi, 2014; Sage & Armstrong, 2000).  De Weck et 
al. (2011) posit that engineering systems require at least 4 levels of decomposition to aid 
in comprehending the component interactions.  They also argue that the need for 
decomposed structuring rests on the human brains capacity for processing information. 
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Table 2: System Attributes Continued 
System Boundary 
The system boundary is meant to delineate elements or components that are internal to 
the system from those that are external to the system (Labi, 2014).  De Weck et al. (2011) 
offer two ways of understanding the system boundary.  First, the space comprised of 
elements in direct control of the system owners.  Second, the space that includes elements 
that may be directly or indirectly affected by the system.  The latter being the more 
comprehensive captures all interactions of a system and accounts for externalities.  
Understanding the system boundary provides a clear line of delineation between all the 
components that comprise a system and the system’s external environment. 
Surrounding Environment 
The surrounding environment is defined as the space outside the system boundary, this 
includes elements that are complimentary to the system (Labi, 2014).  Hughes (1987) 
further explains “complimentary to the system” elements external to the system that have 
a “one-way relationship” with the system.  The system may either influence the 
environment or be influenced by the environment.  However, elements in the 
environment are not treated as system components because there is no interaction with 
system components (Hughes, 1987). 
Dynamic 
Systems are not static as they change with time (De Weck et al., 2011; Labi, 2014; Sage 
& Armstrong, 2000).  Changes in state or condition can be understood as either discrete 
or continuous (De Weck et al., 2011).  In addition to conditional changes over time, 
systems also evolve and grow.  As technology advances systems advance and change.  
Sometimes subsystems or components can change at different rates than other parts of the 
system, increasing the complexity of understanding the system (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2011) 
Rules and Procedures 
Simply stated, these are the governing procedures that determine how the system can be 
operated (Labi, 2014).  Rules and procedures provide the physical and regulatory context 
in which the system may operate. 
Human Interaction 
Human interaction plays a major part in systems.  Systems are constructed or procured by 
humans to perform some function.  The system exists solely as a result of human 
intervention (De Weck et al., 2011).  Humans are also responsible for maintaining, 
evolving, and operating systems.  Additionally, humans perform the important role of 
completing the feedback loop for system performance and are the link between assessing 
system performance against system goals and correcting system errors (Hughes, 1987). 
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Civil Infrastructure Systems 
This review has now presented information with respect to systems in general.  
Because this research focuses solely on civil infrastructure systems, it is important for 
this review to introduce the major civil systems and explain how the generic systems 
information presented above is applicable when discussing civil infrastructure systems. 
Labi (2014) highlights nine major technical areas within civil engineering: 
structural, transportation, hydraulic, environmental, geotechnical, construction, geomatic, 
civil materials, and architectural.  Grigg et al. (2001) highlights two additional technical 
areas: emergency management and systems engineering.  These technical areas represent 
areas of focus and technical expertise with civil engineering.  In a similar fashion to the 
evolution from technical artifacts to systems, some of the technical areas identified by 
Labi (2014) and Grigg et al. (2001) now form the major civil systems seen today.  These 
systems are highly interactive with each other (Little, 2002), as depicted in Figure 2, and 
are often comprised of multiple sub-systems (Labi, 2014).  Given their interactive and 
complex nature, it is necessary to view civil infrastructure as systems.  Little (2002) 
identifies four major civil systems: transportation, energy (electrical power, oil, and 
natural gas), water, and telecommunications systems.  Grigg et al. (2001) and Labi (2014) 
identify additional civil systems: geotechnical, structural, environmental and architectural 
systems. 
 14 
 
Figure 2: Civil Infrastructure Systems (Little, 2002) 
 
Aside from the fact that literature identifies the majority of civil technical areas as 
civil systems, literature also shows that the composition of civil systems is in agreement 
with traditional systems literature.  Just as all systems are comprised of multiple 
components working together to perform a desired objective, civil systems have the same 
composition.  For example, bridges or other structures are composed of multiple 
structural elements.  These elements have a specific arrangement and specific individual 
functions; i.e. support in tension, support in compression, spanning, or cantilevering.  
Each member’s individual function coupled with the relationship with other members 
determine the overall system structure and its ability to perform the desired objective 
(Ambrose, 1967).  Bridges and structures also age with time and require maintenance, 
which is performed and governed by some human entity.  Revisiting the requirements to 
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be called a system, this simple example illustrates the concepts of system components, 
interactions, system and component objectives, structure, dynamic nature, rules and 
procedures, and human interaction (De Weck et al., 2011; Hughes, 1987; Labi, 2014; 
Sage & Armstrong, 2000).  Additionally, applying De Weck’s (2011) concept of level of 
abstraction, one can “zoom” away from this bridge and see it as a component within a 
larger transportation system.  The bridge as a system has its own physical boundary and 
surrounding environment, satisfying the last two requirements for classification as a 
system (De Weck et al., 2011; Hughes, 1987; Labi, 2014).   
Although the above example is simplistic, it displays the transformation from 
thinking about physical structures as civil artifacts to components within civil system, or 
as civil systems themselves.  Once engineers think about civil infrastructure as civil 
systems, they can begin to apply the systems thinking concepts outlined by De Weck et 
al. (2011).  Applying these concepts will aid engineers and infrastructure managers in the 
design and management of civil infrastructure systems. 
Labi (2014) categorizes the majority, if not all, of civil infrastructure into their 
individual systems.  Kandiah and Rao (2008) discuss the evolution of civil water 
infrastructure from artifacts into systems and then into complex interdependent systems.  
Heller (2001) also discusses the interdependencies in many civil systems and identifies 
power generation and distribution systems, transportation systems, and 
telecommunication systems as complex and adaptive systems.  Lastly, and arguably most 
applicable to this research, is the introduction of building or architectural systems (Labi, 
2014; Piper, 2004; Rush, 1986).  These systems are the built infrastructure, or facilities, 
in which society lives and operates.  While architectural systems are systems in their own 
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right, they are more accurately described as a system with multiple sub-systems.  The 
following section provides further understanding of architectural system composition. 
Architectural (Building) Systems 
The primary focus of this research is to understand reliability of certain systems 
within architectural systems.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand what different 
systems make up Architectural systems.  Architectural systems are described as the built 
infrastructure in which society lives and works.  These buildings can be simple structures 
comprised of only two or three systems or can be a very complex with many sub-systems.  
Rush (1986) classifies four distinct systems within the architectural system framework: 
building envelope, structural, mechanical, and interior systems.  Bachman (2003) 
replaces the mechanical system classification with service systems and introduces the 
exterior site as a system.  Benggeli (2003) and Piper (2004) follow similar system 
characterization, however both decompose mechanical systems into the common systems 
in this category: heating ventilation air conditioning (HVAC), fire protection, electrical, 
plumbing, and conveyance systems separately.  The following sections offer a brief 
explanation of the five major systems that comprise architectural systems. 
Structural. 
The structural system in a building consists of any members that are responsible 
for maintaining static equilibrium from static or dynamic loading (Bachman, 2003; Rush, 
1986).  Components of a structural system are load bearing walls, columns, beams, 
foundations, and the like. 
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Envelope. 
The envelope system is responsible for limiting the interaction of the interior 
systems and the building’s external environment.  The envelope primarily consists of 
walls, fenestrations (windows and doors), roofs, and insulation (Bachman, 2003; 
Sadineni, Madala, & Boehm, 2011). 
Interior. 
One can think of interior systems as anything visible from the inside a building.  
These include partitions and their coverings, floor coverings, ceilings, interior 
fenestrations, and fixtures.  The interior system is typically interdependent with the 
envelope system (Binggeli, 2003; Piper, 2004; Rush, 1986). 
Services. 
The services systems provide services to the facility or occupants within the 
facility.  The major systems found in this category are: HVAC, power distribution, water 
distribution, and waste.  These systems are responsible for regulating heat transfer, safely 
distributing electricity and lighting, providing potable water, and removing waste from a 
building, respectively. This category also includes conveyance systems responsible for 
transporting people and products within a building (i.e. elevators and escalators).  Lastly, 
services systems include life safety systems such as fire protection, security and control 
systems (Bachman, 2003; Rush, 1986). 
Site. 
The site consists of any natural or constructed elements that are part of, but 
external to, the building system.  Elements such as vegetation, landscaping, sidewalks, 
parking areas, and drainage compose the site system (Bachman, 2003; Piper, 2004). 
 18 
A building may contain all or only a few of these described systems.  Backman 
(2003), Binggeli (2003), Piper (2004), and Rush (1986) all highlight the hierarchical 
nature of their relationship to the building system as a whole.  In a similar fashion, each 
system is comprised of numerous components arranged in the same hierarchical 
structure; and these components work together to achieve the overall system objective.  
Just as system components work together, each system works toward the building system 
objective, often in an integrated nature.  Rush (1986) highlights five levels of system 
integration: remote, touching, connected, meshed, and unified.  Remote systems share no 
connection, physical or otherwise.  Touching indicates contact between two systems 
without permanent attachment while connected systems are permanently attached.  
Meshed systems occupy the same space but may or may not be connected.  Finally, 
unified systems are integrated to the point that the separate systems are no longer distinct 
from one another (Rush, 1986).  The level of integration will vary from building system, 
however it is arguable that the majority of building systems are at a minimum touching or 
meshed. 
With numerous possible combinations of systems and many possible levels of 
integration within architectural systems, it is easy to see that architectural systems are 
complex.  Engineers and facility managers must use concepts described in systems 
thinking to visualize and understand how these systems work and interact with the intent 
to more effectively manage these systems.  The following sections explain how 
understanding reliability, failure, and performance are used to manage complex 
architectural systems. 
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Reliability 
The content presented when explaining systems and civil engineering systems 
highlights that systems have some inherent purpose or objective.  Systems are 
constructed to achieve something and all systems are susceptible to failing to meet their 
objectives.  Reliability is the the measurement of how likely a system is to meet its 
objectives.  Ang and Tang (1984) discuss the importance of understanding the the 
reliability of a civil system throughout its lifetime.  Understanding a system’s reliability 
allows engineers to better design and manage the system.  Equation 2 presents reliability 
is the mathematical compliment of the probability of failure.  Basic definitions state that 
reliability is the ability of a system to perform a desired function, however, a critical 
component of reliability in civil systems is understanding its relationship with uncertainty 
(Ang & Tang, 1984; Labi, 2014; Singh, Jain, & Tyagi, 2007). 
 ௙ܲሺݐሻ ൌ ܲሺܶ ൑ ݐሻ (1) 
  
 ܴሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺܶ ൑ ݐሻ ൌ ܲሺܶ ൐ ݐሻ (2) 
  
Literature on reliability in civil infrastructure shows that reliability evaluation has 
changed over the years as engineers seek to quantify the level of uncertainty in civil 
systems.  Traditionally, reliability was assessed through deterministic means (Ang & 
Tang, 1984; Singh et al., 2007).  In a deterministic analysis, engineers quantified the 
capacity of the system or components therein.  Engineers would then quantify the “worst 
case” load combination.  Given certain factors of safety, if the system capacity was 
greater then the worst case load the system was deemed reliable (Singh et al., 2007).  The 
primary weakness of this assessment technique is the failure to include uncertainty. 
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In contrast, a probabilistic analysis of reliability attempts to understand the 
uncertainty associated with both loads and system capacity.  Probabilistic methods 
quantify the different load and capacity possibilities and their respective probabilities.  
From there, system reliability becomes the probability that the system capacity is greater 
than the load placed on the system.  Figure 3, depicts this relationship.  The overlap of the 
two probability distributions represents the probability of failure.  The remaining area 
under the strength density function, ܵ̅, represents the overall system reliability (Ang & 
Tang, 1984; Labi, 2014; Singh et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3: Load-Strength Reliability (“Introduction to Reliability Engineering,” 2015) 
 
It is also important to note that assessing reliability of system can vary depending 
on the operational requirements, operating environment and the individual assessing 
reliability (Dummer & Winton, R.C., 1986; Labi, 2014).  More specifically, Labi (2014) 
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discusses how system reliability is dependent upon the criterion being assessed.  For 
example, the reliability of a concrete column with respect to compressive strengths will 
be different than reliability for shear cracking or corrosion.  Therefore reliability 
assessments must be paired with a performance criterion or failure modes.  To indicate 
this, a new equation for reliability is presented with a subscript “c” in equation 3 to 
represent reliability in terms of a specific criterion (Labi, 2014). 
 ܴ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺܶ ൑ ݐሻ ൌ ܲሺܶ ൐ ݐሻ (3) 
  
Reliability as a Performance Measurement 
Stating that an asset has failed typically indicates that the asset is no longer 
performing the desired function at some desired specification.  Performance with respect 
to infrastructure is defined as “the accomplishment of a task set for the system or its parts 
by the society that builds, operates, or uses that infrastructure” (National Research 
Council, 1996, p. 33).  This definition implies that infrastructure is built to meet societal 
or organizational objectives.  These needs and objectives can range in complexity and 
vary greatly (National Research Council, 1996).  Additionally, large organizations 
typically contain numerous stakeholders with varying positions, needs, and individual 
objectives.  
Performance indicators that meet the broad objectives of numerous stakeholders 
are lumped into multiple categories.  The National Research Council (1996) outlines 
three major categories: effectiveness, reliability, and financial performance.   Similarly, 
Levy et al. (2010) identify three categories associated with infrastructure performance: 
financial, physical, and functional.  These different categorizations effectively cover an 
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assets financial performance, capability to perform its intended function, and reliability 
with respect to performing its intended function.  Therefore, large organizations can use 
reliability as a performance measure when trying to evaluate the objectives of numerous 
stakeholders. 
Air Force Infrastructure Performance Measurement 
To improve Infrastructure Asset Management within the Air Force, civil 
engineers have identified ten metrics and key performance indicators (KPIs) for 
assessment.  These indicators focus primarily on financial performance with respect to 
the amount of resources required to maintain a facility or system.  The primary focus of 
these indicators is measuring cost of preventive maintenance (PM), corrective 
maintenance (CM), labor hours and work responsiveness (United States Air Force, 2015).  
However, data against these KPIs are not frequently captured for Air Force facilities 
therefore cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of asset performance.  In an 
attempt to quantify asset performance, the Air Force has implemented the use of 
BUILDER® and currently collects physical condition data on a five year cycle.  With the 
adoption of BUILDER®, engineers have attempted to equate annual condition indices to 
a proportional measure of asset reliability, as discussed in Grussing et al. (2006).   
Literature shows that reliability can be used to assess asset performance (Lavy et 
al., 2010; National Research Council, 1996).  With the implementation of BUILDER®, 
the Air Force has begun to assess the performance of civil infrastructure via asset 
condition and use asset condition as a proxy measure of reliability.  As with any 
performance objective, an organization must determine the desirable range before 
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performance assessment can begin.  With respect to asset condition, the Air Force has 
accepted the minimum threshold for condition at a CI = 37, consistent with the terminal 
value for failure defined in BUILDER® (Grussing, M. N., 2015).  The Air Force is now 
prepared to use calculated CIs to assess asset performance and prioritize resource 
allocations for civil infrastructure. 
It is worth noting that KPIs and CI appear to focus primarily on the financial 
aspects associated with an asset.  The KPIs outlined in the AF CE Operations 
Engineering Playbook (United States Air Force, 2015) focus primarily on an assets 
financial performance while condition indices attempt to connect asset condition to 
reliability.  However, condition is better suited to capture an asset’s degradation and 
quantify the financial requirement required to return an asset to near perfect condition.  
What remains to be shown is if asset condition is truly an accurate proxy measure for 
asset reliability. 
BUILDER® 
BUILDER® is a Sustainment Management System (SMS) developed by the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers.  A primary function of this system is to track 
asset inventory and monitor asset condition.  BUILDER® also provides asset managers 
with the ability to configure standards, policies, prioritizations and funding to generate 
work (United States ARMY Corps of Engineers (USACE), 2015c).  Because these 
secondary functions are outside the scope of this research, these topics will not be 
discussed and this literature review will focus primarily on asset condition assessment 
and Condition Index calculations. 
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BUILDER® Hierarchy. 
BUILDER® permits asset managers to construct a comprehensive asset portfolio 
where they can analyze life-cycle performance at various levels of infrastructure systems.  
BUILDER® uses the UNIFORMAT II (U2) format to compose the hierarchy associated 
with infrastructure assets(U.S. Army ERDC/CERL, 2007a).  The hierarchy begins with 
the creation of sites, or geographical regions.  Each site is populated with one or more 
“buildings”, which represent individual facilities in the portfolio.  BUILDER® allows for 
further decomposition from the building level to the system, component, component-
section, and sub-component levels.  A depiction of this relationship is displayed in Figure 
4.  Users may select from 12 systems when using BUILDER®(U.S. Army ERDC/CERL, 
2007a), as seen in Table 3.  Not all systems are present in every facility and a facility may 
only possess one of each type of system. 
Decomposing systems requires the identification of individual components.  Each 
system possesses a standard list of components that data managers must select from to 
populate the system.  Continuing down the facility hierarchy, BUILDER® manages data 
and calculates foundational condition indices at the component-section level (U.S. Army 
ERDC/CERL, 2007a).  While component-sections can be broken down into sub-
components for condition information purposes, decomposition of assets primarily stops 
at the component-section level. 
 
 25 
 
Figure 4: Building Hierarchy (Uzarski & Grussing, 2006) 
 
Table 3: Building Systems (U.S. Army ERDC/CERL, 2007b) 
BUILDER®  UNIFORMAT II 
Conveying  A10 Foundations D50 Electrical 
Electrical  A20 Basement Construction E10 Equipment 
Exterior Circulation  B10 Superstructure E20 Furnishings 
Exterior Closure  B20 Exterior Enclosure F10 Special Construction
Fire Suppression  B30 Roofing  
HVAC  C10 Interior Construction  
Interior Construction  C20 Staircases  
Plumbing  C30 interior Finishes  
Roofing  D10 Conveying  
Site  D20 Plumbing  
Specialties  D30 HVAC  
Structural  D40 Fire Protection  
 
 26 
Data Input: BUILDER® Surveys. 
The foundation of asset life-cycle analysis is the data collected and input into 
BUILDER®.  Once data managers have established the necessary hierarchy for an asset 
down to the component-section level, associated data is then put into the system.  
Condition data is collected from two types of surveys: direct rating and distress based 
surveys.  Distressed based surveys are an in-depth process that identifies the type, 
quantity, and severity of distress for a particular sub-component (Uzarski & Grussing, 
2006).  BUILDER® uses this distress data to calculate a deduct value and an associated 
subcomponent condition index (CI).  BUILDER® then calculates component-section CIs 
(CSCI) by weighting individual subcomponent CIs (U.S. Army ERDC/CERL, 2007a).   
As a note, both survey types contain some subjectivity because neither is intended 
to be a detailed engineering analysis.  However, direct rating surveys are less qualitative 
and consequently more subjective.  Direct rating surveys assign a rating of Green, 
Amber, or Red to a given component-section.  These ratings represent a sliding scale of 
serviceability loss due to degradation.  Green represents the positive end of the spectrum 
implying minor, if any, serviceability loss while Red represents a serious loss of 
serviceability.  Amber represents the stages between Green and Red, and indicates that 
some serviceability loss is present and further analysis, or a distressed based survey, is 
warranted (Uzarski & Grussing, 2006).  Each rating can also be assigned a (+) or (-) 
value, therefore a direct rating survey results in a component-section receiving one of 
nine possible ratings as seen in Table 4.  Similar to distress based surveys, BUILDER® 
uses the results of the direct rating survey to calculate a component-section deduct value 
and subsequent CSCI. 
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Once condition data is input against a component-section and BUILDER® 
calculates a CSCI, higher-level CIs can then be calculated.  BUILDER® calculates a 
particular level CI using the average of the lower level CI weighted by its cost of 
replacement (U.S. Army ERDC/CERL, 2007a).  Equations 4-6 depict this process 
starting at the component-section level and terminating at the building level where BCCI 
is the building-component CI, SCI is the system component CI, and BCI is the building 
CI. 
 ܤܥܫ ൌ ∑ሺௌ஼ூ ௫ ூ௡ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௨௔௟ ܵݕݏݐ݁݉ ஼ோ௏ሻ∑ௌ௬௦௧௘௠ ஼ோ௏  (4) 
  
  ܵܥܫ ൌ ∑ሺ஻஼஼ூ ௫ ூ௡ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௨௔௟ ஼௢௠௣௢௡௘௡௧ ஼ோ௏ሻ∑஼௢௠௣௢௡௘௡௧ ஼ோ௏  (5) 
  
  ܤܥܥܫ ൌ ∑ሺ஼ௌ஼ூ ௫ ூ௡ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௨௔௟ ௌ௘௖௧௜௢௡ ஼ோ௏ሻ∑ௌ௘௖௧௜௢௡ ஼ோ௏  (6) 
  
 
Data Output: Condition Index. 
BUILDER® uses survey data to calculate a Component-Section Condition Index 
(CSCI) for each component and uses the roll-up process depicted in equations 4-6 to 
calculate higher-level CI values.  Condition Index is a numeric value from 0-100 that is 
equated to being proportionate with reliability (Grussing et al., 2006), and subsequently 
the probability of failure for a given system or component therein.  A CI of 100 
represents a perfectly reliable asset displaying no aspects of failure.  Perfect reliability is 
typically only found at time zero (time of installation) for a given component.  A decrease 
in CI, ultimately terminating at a CI of 0, represents the decrease in ability of an asset to 
perform its intended function (Grussing et al., 2006).  The current CI failure threshold is 
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represented by CI values less than or equal to 37, representing an unacceptable loss of 
asset functional ability (Grussing et al., 2006). 
 
Table 4: Direct Survey Rating Criteria (United States ARMY Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), 2015b; Uzarski & Grussing, 2006) 
Rating Rating Definition 
100 Green (+) Entire component-section is free of observable or known distress 
99-93 Green 
No component-section serviceability or reliability reduction.  Some, 
but not all, non-critical subcomponents may suffer from slight 
degradation or few critical subcomponents may suffer from slight 
degradation 
92-86 Green (-) 
Slight or no component-section serviceability or reliability 
reduction.  Some, but not all, non-critical subcomponents may suffer 
from slight degradation or more than one critical subcomponents 
may suffer from slight degradation 
85-75 Amber (+) 
Component-section serviceability or reliability is degraded, but 
adequate.  A very few, critical subcomponents may suffer from 
moderate deterioration with perhaps a few non-critical 
subcomponents suffering from severe deterioration. 
74-65 Amber 
Component-section serviceability or reliability is definitely 
impaired. Some, but not a majority, critical subcomponents may 
suffer from moderate deterioration with perhaps a few non-critical 
subcomponents suffering from severe deterioration. 
64-56 Amber (-) 
Component-section has significant serviceability or reliability loss. 
Most subcomponents may suffer from moderate degradation or a 
few critical subcomponents may suffer from severe degradation. 
55-37 Red (+) 
Significant serviceability or reliability reduction in component-
section.  A majority of subcomponents are severely degraded and 
others may have varying degrees of degradation. 
36-11 Red 
Sever serviceability or reliability reduction to the component-section 
such that it is barely able to perform.  Most subcomponents are 
severely degraded. 
10-0 Red (-) 
Overall component-section degradation is total.  Few, if any, 
subcomponents salvageable.  Complete loss of component-section 
serviceably. 
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In addition to providing current CI values, BUILDER® possesses the capability 
to forecast condition trends over the life cycle of an asset.  This forecasting capability 
aids asset managers with the ability to estimate an asset’s condition at a future date and 
plan reinvestment strategies.  BUILDER® uses a Weibull cumulative probability 
distribution function, Equation 7, to calculate CI at future time, t 
 ܥܫሺݐሻ ൌ ܽ ൈ ݁ିቀ
೟
ഁቁ
ഀ
 
(7) 
  
where ܽ is the initial steady state component-section index with possible values ranging 
from 0 to 100,  is the service life adjustment factor (scale parameter), and  is the 
deterioration factor (shape parameter). 
BUILDER® defines β as the service life adjustment factor.  The traditional 
Weibull nomenclature defines β as the equations scale parameter.  Increasing this factor 
will increase the scale, or range, of the CI curve.  BUILDER® defines α as the 
deterioration factor.  More specifically, Weibull defines α as the shape or slope 
parameter.  α directly defines the slope at which the curve deteriorates.  Increases in α 
indicate and increases slope or rate of deterioration. 
Equation 7 represents the CI distribution for a given component-section.  At time 
of installation, distribution parameters are estimated using industry standard or the 
manufacturer supplied service life.  However, factors such as the environment and 
maintenance rates can cause an assets actual performance to differ from the projected CI 
curve.  Once a component-section has survey data populated against it, BUILDER® uses 
this data and a regression model to minimize the sum of squares residual errors to best fit 
a new CI curve (Grussing et al., 2006).  The model also uses weights for each data point 
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collected, assigning and increasing weights based on the certainty of the information (i.e. 
estimated versus actual), the type of inspection, how recent the data is, and the change in 
CI from the last inspection.  This data and regression model ultimately best fit a new 
curve and with updated β and α parameters.   
Probabilistic Assessment of Failure 
In a previous study of the  BUILDER® model, Alley (2015) proposes an alternate 
model for computing the probability of failure at the system level.  In contrast to the use 
of replacement costs, Alley uses fault trees with fuzzy logic combined with importance 
weighting to calculate the probability of failure at the component-section level.  She then 
uses the same method to calculate the probability of failure at higher levels.  Basic fault 
trees use AND and OR operators to calculate statistical probabilities.  These basic 
probability equations can be found in Equations 8 and 9 (Alley, 2015).  
  ௙ܲሺܣ	AND	ܤሻ ൌ ௙ܲሺܣ ∩ ܤሻ ൌ ௙ܲሺܣሻ ൈ ௙ܲሺܤሻ (8) 
  
 ௙ܲሺA	OR	Bሻ ൌ ௙ܲሺܣ ∪ ܤሻ ൌ ௙ܲሺܣሻ ൅ ሺܤሻ െ ௙ܲሺܣሻ ൈ ௙ܲሺܤሻ (9) 
  
Fault trees with fuzzy logic use Order Weighted Averages (OWA) to adjust the 
degree to which an operator represents an OR or an AND gate.  That is to say, OWA 
replaces traditional OR and AND gates with a new operator that lies somewhere between 
a true OR or AND gate.  OWA uses a weight vector, W, and a probability vector, B.  
These two vectors are multiplied together to calculate a scalar, ORAND operator (Alley, 
2015).  This methodology uses the ORAND operator to calculate the probability of 
failure at time, t, for a given component and system.   
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Equation 10 calculates the probability vector, B, for a given component-section.  
This equation represents a Weibull cumulative probability distribution, where A is an 
asset’s initial condition index at time of installation.  CIf is the condition index threshold 
for failure, set at CIf  = 37.  t, is time in years represented as a percentage of the assets 
expected service life.   is the Weibull scale parameter, and  is the Weibull shape 
parameter.  In the construction of this model, Alley assumes a  = 1 and an  of 2.64 
(Alley, 2015).   
 ௙ܲ ൌ 1 െ ቎ܣ ൈ ൤ ଵ஼ூ೑൨
ିቀ೟ഁቁ
ഀ
቏ (10) 
  
The weight vector, W, for each component and component-section is determined 
using their respective importance indicators.  As previously stated, these vectors are then 
multiplied together to compute a scalar, component level, ORAND operator.  This 
process is repeated once more to compute the probability of failure at the system level.  
While this communicates a cursory explanation of how the probabilistic model uses 
OWA, Chapter III will provide a detailed explanation of these calculations. 
After constructing the PoF model, Alley validates the model through work order 
(WO) data contained in the Interim Work Information Management System (IWIMS) 
database.  Alley collects failure data founded on the assumption that a WO coded with 
work order indicator (WOIND) J and type of service (TYPESVS) of emergency (E) or 
urgent (U) combined with a title indicating system level failure point toward a system 
failure as these actions are not planned or preventive in nature, but reactive and corrective 
to a failed system (Alley, 2015).  Examples of WOs meeting these criteria in the 
Electrical and HVAC systems are shown in Table 5. 
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Once the failed systems are identified, Alley extracts facility data from 
BUILDER® to determine the average component-section age.  The average age extracted 
from BUIDER® is then input into Equation 10 to calculate the probability of failure 
associated with that particular component-section.  Each component-section probability 
of failure represents a single value in the B vector.  Alley then uses OWA and sub-
component importance, the W vector, to “roll” the probability of failure up to the 
component level.  The OWA method is repeated until the model computes a system level 
probability of failure.  This probability is then compared to the System Condition Index 
(SCI) calculated by BUILDER® (Alley, 2015). 
 
Table 5: Work Order Failure Examples (Alley, 2015) 
Electrical System 
FAC# WOTITLE DATE TYPESVS WOIND 
525 POWER LOSS 141114 U J 
763 NO POWER 140923 E J 
1544 EMERGENCY LIGHTS/ NO POWER 140127 U J 
1639 NO POWER 141014 U J 
5500 NO POWER 141006 U J 
6510 POWER OUTAGE 140423 E J 
7011 LOSS OF POWER 131230 E J 
8500 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER 140703 U J 
HVAC System 
FAC# WOTITLE DATE TYPESVS WOIND 
7011 A/C NOT WORKING 140312 U J 
7015 A/C UNIT STOPPED WORKING 140825 E J 
7025 HVAC IS DOWN 140818 E J 
8195 HVAC UNIT DOWN 141110 E J 
8500 REPAIR A/C UNITS INOP 140916 U J 
10130 HVAC NOT WORKING 130925 U J 
10660 HVAC NOT WORKING 140206 U J 
12000 REPAIR INOP. HVAC 140728 U J 
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Once values using the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure model are calculated 
and SCI values extracted from BUILDER®, Alley uses contingency analysis to both 
compare the models to one another and determine which model possesses more 
predictive capability.  To do this, Alley creates two population samples.  The first 
population sample, categorized as the failed sample, is created using the previously 
mentioned assumption of failure associated with IWIMS work orders.  Facilities with 
WOs meeting the requirements for system failure are placed in the failed sample, size n.  
A second, non-failed population consists of any remaining facilities not meeting the 
prerequisites for failure.  From this non-failed population, Alley selects a random sample 
of size n (Alley, 2015). 
With a failed and non-failed sample, Alley determined that both models predicted 
similar results in 10 out of 46 component-sections analyzed.  Each model is also analyzed 
to determine its predictive capability of system level failure. Figure 5 and Figure 6 
display the results of the contingency analysis for each model.  Still using contingency 
analysis, Alley found that the BUILDER® model possessed little to no predictive ability 
while her model was able to accurately predict probability of failure with a statistical 
significance of 0.12 (Alley, 2015). 
 
Truth 
Observed Fail No Fail Row Total 
Fail 6 17 23 
No Fail 2 21 23 
Column Total 8 38 46 
Test  ChiSquare  Prob>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 2.515  0.1128 
Pearson  2.421  0.1197 
Figure 5: PoF vs Truth Contingency Analysis (Alley, 2015) 
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Truth 
Observed Fail No Fail Row Total 
Fail 2 21 23 
No Fail 2 21 23 
Column Total 4 42 46 
Test  ChiSquare  Prob>ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio 0.000  1.000 
Pearson  0.000  1.000 
Figure 6: SCI vs Truth Contingency Analysis (Alley, 2015) 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented a literature review of topics relevant to this research.  The 
chapter provided an overview of systems literature, civil infrastructure systems and 
architectural systems. Additionally, system reliability was presented and how it relates to 
failure and performance.  Finally, this chapter presented both the BUILDER® SCI model 
and the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure model.  The following chapter will further 
detail the methodology of the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure model and explain 
additional methodology associated with this research.  
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the methodology associated with this research.  The chapter 
begins by explaining the calculations behind the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure 
(PoF) model developed by Alley (2015).  Next, this chapter presents the method for 
assessing the both the PoF and BUILDER® model performance through the use of the 
Fisher’s Exact Test and Odds Ratios.  The chapter concludes by presenting the method 
for assessing the accuracy of both models through a comparison of reliability calculated 
via a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) Availability Growth Model (AGM). 
Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) Model 
Fault Trees with Fuzzy Logic 
Traditional fault trees calculate the probability of events via traditional AND and 
OR gates.  The AND gate requires that all basic events in a Fault Tree occur before a 
higher-level event occurs.  In contrast, the OR gate requires only one basic event occur in 
order to trigger a higher-level event.  Ross (1996) discusses the restrictive nature of 
boolean style gates and proposes that basic events truly lie somewhere between a true 
AND gate and a true OR gate.  Ross proposes the use of Ordered Weighted Averaging to 
construct logic gates that are not entirely AND or OR in nature (Ross, 1996). 
Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) 
Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) has it roots in multi-criteria decision 
analysis.  Modelers used the process to determine to what degree a proposed alternative, 
X, satisfied a desired criteria (Yager, 1988).  In the context of this research, OWA in 
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conjunction with fault trees will determine to what extent, or the likelihood, a system will 
fail. This research will validate the results using a determined  “failed” state as defined by 
Alley (2015). 
In conjunction with Fault Trees, this research uses OWA to calculate an aggregate 
operator that lies somewhere between a true AND gate and true OR gate.  When referring 
to the aggregate operator, this research uses the term ORAND operator.  The ORAND 
operator requires the construction of two vectors.  The first of which is a weighting 
vector, W, where wi  (0,1) and Wi = 1.  The second vector, B, is the ordered argument 
vector representing failure probabilities for each component or component-section, 
depending on what level in the system hierarchy the vector represents.  Where bi  [0,1] 
and all bi are ordered in descending order. 
 ௜ܹ ൌ ሾݓଵ ݓଶ ݓଷሿ (11) 
  
 ܤ௜ ൌ ൥
ܾଵ
ܾଶ
ܾଷ
൩ (12) 
  
Yager (1988) emphasizes that the B vector must be ordered when applying OWA.  
OWA differs from simple weighted averaging in that weights are not associated with 
particular attributes but with respect to an ordered position (Yager, 1988).  In other 
words, Wi is associated with the ith largest argument in the B vector. 
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Weighted Average 
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Ordered Weighted Average 
Where B is ordered in descending order 
 
FሺBሻ ൌ WB ൌ ሾwଵ,… ,w୬ሿ ൥
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b୬
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Figure 7: Weighted Average vs. OWA 
 
After populating the W and B vectors, this method computes the ORAND 
operator by multiplying the two vectors together.  Letting F(B) be a resulting ORAND 
operator, the following example illustrates the ORAND calculation.  Given the W vector, 
this example will calculate F(0.6, 1.0, 0.7). 
 
W ൌ ൥
0.3
0.4
0.3
൩ B ൌ ൥
1.0
0.7
0.6
൩ FሺBሻ ൌ WᇱB ൌ ሾ0.3,0.4,0.3ሿ ൥
1.0
0.7
0.6
൩ 
FሺBሻ ൌ ሺ0.3ሻሺ1.0ሻ ൅ ሺ0.4ሻሺ0.7ሻ ൅ ሺ0.3ሻሺ0.6ሻ ൌ 0.76 
Figure 8: Example of ORAND operator calculation 
 
This operator combines 30% of a pure or gate (the maximum basic event of 1.0), 
30% of a pure and gate (the minimum basic event of 0.6) and 40% from the intermediate 
valued basic event (0.7).  This calculated ORAND operator of 0.76 hows the nature of the 
logic gate lies between the maximum basic event (1.0) and minimal basic event (0.6).   
The Weight Vector, W  
This research will construct the W vector using two sets of weights contained in 
BUILDER®.  At the component-section level of the building hierarchy, Figure 4, this 
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research uses an average subcomponent importance weight to populate component-
section W vector.  At the component level, each component’s Component Criticality 
Index (CCI) populates the W vector.  The Construction and Engineering Research 
Laboratory (CERL) developed the subcomponent importance weights and CCI.  The 
importance weights represent each component-section’s cost and importance in relation 
to its associated component while the CCI quantifies the same relationship between the 
component and the system (United States ARMY Corps of Engineers (USACE), 2015b).  
Because all values of W must be between 0 and 1, all weights and CCIs will be 
standardized when populating the W vector. 
Because Ordered Weighted Averaging orders the argument vector, the order in 
which the weights are placed in the weight vector can effect the scalar ORAND operator 
produced by the cross product of the two vectors.  However, neither Yager (1988) nor 
Ross (1996) prescribe a method for the populating the W vector prior to ordering the B 
vector.  In order to provide a consistent method for populating the W vector, this research 
populates both the W vector and B vector in ascending order based on the numerical 
component-section indicator given in BUILDER™.  After which the B vector is ordered 
consistent with the method described by Yager (1988) while the W maintains its initial 
ordering.  This method for populating the W vector is consistent with the method used to 
develop the PoF model (Alley, 2015). 
The Argument Vector, B 
This research uses equation to calculate the probability vector, B, for a given 
component-section.  This equation represents a Weibull cumulative probability 
distribution: 
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 ௙ܲ ൌ 1 െ ቎ܣ ൈ ൤ ଵ஼ூ೑൨
ିቀ೟ഁቁ
ഀ
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where A is an asset’s initial condition index at time of installation, assumed to be 100.  
CIf is the condition index threshold for failure, set at CIf  = 37.   is the Weibull scale 
parameter, and  is the Weibull shape parameter.  The PoF model assumes a  = 1 and an 
 of 2.64 (Alley, 2015).  The time in years, t, is represented as a percentage of the asset’s 
expected service life.  This research calculates t by taking the component-sections 
average age and dividing by the expected service life. 
Equation 13 calculates the probability of failure for each component-section in a 
system, representing the individual values, bi, in the argument vector.  These values range 
from 0.00 to 1.00, satisfying the requirement that bi  [0,1].  In accordance with the 
OWA, this method orders all bi values to form the completed B vector.  Figure 9 displays 
a pictorial and mathematical representation for calculating the probability of failure, P(t), 
and reliability, R(t), for a simple system using the PoF model. 
Model Validation: Performance Assessment 
Two-Way Contingency Analysis 
This research employs the use of two-way contingency analysis to assess each 
model’s performance.  Contingency analysis provides the ability to test for independence 
between two categorical variables (McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2014).  In this research, 
the categorical variables are the truth state and the model’s predicted state.  Both the truth 
state and model predicted state consist of a failed and non-failed sample, thus providing 
the necessary groupings for a two-way analysis.  To populate the failed sample, this 
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research considers a system failed if for a given year of analysis if it has a work order 
(WO) indicating a system level failure, as described in Chapter II.  To populate the non-
failed sample, this research randomly selected a representative sample from the 
remaining system population.  For continuity in methodology, the non-failed sample size 
will match the failed population size. These two failed and non-failed samples represent 
the truth state. 
After placing systems in their respective populations within the truth state, this 
research cross-references their corresponding facility number with BUILDER® to 
determine the age and service life of each component-section in the system.  Given the 
age and service life, the OWA method calculates a probability of failure for that system.  
Using the prescribed failure threshold of SCI = 37, this research is now able to assign 
systems to the failed or non-failed population within the model predicted state.  
Remembering that SCI of 37 is a threshold for reliability, the probability of failure, P(f), 
calculated by the OWA method is subtracted from 1 to calculate the reliability of the 
system, R(t).  Table 6 summarizes the criteria for each categorical state population.  The 
annotations provided in Table 6 correspond to the population size depicted in the two-
way table in Figure 10.  The sample size for the entire test, n = ntf + ntn = nmf + nmn.  
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System          P(t)          
                       
                                
Component   w = 0.4         w = 0.6     
                          
                          
Comp. w = 0.2  w = 0.3  w = 0.5   w = 0.1  w = 0.6  w = 0.4  
Section                     
   b1 = 0.1 b2 = 0.2 b3 = 0.6  b1 = 0.4 b2 = 0.5 b3 = 0.3 
    *bi values are theoretical output of equation 13               
   Example Calculations:                           
    Component-Section Level 
   W1 = (0.2, 0.3, 0.5)       W2 = (0.1, 0.6, 0.4)     
   B1 = (0.6, 0.2, 0.1)       B2 = (0.5, 0.4, 0.3)     
   F(B1) = W1 x B1       F(B2) = W2 x B2     
   = (0.2*0.6+0.3*0.2+0.5*0.1)    = (0.1*0.5+0.6*0.4+0.4*0.3) 
   F(B1) = 0.68        F(B2) = 0.41      
    Component Level 
   W3 = (0.4, 0.6)                 
   B3 = (0.68, 0.41)                
   P(t) = W3 x B3 = (0.4*0.68 + 0.6*0.41)           
                       
   P(t) = 0.518  R(t) = 1-P(t) =1-0.518 = 0.482        
Figure 9: PoF Model Example Calculation 
 
Table 6: Contingency Analysis Population Criteria 
State: Population Criteria Annotation 
Truth: Failed A system having a work order indicating system 
level failure.  Direct schedule work with type of 
service indicator emergency (E) or urgent (U). 
ntf 
Truth: Non-failed Any system not having a work order indicating a 
system level failure. 
ntn 
Model: Failed Any system with a reliability, R(t) ≤ 0.37 nmf 
Model: Non-failed Any system with a reliability, R(t) > 0.37 nmn 
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  Model Predicted State  
  Failed Not Failed  
Truth 
State 
Failed True Pos False Neg ntf 
Not Failed False Pos True Neg ntn 
  nmf nmn n 
Figure 10: Example Two-Way Table 
 
Figure 10 introduces four terms when defining the agreement or disagreement 
between the truth state and model predicted state: true positive, true negative, false 
positive, and false negative.  To ensure understanding of these terms, this research 
defines each as follows.  True positive is when both the truth state and model state agree 
on the failed nature of a system.  True negative is when the truth state and model state 
agree on the non-failed state of a system.  A false positive exists when the model predicts 
failure, but in fact the truth state declares a non-failed system.  A false negative exists 
when the model predicts a non-failed system, but in fact the truth state declares a failure. 
Hypothesis Testing 
As stated above, two-way tables test for independence between two categorical 
variables (McClave et al., 2014).  This research identifies the two categorical variables as 
the truth state and the model predicted state, displayed in Figure 10.  This research uses 
two-way tables and their associated hypothesis testing method to address model 
performance.  The null hypothesis, H0, is that these two variables are independent.  The 
corresponding alternate hypothesis, Ha, is that the two variables are dependent.  Figure 11 
below displays the general form for hypothesis testing with two-way table analysis. This 
research will utilize the Fisher’s Exact Test as the resulting test statistic with a 
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corresponding significance level,  = 0.10.  Therefore, this research will consider any 
Fisher’s Exact Test p-value < 0.10 statistically significant. 
 
Ho = The two classifications are independent 
Ha = The two classifications are dependent 
Test statistic = Fisher’s Exact Test, p-value 
Rejection Region =  > p-value 
Figure 11: Two-Way Table Analysis: Fisher’s Exact Test for Independence (adapted 
from McClave et al., 2014) 
 
Fisher’s Exact Test 
Fisher’s Exact Test is a probability test that calculates the exact probability of 
receiving a specific outcome of a two-way table.  This test appropriately replaces a chi-
squared or other approximation test statistics when expected individual cell counts in a 
two-way table are low: less than five (McClave et al., 2014) or less then ten (Shasha & 
Wilson, 2011).  This research will utilize the more conservative threshold provided and 
use the Fisher’s Exact Test when cell counts are lower then five.  Using a table similar to 
Figure 10, Figure 12 shows an example of a two-way table with low expected values, 
indicated by bold text.  These expected values are less then five, thus suitable for Fisher’s 
Exact Test. 
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  Model Predicted State  
  Failed Not Failed  
Truth 
State 
Failed TP FP ntf 
Not Failed FN TN ntn 
  nmf nmn n 
    
    
  Model Predicted State  
  Failed Not Failed  
Truth 
State 
Failed 3 1 4 
2 2 
Not Failed 2 4 6 
 3 3 
  5 5 10 
Figure 12: Example Two-Way Table 
 
Fisher’s Exact Test provides an exact probability, or p-value, associated with a 
specific table.  Referencing the upper portion of Figure 12, equation 14 provides the p-
value calculation for a specific two-way table. 
 
ሺ்௉ାி௉ሻ!ሺிேା்ேሻ!ሺ்௉ାிேሻ!ሺி௉ା்ேሻ!
்௉!ிே!ி௉!்ே!௡!  (14) 
  
For the specific table displayed in Figure 12, equation 14 calculates the p-value as 
follows: 
 
ሺଷାଵሻ!ሺଶାସሻ!ሺଷାଶሻ!ሺଶାଷሻ!
ଶ!ଶ!ଷ!ଷ!ଵ଴! ൌ
10 42⁄ ൌ 0.2381 (15) 
  
 
This example calculates a p-value of 0.2381 for the specific table displayed in 
Figure 12.  To calculate the Fisher’s Exact Test p-value, this method first finds the 
resulting p-values for all combinations of a two-way table that have the same column and 
row totals as the observed table in Figure 12.  This method then sums the p-value of all 
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two-way tables labeled “more extreme” then the observed table.  The Fisher’s Exact 
method labels a table “more extreme” if the table has a p-value less than or equal to the 
observed table (Shasha & Wilson, 2011).  Figure 13 provides an example of calculating a 
p-value with the Fisher’s Exact methodology using Figure 12 as the observed table. 
 
Matrix Probability Calculation Probability 
0 4 4 
(0+4)!(5+1)!(0+5)!(4+1)! / 
0!4!5!1!10! 0.02381 
5 1 6 =1/42 
1 correct, 9 incorrect 
1 3 4 
(1+3)!(4+2)!(1+4)!(3+2)! / 
1!3!4!2!10! 0.2381 
4 2 6 =10/42 
3 correct, 7 incorrect 
2 2 4 
(2+2)!(3+3)!(2+3)!(2+3)! / 
2!2!3!3!10! 0.4762 
3 3 6 =20/42 
5 correct, 5 incorrect 
3 1 4 
(3+1)!(2+4)!(3+2)!(1+4)! / 
3!1!2!4!10! 0.2381 
2 4 6 =10/42 
7 correct, 3 incorrect (observed table from Figure 12) 
4 0 4 
(4+0)!(1+5)!(4+1)!(0+5)! / 
4!0!1!5!10! 0.0238 
1 5 6 =10/42 
9 correct, 1 incorrect 
       
Fisher's Exact 
p-value = 0.2381+0.2381+0.0238+0.0238 0.5238 
Figure 13: Example of Fisher's Exact p-value Calculation 
 
For the example displayed in Figure 13, the resulting Fisher’s Exact Test p-value 
for the table in Figure 12 is p = 0.5238.  Because contingency analysis tests for 
independence between two categorical variables, this p-value indicates the dependence 
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between the truth state and the model predicted state has ~52.4% probability being the 
result of random chance.  This high p-value would require this research to not reject the 
null-hypothesis and maintain that truth state and model predictive state are independent 
of one another. 
Odds Ratios 
The p-value calculated by Fisher’s Exact Test enables this research to determine 
the presence of a relationship between the truth state and model predictive state.  
However, this value fails to communicate the magnitude and nature (i.e. positive or 
negative) of that relationship.  The odds ratio allows for the determination of the 
magnitude and nature of the relationship.  This method calculates the odds ratio (OR) 
using equation 16 (Glas, Lijmer, Prins, Bonsel, & Bossuyt, 2003). 
 ܱܴ ൌ ܶܲܨܰ
ܨܲ
ܶܰൗ  (16) 
  
An OR value can range from 0 to infinity.  Values greater than 1.0 indicate a 
positive relationship between the truth and model state.  Higher OR values indicate a 
stronger positive relationship and signify stronger model predictive capability.  Values of 
1.0 indicate no relationship between the truth state and the model predictive state.  OR 
values equal to 1.0 are typically accompanied by p-values of 1.0, both values equaling 1.0 
indicate complete independence (i.e. no relationship) between the two states.  OR values 
less than 1.0 indicate a negative relationship between the truth and model state (Glas et 
al., 2003).  Therefore, when assessing the overall performance of the model, this research 
looks to obtain statistically significant p-values accompanied by OR values greater than 
1.0. 
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Model Validation: Accuracy Assessment 
In addition to assessing each models performance through the use of contingency 
analysis, this research also assesses each model’s ability to accurately calculate system 
reliability.  This method calculates system level reliability using a counting process 
known as the Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process and Availability Growth modeling. 
Counting Processes 
Counting processes are useful when considering repairable systems, sub-systems, 
or components.  Given a system put into operation at time t = 0, its kth failure occurs at 
time Sk.  Given a failure, the system is restored to a functioning state allowing it to 
operate until the next failure.  Therefore, over its lifetime, a system will have a sequence 
of failure time S1, S2, S3,…Sk .  Additionally, Tk represents the time between failure k-1 
and failure k. Tk is known as the failure interarrival time, or time between failures 
(Høland & Rausand, 1994). 
The random variable of interest in a counting process, N(t), is the number of 
failures in the time interval (0,t].  This process is considered a counting process if N(t) 
satisfies the following (Høland & Rausand, 1994): 
1. N(t) ≥ 0 
2. N(t) is an integer 
3. If s < t then N(s) ≤ N(t) 
4. For s < t, [N(t)-N(s)] equals the number of failures in the interval (s, t] 
 
Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process 
When considering a counting process, the interarrival times are important as they 
determine which kind of counting process is appropriate for calculating system reliability 
(Høland & Rausand, 1994).  Due to the nature of system failure interarrival times, this 
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research will use a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP).  NHPP assumes 
interarrival times are neither independent nor identically distributed.  For clarification, an 
assumption of independence requires that the number of failure events in interval (t-1, t] 
is not influenced by failures in a previous interval.  Further, an assumption of identical 
distribution requires that the number of failure events in interval (t-1, t] depends only on 
the length of the interval and not the interval’s distance from t0 (Høland & Rausand, 
1994).  This research assumes that the systems considered have failure times that are 
neither independent nor identically distributed.  Failure events in interval (t-1, t] are 
influenced by previous failures and the number of failures in interval (t-1, t] do depend on 
the length of the interval’s distance from t0.  Negating the assumptions of independence 
and identical distribution is consistent with the assumption that the systems analyzed in 
this research are minimally repaired.  In other words, maintenance strategies restore 
failed systems to an operational state as quickly as possible by replacing only the failed 
component(s) and not the entire system.  Høland and Rausand (1994) label this strategy 
“as bad as old”, compared to a renewal process where a system is restored to “as good as 
new” after each failure. 
  
Renewal Process  
Independent Increments  “as good as new” repair 
strategy Identically Distributed  
Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process  
Non Independent Increments  “as bad as old” repair 
strategy Non Identically Distributed  
   
Figure 14: Counting Process Assumptions 
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Because the NHPP has interarrival times that vary with time, the typical Poisson 
arrival rate, , is replaced by a cumulative intensity function M(t), a function of the Rate 
of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF) function, m(t) (Høland & Rausand, 1994).  Equation 
17 shows the relationship between M(t) and the ROCOF function, m(t).  Common forms 
of the ROCOF function in a NHPP process are the exponential failure rate model, the 
linear failure rate model, and the power law failure rate model (Atwood, 1992). 
 ܯሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ݉ሺݐሻ݀ݐ௧଴  (17) 
  
Because this research focuses on repairable systems, typical calculations for 
reliability are not suitable, as they typically do not consider events beyond an initial 
failure.  Høland and Rausand (1994) introduce Availability as a more appropriate 
measure for assessing the probability that a repairable system will be in a functioning 
state at time t.   Given that the system has the following state variable: 
 Xሺtሻ ൌ 	 ൤ 1	if	component is functioning at time t0	if	component is under repair at time t  
   
Equation 18 calculates the availability, or probability that the system is functioning, at 
time t 
 ܣሺݐሻ ൌ ܲሺܺሺݐሻ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ெ்஻ிெ்஻ிାெ்்ோ (18) 
  
 
where MTBF is the mean time between failure and MTTR is the mean time to repair. 
This research will model MTBF and MTTR using the Rate of Occurrence of 
Failure function, m(t).  As previously mentioned, there are three common forms of the 
ROCOF function with respect to NHPPs.  This research will assess the fit of the power-
law model in conjunction with Availability Growth Modeling. 
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Availability Growth Modeling 
Availability Growth Modeling (AGM) assesses system performance based on the 
probability that a system will be in a functional state at a given time.  When used with 
repairable systems, it is appropriate to assess the MTTF and MTTR using a ROCOF 
function (Bluvban & Porotsky, 2011).  This research will assess the fit of the power-law  
ROCOF function.  The power-law function intensity function, m(t), has the form 
 ݉ሺݐሻ ൌ ߣߚݐఉିଵ (19) 
  
with model parameters  and  (Department of Defense, 1981).  This research will assess 
the fit of the  power-law intensity function via a visual test known as Duane plotting and 
a parametric goodness of fit test as outlined in Military Handbook 189 (Department of 
Defense, 1981). 
Reliability analysts use Duane Plotting to assess fit and determine parameter 
estimates for a power-law intensity function.  This research will use Duane plotting 
primarily to assess fit.  Duane plots plot cumulative MTBF versus actual failure times on 
a log-log scale.  For example, if the kth failure occurs at time tk, Duane plots plot tk/k 
versus tk for all observed failures.  If the data follow a power-law intensity function, the 
plot should display a linear trend (NIST/SEMATECH, 2012).  Figure 15 displays an 
example of a simple Duane Plot.  The positive slope indicates an increase in the MTBF, 
signifying an improving system. 
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Figure 15: Example Duane Plot (Adapted from NIST/SEMATECH, 2012)  
 
This research will utilize the procedures to estimate parameters and goodness of 
fit for a power-law intensity function for time terminated testing, as outlined in Military 
Handbook 189.  Time terminated testing procedures assume that the data analyzed is 
from systems which are terminated at a predetermined time or are currently in operation 
and data is available through some time (Department of Defense, 1981).  The latter of 
which describes the systems analyzed in this research.  To determine the parameters of 
equation 19, this research uses maximum likelihood estimates ߚመ  and ߣመ 
 ߚመ ൌ ேே௟௡்ି∑ ௟௡௑೔೔ಿసభ  (20) 
  
 ߣመ ൌ ܰ ܶఉ෡⁄  (21) 
  
where N is the total number of failures, T is the total time on test for the system of 
interest, and Xi is the failure time of the ith failure (Department of Defense, 1981). 
For systems with small sample sizes, this research utilizes an unbiased estimator 
̅ߚ to replace	ߚመ . 
 ̅ߚ ൌ ேିଵே ߚመ  (22) 
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Given the maximum likelihood estimates, this research will determine the goodness of fit 
through the use of the Cramer-von Mises statistic.  The null hypothesis associated with 
this test statistic is that a NHPP with intensity function 
 ݉ሺݐሻ ൌ ߣߚݐఉିଵ (23) 
  
accurately describes the reliability growth of a given system.  The goodness of fit statistic 
is  
 
						ܥெଶ ൌ 112ܯ ൅෍൥൬
௜ܺ
ܶ ൰
ఉഥ
െ 2݅ െ 12ܯ ൩
ெ
௜ୀଵ
ଶ
 (24) 
   
where M is equal to N for time terminated testing.  The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
statistic exceeds the for the critical value at a significance of 0.10 (Department of 
Defense, 1981).  If the research determines that a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process 
appropriately represents the data, the MTBF at time, t, is simply the inverse of m(t). 
 ܯܶܤܨሺݐሻ ൌ ݉ሺݐሻିଵ ൌ ൣߣߚݐఉିଵ൧ିଵ (25) 
  
 
Calculating Availability 
This research assumes both failure data and repair data follow a NHPP and will 
use the Duane plotting method and goodness of fit testing to determine distribution 
parameters.  With goodness of fit requirements satisfied and parameters fit to the data, 
this research calculates the availability of system with equation 26.  Time, t, is the 
system’s age in 2015, the year from which the data was pulled. 
 ܣሺݐሻ ൌ ெ்஻ிெ்஻ிାெ்்ோ (26) 
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Accuracy Assessment: Paired Difference 
After populating the failed sample and non-failed sample, as described earlier and 
in Alley (2015), and calculating both the system reliability (PoF model) and system 
availability (Availability Growth Model), this research focuses on assessing the accuracy 
of the PoF as compared to the Availability Growth Model through paired differences.  
 Paired difference experiments allow for the comparison of two populations to 
determine if their means differ.  This method compares population means by comparing 
the differences between experimental units (McClave et al., 2014).  In the case of this 
research the experimental units are the PoF model and Availability Growth Model output 
for a given system. 
Paired difference experiments use hypothesis-testing procedures similar to those 
explained previously.  This research will use a large sample, two-tailed test to determine 
if the two models are comparable.  Figure 16 displays hypothesis-testing criteria for this 
test.  This research will use a significance level, , of 0.10 and a D0 = 0.  Using D0 = 0 
signifies a null hypothesis, H0, stating that the two population means are equal.  If the 
results fail to reject the null hypothesis, the model is in agreement with the AGM and 
thus an accurate estimate of system reliability. 
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Two-tailed test 
Ho: 0 = D0 
Ha: 0 ≠ D0 
Test statistic:	ݖ ൌ ௗതି஽బఙ೏ ඥ௡೏⁄ ൎ
ௗതି஽బ
௦೏ ඥ௡೏⁄   
Rejection Region: |ݖ| ൐ ݖఈ ଶ⁄    = 0.10 
Confidence Interval 
݀̅ േ ݖఈ ଶ⁄ ߪௗඥ݊ௗ
ൎ ݀̅ േ ݖఈ ଶ⁄ ݏௗඥ݊ௗ
 
Figure 16: Paired Difference Test of Hypothesis for d = (1-2) (Adapted from McClave 
et al., 2014) 
 
Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology associated with this research. First by 
explaining the calculations behind the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) model 
developed by Alley (2015).  Second, by presenting the method for assessing the 
performance of both the PoF and BUILDER® models through the use of the Fisher’s 
Exact Test and Odds Ratios.  Lastly, by presenting a method for assessing both models 
accuracy through comparison of a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) 
Availability Growth Model.  Through these accuracy and performance assessments, this 
research will determine the validity of both the PoF and BUILDER® model to calculate 
reliability at the system level. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of this research effort.  First, the chapter presents 
the results associated with the performance of both the Probabilistic Assessment of 
Failure (PoF) and the BUILDER® SCI models through contingency analysis and the use 
of odds ratios.  This segment of analysis utilized a Shiny application and system attribute 
data to determine what type of systems, and at what reliability threshold each model 
displays significant agreement with the truth state.  By doing so, this research focused on 
improving the predictive capability both models.  Next, this research attempts to compare 
the output of both models with that of an accepted method in reliability analysis.  
Utilizing a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) method, this research attempts to 
develop a system Availability Growth Model (AGM) for 40 HVAC systems in order to 
compare the output with that of the PoF and SCI models.  Each major sections of this 
chapter presents information regarding the data used in the research, the results of the 
analysis, and relevant discussion with respect to the results. 
Model Performance Assessment 
This section presents the data, results, and discussion associated with the 
performance of both the PoF model and the SCI model.  This research assessed the 
performance of each model in four major building systems (heating ventilation and 
cooling (HVAC), electrical, fire protection, and plumbing) through the use of 
contingency analysis.  The research ultimately narrows its scope to focus primarily on the 
performance of both models with respect to HVAC systems. 
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Failure Data 
This research collected work order (WO) data from calendar year 2014 for six Air 
Force Installations: Barksdale AFB, Cannon AFB, Davis Monthan AFB, Keesler AFB, 
Patrick AFB, and Scott AFB.  This research used a definition of failure which elicited 
failure data from the USAF’s Interim Work Information Management System (IWIMS). 
Table 7 presents examples of work orders indicating system level failures used for this 
research.  If a facility had at least one WO indicating failure for a given system during 
2014, that system was placed into the failed population for the year of analysis. 
 
Table 7: Example Work Orders Indicating System Level Failure 
WOTITLE WOIND TYPESVC WONR FACIDNR
HVAC System Failures 
HEATER INOP FOR BAYS 1 AND 2 J U Y6486 04809 
NO HEAT TO BLDG J U Y6729 00220 
A/C INOP IN HALF THE BLDG  J E Y6816 00078 
A/C INOP FOR BLDG J U Y8345 02301 
Electrical System Failures 
HALF THE BUILDING HAS NO POWER J U Y9066 04701 
NO POWER TO BUILDING. J U Y9859 07318 
POWER OUT IN WHOLE BLDG J U Z1048 05230 
NO POWER J U Z1061 07000 
Fire Protection System Failures 
FIRE ALARM IN TROUBLE, ISO DOC J U Y9706 00129 
FIRE ALARM IN TROULBE J U Z0427 00183 
FIRE ALARM SYSTEM, STILL IN FI J E Z0675 04876 
FIRE ALARM INOP J U Z3226 00410 
Plumbing System Failures 
NO WATER IN BUILDING. J U Y7782 00130 
LOW WATER PRESSURE J E Z0915 02350 
WATER CUT OFF IN BLDG J U Z1743 00096 
NO WATER J E Z2717 75046 
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BUILDER® Data 
After this research determined the failures for a given system, BUILDER® data 
was necessary to calculate the average age of each component-section.  Component-
section data was obtained from BUILDER® by cross referencing the facility ID number 
(FACIDNR) associated with each failure WO.  Because the contingency analysis 
explained in Chapter III required both a failed and non-failed sample, this research 
populated a non-failed sample via random sampling from the remaining facilities in each 
installation’s BUILDER® inventory.  For continuity of method with Alley (2015), this 
research populated the non-failed sample to equal the size of the failed sample for each 
system.  This research then obtained component-section data for the non-failed sample to 
determine the average component-section age. 
As a note, this research selected the six bases for analysis based on the quality of 
their BUILDER® inventory data.  However, BUILDER did not contain inventory data 
for some facilities.  If a non-failed system was not in the inventory data, this research 
randomly chose an additional system to take its place.  If a failed system was not in the 
inventory data, the failed data point was omitted thus reducing both the failed and non-
failed samples by the number of omitted data points.  
Table 8 displays the number of failures per system per base for 2014.  It also 
annotates the number of systems omitted due to lack of facility inventory data in 
BUILDER® and total failed sample size per system.   
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Table 8: Model Performance Assessment Data Summary 
Installation HVAC Plumbing Electrical Fire  
Barksdale 49 4 14 2 Failed 12 1 5 2 Omitted 
Cannon 89 10 11 4 8 2 2 3 
Davis Monthan 74 4 18 5 11 1 6 3 
Keesler 29 3 13 7 4 3 4 0 
Patrick 88 2 16 57 7 0 7 37 
Scott 88 5 16 2 25 1 5 0 
Total Failed 417 28 88 77  
Total Omitted 67 8 29 45  
Failed Population Total 350 20 59 32 
 
 
 
Because this research narrowed its focus to HVAC systems and collected 
additional HVAC system data, it was able to ensure the randomly selected non-failed 
systems were a representative random sample.  The research ensured the non-failed 
sample was representative with respect to age and size of the facility supported by the 
HVAC system.  Table 9 displays the breakdown of the non-failed HVAC sample 
compared to that of the non-failed HVAC population.  The “bins” used to ensure a 
representative sample were based on the 10% quantiles of the population with respect to 
the two attributes.  Because the same level of analysis performed on the HVAC systems 
was not accomplished for electrical, fire protection, and plumbing systems, attribute data 
was not available to ensure a representative sample for these systems. 
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Table 9: HVAC Sample Representation 
Facility Size (sq ft) Facility Year 
Population 
Quantiles 
(sq ft) 
Population  Sample  
Population 
Quantiles 
(year) 
Population  Sample  
560 10.0% 10.5% 1951 10.4% 11.6% 
1,515 9.9% 10.5% 1958 9.6% 10.8% 
2,805 10.0% 11.6% 1968 10.9% 9.3% 
4,551 10.0% 9.3% 1977 9.1% 10.5% 
6,360 10.3% 10.5% 1986 10.4% 11.0% 
9,825 9.8% 10.2% 1991 8.6% 7.3% 
15,832 10.0% 11.6% 1996 11.6% 12.2% 
25,598 10.0% 11.0% 2000 10.0% 9.3% 
45,184 10.0% 6.4% 2006 10.2% 9.3% 
275,900 9.9% 8.4% 2014 9.1% 8.7% 
 
 
 
Table 9 displays the proportion of the population and sample that fall between the 
10% quantiles.  As expected, the population proportions are fairly close to 10% in each 
quantile.  With respect to both attributes, Table 9 displays that the sample shows some 
deviation from the population proportions.  To determine if the sample is representative, 
this research used a t-test to compare the mean population and sample proportions.  The t-
test employed a null hypothesis of “the true difference in means is equal to zero” at a 
statistical significance of 0.10.  For both facility size and facility year, the t-test failed to 
reject the null hypothesis with p-values of 0.98 for both tests.  Based on these results, this 
research concludes that there is no difference in mean proportions for both facility size 
and facility year; and deems the sample used a random representative sample. 
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Calculations Using PoF Model 
After computing the average age for each component-section, this research used 
equation 27 to calculate each component-sections probability of failure.  After which the 
system level probability of failure was computed using the structure dictated by the PoF 
model.  Due to the large nature of the data set, this research utilized the statistical 
programming software R to compute the system level probabilities of failure for the four 
major systems at the six installations.  Appendix A displays the calculation results for 
each installation and Appendix B displays the R code used to compute the system level 
probability of failures. 
 
௙ܲ ൌ 1 െ ൦A ൈ ቈ 1ܥܫ௙቉
ି൬௧ఉ൰
ഀ
൪ (27) 
   
 
Contingency Analysis 
From the results displayed in Appendix A, this research was able perform a 
contingency analysis for each system.  The original PoF model validation assumed that a 
reliability threshold of 37 was the threshold for system failure.  This research focuses on 
determining the performance of each model by determining at what threshold the model 
displays statistically significant results.  This research defines statistical significance as a 
contingency analysis having a Fisher’s Exact p-value less than or equal to 0.10.  This p-
value indicates a statistically significant relationship between the PoF models output and 
the truth state.  The level indicates that there is less than a ten percent probability that a 
relationship between the two states is due to random chance.  This research also employs 
an odds ratio to determine the magnitude and direction of the relationship; any odds 
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ration greater than 1.0 indicates a positive relationship.  Therefore, this research defines 
“good model performance” as a contingency analysis having a p-value less than 0.10 
combined with an odds ratio greater than or equal to 1.0.  Appendix C displays the R 
code used to calculate and plot p-values and odds ratios over all possible threshold 
values.  
PoF Performance Results: Fire, Plumbing, and Electrical systems 
Figure 17 through 20 display the output of the model performance calculations for 
the four major systems under consideration.  The data presented is from all six 
installations introduced above.  A horizontal dashed line is included in each figure to 
annotate the statistical significance requirement of 0.10.  Beginning with Figure 17, the 
PoF model does not display good performance within the electrical system.  However, 
there are areas of positive relationship between PoF model output and the truth state but 
not at the statistical significance expected for this research. 
 
 
Figure 17: Electrical System PoF Model Performance 
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Figure 18 displays the results for PoF model performance with respect to the fire 
protection system.  Unlike the electrical system, the PoF displays good performance at a 
failure threshold of 49, with a p-value of 0.06 and odds ratio of 4.29.  This indicates 
agreement between the model predictive state and the truth state when the reliability 
threshold is set at 49.  This signifies that infrastructure managers should expect to see fire 
protection system failures when a system receives a reliability estimate at or below 49, as 
calculated by the PoF model. 
Figure 19 displays the results for the PoF model with respect to the plumbing 
system.  The PoF begins to demonstrate a positive relationship at approximately a 
reliability of 70 and approaches statistical significance at reliability thresholds of 77 and 
84.  However, the model falls slightly short with p-values of 0.20 and 0.11 respectively.  
The PoF model does not obtain good performance until a reliability threshold of 95 with 
a p-value of 0.07 and odds ratio of 5.74.  While not statistically significant until a 
threshold of 95, the PoF model does demonstrate some performance at lower reliabilities 
and suggest a failure threshold for the plumbing systems may reside in the 70-85 range. 
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Figure 18: Fire Protection System PoF Model Performance 
 
 
Figure 19: Plumbing System PoF Model Performance 
 
Figure 20 presents the results for PoF model performance with respect to the 
HVAC system.  This figure differs from the previous three in that the model does not 
display a positive relationship at any reliability threshold.  The model attains an odds 
ratio of 1.0 near a reliability of 90, however the odds ratio never goes above 1.0.  Because 
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PoF model output displays some level of positive relationship with the truth state with the 
three previous systems and no positive relationship with the HVAC system, this research 
continued by focusing solely on the HVAC system. 
 
 
Figure 20: HVAC System Model Performance 
 
SCI Model Performance Results: Fire, Plumbing, and Electrical systems 
Similar to the analysis of the PoF model, this research began analyzing the SCI 
mode with a basic analysis of the fire protection, electrical and plumbing systems.  The 
results of that analysis are displayed in figures 21-23.  Figure 21 displays the 
performance of the SCI model when considering electrical systems.  The figure shows no 
area of positive agreement between the model predictive state and truth state.  Figure 22 
displays the performance of the SCI model for fire protection systems.  The figure 
displays areas of positive agreement between reliability thresholds of 8-25 and near 65.  
When analyzing the contingency tables for these thresholds, this research suggests 65 as a 
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more suitable threshold.  While not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.59 and 
odds ratio of 1.52, a threshold of 65 displays greater positive detection to false detection 
when analyzing the contingency table.  Figure 23 displays positive agreement for the 
plumbing system at reliability thresholds of 88 and 92.  Although not statistically 
significant, when analyzing the contingency tables for these values this research suggests 
88 as a more suitable threshold.  Having a p-value of 0.32 and an odds ratio 2.39 of, the 
contingency table for a threshold of 88 displayed more positive detections then false and 
a balance between false positives and false negatives. 
 
 
Figure 21: Electrical system SCI Model performance 
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Figure 22: Fire Protection system SCI Model performance 
 
 
Figure 23: Plumbing system SCI Model performance 
 
Model Performance Assessment: HVAC system analysis 
In an attempt to have a greater impact on the reliability analysis for Air Force 
civil infrastructure and generate greater understanding of each model’s performance with 
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respect to a single system, this research limited further analysis solely to HVAC systems.  
In doing so, this research obtained HVAC system attribute data to determine if the PoF 
and SCI models performed better with different types and sizes of HVAC systems. 
In order to further the analysis, this research determined different attributes 
associated with each system.  The following attributes were obtained from BUILDER® 
for each HVAC system: number of floors in the facility, square footage of the facility, 
system age, facility age, and number of unique component-sections in the systems.  This 
research attempted to use a measure of the systems size (total tonnage) as an attribute for 
analysis.  This attribute was ultimately eliminated due to insufficient data on system 
tonnage within BUILDER®. 
This research created and utilized a Shiny© application to manipulate the type 
and range of the above attributes to asses each model’s performance.  For example, a 
system attribute of facility square footage can be selected and HVAC systems supporting 
facilities larger than 15,000 square feet can be assessed.  The Shiny© application 
developed for this research is available at https://prdhd7.shinyapps.io/Deering-16-M-
143/#1.  The application is interactive and users may select and change system attributes 
for analysis. 
PoF Model Results: HVAC systems  
Figures 24 through 35 display the results of assessing PoF performance against 
different facility attributes.  Figure 24 displays the PoF model performance when 
analyzing facilities that are 15,000 sq-ft to 25,000 sq-ft.  While not at the statistical 
significance desired, the model begins to show agreement with the truth state at a 
reliability threshold near 40.  This particular example shows how accounting for other 
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system features can increase the predictive capability of the PoF model.  Figure 25 
displays the resulting contingency table, p-value, and odds ratio for a reliability threshold 
of 40. 
 
Figure 24: HVAC PoF Model (15K-25K Sq Ft) 
 
  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 8 67 75 CIf =  40 Not Failed 1 43 44 p-value =  0.151 
  9 110 119 odds ratio = 5.082 
Figure 25: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 40, 15K-25K Sq Ft) 
 
The analysis continued by increasing the range of facility square footage to all 
facilities greater than 15,000 sq ft.  Figure 26 displays the results for the PoF model for 
these facilities indicating good performance at a reliability threshold of 35.  Figure 27 
displays the resulting contingency table, p-value, and odds ratio for a reliability threshold 
of 35.  The model displays statistically significant results with an odds ratio of infinity.  
 69 
An odds ratio of infinity is a result of the contingency table having a zero count in the 
“false positive” cell.  While this result satisfies the requirements for statistically 
significant agreement between the PoF model predicted state and truth state, the 
contingency table in Figure 27 shows large count of “false negatives”.  This displays the 
PoF model leaves a substantial amount of failures left undetected. 
One could reasonably assume that larger facilities have larger HVAC systems; 
and large HVAC systems will likely have more unique component-sections.  Therefore, 
this research examined if the PoF model displayed any performance when limited to 
larger number of unique component-sections.  
Figure 28 displays PoF model results for systems with seven or more unique 
component-sections.  Although the model does not display good performance at any 
reliability threshold it does display positive agreement at a threshold of 35, similar to that 
of larger facilities (≥ 15,000 sq ft).   
This research also assessed model performance with respect to the number of 
floors in a facility.  Figure 30 displays the PoF model performance for facilities with 3 or 
more stories.  The model begins to display a positive relationship near a reliability 
threshold of 70 and continues to display this relationship through a reliability of 99.  In 
this range, the model displays the best performance at a reliability threshold of 77.5, 
displayed in Figure 31.  While this result is not consistent with a reliability threshold of 
35 displayed in Figures 26-29, it does suggest that a reliability threshold exists at 77.5.  
The merit with this threshold is the increased recognition of true failures.  While a 
threshold of 77.5 does not eliminate false positives or false negatives, the ratio of false 
detections to positive detections is substantially improved. 
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Figure 26: HVAC PoF Model ( ≥ 15K Sq Ft) 
 
  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 8 196 204 CIf =  35 Not Failed 0 96 96 p-value =  0.058 
  8 292 300 odds ratio = Infinity
Figure 27: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 35, ≥ 15K Sq Ft) 
 
 
Figure 28: HVAC PoF Model ( ≥ 7 component-sections) 
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  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 4 163 167 CIf =  35 Not Failed 0 86 86 p-value =  0.302 
  4 249 253 odds ratio = Infinity
Figure 29: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 35, ≥ 7 component-sections) 
 
 
Figure 30: HVAC PoF Model (3-9 Floors) 
 
  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 31 6 37 CIf =  77.5 
Not Failed 7 8 15 p-value =  0.013 
  38 14 52 odds ratio = 5.695 
Figure 31: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 77.5, ≥ 3 stories) 
  
Aside from indicators of facility size, this research also assessed the PoF model 
against age based attributes.  When analyzing against facility age, this research found no 
ranges in which the PoF model displayed good performance.  However, the PoF model 
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displayed good performance when analyzed against system age and segregated into two 
ranges: 0-9 years and ≥ 9 years.  Figure 32 and Figure 33 display the PoF model 
performance for systems with an average age greater than or equal to nine years.  The 
model displays good performance at a reliability threshold of 92.5.  Figure 33 displays 
the contingency table for this scenario highlighting a large proportion of true positives 
and false positives.  Figure 34 displays the PoF model performance for systems with an 
average age of 0-9 years.  Interestingly the model displays a reliability threshold of 91.5 
for this range, similar to that of systems nine years and older.  In contrast to the older 
systems, the contingency table for this scenario displays large proportion of true 
detections to false detections which is not the case for scenario with the systems greater 
than 9 years old.  
 
 
Figure 32: HVAC PoF Model (System age ≥ 9 years) 
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  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 238 1 239 CIf =  92.5 
Not Failed 263 7 270 p-value =  0.072 
  401 8 409 odds ratio = 6.316 
Figure 33: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 92.5, System age ≥ 9 years) 
 
 
Figure 34: HVAC PoF Model (System age 0-9 yrs) 
 
  PoF Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 39 76 115 CIf =  91.5 
Not Failed 21 71 92 p-value =  0.091 
  60 147 207 odds ratio = 1.730 
Figure 35: HVAC PoF Model (CIf = 91.5, System age 0-9 yrs) 
 
In addition to PoF model assessment using HVAC system attribute data, this 
research also analyzed the models performance with respect to installation.  By doing so, 
this research could determine if the model displayed differences in reliability thresholds 
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based on the installation under consideration.  This research used the HVAC systems 
analyzed above to perform this analysis. 
Table 10 displays the results of the installation level analysis.  All six installations 
displayed areas of positive agreement between the model predictive state and the truth 
state.  However, the model did not display areas of statistically significant agreement 
when considering installation.  Additionally, the majority of possible reliability 
thresholds identified do not appear suitable due to the large number of false detections.  
This research ultimately concluded that installation was not a variable that contributed to 
the significance of the PoF model’s performance.  
 
Table 10: PoF Model performance for HVAC systems by installation 
 CIf 
P-
value 
Odds 
ratio Suitability 
Barksdale         
>7 Component 
Sections 
53 0.27 2.81 Large number of false negatives 
Cannon         
Sq ft > 15K 65 0.13 2.98 Large number of false negatives 
System Age 0-9 yrs 95.5 0.23 2.28 Large number of false negatives 
Davis Monthan         
System Age 0-9 yrs 91.5 0.22 4.22 Large number of false negatives 
System Age > 9 yrs 92 0.12 Inf Large number of false positives 
Keesler         
Sq ft > 15K 51 0.12 4.20 Large number of false negatives 
>7 Component 
Sections 
51 0.24 2.80 Greater positive detections to false 
System Age > 9 yrs 51 0.31 2.24 Large number of false negatives 
Patrick         
System Age 0-9 yrs 91.5 0.21 2.10 Greater positive detections to false 
System Age > 9 yrs 82 0.33 2.27 Large number of false positives 
Scott         
System Age > 9 yrs 83 0.57 1.61 Large number of false positives 
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PoF Model Performance Summary  
Overall the PoF model showed sporadic performance in agreement with the truth 
state and model output at reliability thresholds of 35, 77.5, 91.5, and 92.5.  Among these 
thresholds, this research noted a reliability of 35, similar to that of the current 37.  
However, this threshold resulted in a substantial amount of false negatives.  Reliabilities 
of 77.5 and 91.5 stand out as more likely thresholds.  While each scenario has both false 
negatives and false positive detections, the number of positive detections is greater than 
the number false detections, indicating better model performance.  However, reliability 
thresholds of 77.5 and 91.5 are fairly high, suggesting the PoF model may be over 
estimating HVAC system reliability.  
SCI Model Performance: HVAC systems 
Figure 36 displays the performance for the SCI model for facilities greater than 
12,000 square feet.  The model achieves good performance at a SCI threshold of 55 with 
a p-value of 0.064 and odds ratio of 4.013.  The associated contingency table in Figure 37 
displays the results and indicates a similar to trend to that of the PoF model; the model 
predicts a large number false negatives. 
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Figure 36: HVAC SCI Model ( ≥ 12K Sq Ft) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 15 218 233 CIf =  55 
Not Failed 2 117 119 p-value =  0.064 
  17 335 352 odds ratio = 4.013 
Figure 37: HVAC SCI Model (CIf = 55, ≥ 12K sq ft) 
 
Figure 38 displays the performance of the SCI model with respect to 7 or more 
unique component-sections.  For these facilities, the model displays statistically 
significant results at a reliability threshold of 66 and a possible SCI threshold of 55.  
Figure 39 and 40 display the contingency tables for these two thresholds which indicates, 
again, a trend of numerous false negative predictions.  Due to the nature of displaying 
two possible reliability thresholds, this indicates the possibility of a true SCI threshold 
residing somewhere within the 55-66 range. 
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Figure 38: HVAC SCI Model ( ≥ 7 component-sections) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 17 150 167 CIf =  66 
Not Failed 3 83 86 p-value =  0.084 
  11 242 253 odds ratio = 3.124 
Figure 39: HVAC SCI Model (CIf = 66, ≥ 7 component-sections) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 10 157 167 CIf =  55 
Not Failed 1 85 86 p-value =  0.104 
  11 242 253 odds ratio = 5.388 
Figure 40: HVAC SCI Model(CIf = 55, ≥ 7 component-sections) 
 
When considering age related attributes, the SCI model displays fairly consistent 
results when segregating both facility age and system age.  With respect to facility age, 
the model displays a high level of agreement over ages 0-40 years and statistically 
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significant agreement at ages 20-40 years old.  Figure 41 and Figure 43 display the results 
for these scenarios, indicating a reliability threshold of 86.  With respect to system age, 
the model displays agreement over a range from 0-20 years, 20-40 years, and 0-40 years.  
In each scenario the model indicates a reliability threshold at or near 86.  Figure 45 and 
Figure 47 display the results for the 0-20 years and 20-40 years scenarios.  In both 
scenarios, false positive and false negative detections are present; however, the model 
presents a greater number of positive detections than false detections.  This finding 
suggests that an SCI score of 86 is more appropriate than previously discussed thresholds. 
 
 
Figure 41: HVAC SCI Model (Facility age 0-40 years) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 100 82 182 CIf =  86 
Not Failed 100 113 213 p-value =  0.130 
  200 195 395 odds ratio = 1.376 
Figure 42: HVAC SCI Model(CIf = 86, Facility age 0-40 years) 
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Figure 43:  HVAC SCI Model (Facility age 20-40 years) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 60 24 84 CIf =  86 
Not Failed 64 44 108 p-value =  0.095 
  124 68 192 odds ratio = 1.714 
Figure 44: HVAC SCI Model(CIf = 86, Facility age 20-40 years) 
 
 
Figure 45: HVAC SCI Model (System age 0-20 years) 
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  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 161 140 301 CIf =  86 
Not Failed 139 159 298 p-value =  0.102 
  300 299 599 odds ratio = 1.314 
Figure 46: HVAC SCI Model(CIf = 86, System age 0-20 years) 
 
 
Figure 47: HVAC SCI Model (System age 20-40 years) 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State 
Failed 36 11 47 CIf =  86 
Not Failed 30 20 50 p-value =  0.087 
  66 31 97 odds ratio = 2.164 
Figure 48: HVAC SCI Model(CIf = 86, System age 20-40 years) 
 
Lastly, Figure 49 displays the SCI model performance for all facilities considered.  
The model shows good performance again at a reliability threshold of 86 with a p-value 
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and odds ratio of 0.09 and 1.30, respectively, and the associated contingency table is 
displayed in Figure 50.  The contingency table displays a high number of false positives 
and false negatives; however, the model attains more positive detections than false 
detections.  The statistical significance at this threshold indicates that for a majority of the 
700 HVAC systems considered, Air Force civil engineers are assigning SCIs of up to 86 
for systems that soon after fail. 
 
 
Figure 49: HVAC SCI Model 
 
  SCI Predicted State    
  Failed Not Failed    
Truth State Failed 201 149 350
CIf =  86 
Not Failed 178 172 350 p-value =  0.095 
  379 321 700 odds ratio = 1.303 
Figure 50: HVAC SCI Model (CIf = 86) 
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In addition to analyzing the SCI model against system attributes, this research 
sought to understand the performance of the model when considering systems at 
individual installations.  Table X displays the results for the SCI model for HVAC 
systems at each installation.  Five out of the six installations displayed areas of positive 
agreement.  Three of which (Davis Monthan AFB, Keesler AFB, and Patrick AFB) 
displayed statistically significant agreement at or near 86, the reliability threshold noted 
when considering all systems in Figure 49.  Additionally, the systems at these 
installations showed relatively consistent performance when considering multiple system 
attributes. 
Cannon AFB and Scott AFB displayed consistent agreement across multiple 
attributes, but at substantially different reliability thresholds.  Cannon AFB displayed 
statistically significant agreement at a threshold of 91 while Scott AFB displayed 
statistically significant agreement at a threshold of 71.  This suggests that the installation 
under consideration can have an effect on the appropriate reliability threshold for a 
system. 
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Table 11: SCI Model performance for HVAC systems by installation 
  CIf P-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
Suitability 
Cannon         
All Facilities 91 0.10 1.95 Greater positive detections to false 
Fac Age 20-40 yrs 91 0.11 Inf Large number of false positives 
Syst Age 0-20 yrs 91 0.02 2.37 Greater positive detections to false 
Davis Monthan         
All Facilities 86 0.12 1.92 Greater positive detections to false 
Fac Age 20-40 yrs 86 0.09 2.96 Greater positive detections to false 
Keesler         
All Facilities 85 0.04 3.91 Greater positive detections to false 
>7 Component Section 86 0.06 5.15 Greater positive detections to false 
Fac Age 0-40 yrs 86 0.02 6.92 Greater positive detections to false 
Syst Age 0-20 yrs 85 0.02 5.98 Greater positive detections to false 
Patrick         
Sq Ft > 14.6K 89 0.06 4.17 Greater positive detections to false 
Syst Age 0-20 yrs 85 0.11 1.72 Greater positive detections to false 
Scott         
Sq Ft > 2.6K 71 0.05 2.81 Greater positive detections to false 
>7 Component Section 67 0.07 6.19 Large number of false negatives 
Syst Age 0-20 yrs 71 0.04 4.06 Greater positive detections to false 
 
 
 
SCI Model Performance Summary 
The SCI model displayed statistically significant agreement with the truth state at 
reliability thresholds of 55, 66, and 86.  When analyzing the contingency tables at 
thresholds of 55 and 66, the model predicted numerous false negatives indicating these 
may not be accurate threshold values.  However, the model consistently shows statistical 
agreement with the truth state at a reliability threshold of 86.  When analyzed at 86, the 
model consistently presented more positive detections than false detections suggesting 86 
as more accurate reliability threshold.  Similar to the PoF model, a threshold this high 
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indicates the SCI model is likely overestimating HVAC system reliability.  Additionally, 
the results of Table 11 suggest the installation under consideration may have an impact as 
to what reliability threshold is appropriate for a system. 
Model Accuracy Assessment  
This section will present the data, results, and discussion associated with 
assessing the accuracy of the PoF and SCI models via a Non-homogeneous Poisson 
Process in conjunction with the Availability Growth Model. 
Failure Data 
This research utilized two data sets when analyzing the PoF model accuracy.  In 
the first stage of this analysis this research used HVAC failure data from the six 
previously mentioned Air Force installations.  This research captured HVAC system 
failures via IWIMS work orders from calendar year 2013 and 2014.  
Table 12 displays the total number of failures per year, per installation.  The 
following results will show that this data set was deemed unsuitable thus requiring a 
second data set.  The second data comprised solely of HVAC failures from Cannon Air 
Force Base, dating back to 1995.  The primary intent for developing a new data sat was to 
collect HVAC failures over a system’s lifetime in contrast to only a 2 year period.  
Therefore, due to the IWIMS data dating back to 1995, facilities constructed prior to this 
year were not considered.  This research randomly selected 30 facilities constructed on or 
after 1995.  In order to capture additional “older” facilities that could offer more lifetime 
data, the sample was ultimately increased to 33 systems.  Appendix D displays the failure 
data collected for these facilities. 
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Table 12: PoF Model Accuracy Assessment Data Summary 
Installation 2013 2014 Total 
Barksdale 99 62 161 
Cannon 71 181 252 
Davis Monthan 84 113 197 
Keesler 44 31 75 
Patrick 140 251 391 
Scott 125 230 355 
Total 563 868 1431 
 
 
 
Results 
The initial assessment for determining if the data fit a nonhomogeneous process 
was a visual check using Duane plots.  The system under consideration likely followed a 
NHPP with a power-law intensity function if the cumulative mean time between failure 
(MTBF) versus failure time displayed a linear tend.  This research began this portion of 
analysis by assessing the Duane plots of the data presented in Table 12.  Figure 51 
presents the plot for this data set and displays a mostly linear trend from 0-7000 days (0-
19 years), at which the cumulative MTBF sharply increases into a secondary linear trend.  
This research concluded that the shift in trend was likely due to truncated failure data.  
Truncation occurs when observations outside a particular range are not known (Meeker & 
Escobar, 1998).  In this case, truncation occurred because failure events outside of 2013 
and 2014 were not know.  This research noticed similar trends in all six installations.  
Appendix E displays similar plots to Figure 51 for all six installations individually. 
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Figure 51: HVAC Duane plot for all installations (CY13/14 failures) 
 
To overcome the perceived issues with truncated failure data, this research 
adjusted failure times by counting the time to failure from the beginning of the window in 
which data was collected.  In other words, Figure 51 displays failure times counted from 
when a system was placed into operation while Figure 52 displays data with failure times 
counted from January 1, 2013.  This correction resulted in a plot that displayed s 
somewhat linear trend.  This research assesses the goodness of fit via the Cramer-von 
Mises test statistic.  Table 13 displays the results, highlighting that the resulting test 
statistic is well above the critical value at a significance level of 0.10, thus rejecting the 
null hypothesis that data fit a NHPP with power-law intensity function.  This research 
obtained critical values for the Cramer-von Mises test statistic from Military Handbook 
189 (Department of Defense, 1981). 
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Table 13: Goodness of Fit results for truncation adjusted HVAC data 
N ࢼ෡ ࣅ෠  ࡯ࡹ૛  ࡯ࡹ૛ ࢉ࢘࢏࢚ 
1423 1.6124 0.0344 4.201 0.173 
4.20 > 0.17, reject Ho of NHPP power-law intensity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: HVAC Duane plot for all installations (CY13/14 failures adjusted for 
truncation) 
 
Due to the inability to develop an availability growth model with the data 
presented above, this research limited its focus to HVAC systems at Cannon Air Force 
base in an effort to collect system lifetime failure data.  The data used for this portion of 
analysis is presented in Appendix D.  Beginning with visual assessment of the Duane 
plots, figures 53-54 present 12 of the 33 systems analyzed.  These figures help summarize 
the visual assessment and are used to describe the general theme for how the systems 
considered visually fit the NHPP.  Appendix F displays Duane plots for all 33 facilities. 
Of the 40 systems analyzed, Figure 53 presents six plots for the HVAC systems 
that displayed a good linear trend.  However, only four of the six systems in this figure 
pass the Cramer-von Mises goodness of fit test, displayed in Table 14.  Of the six plots, 
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five display deteriorating systems while the HVAC system in building 00208 displays a 
positive trend at roughly 600 days, indicating an improving system.   
Figure 54 displays additional facilities that show changes in trend from a 
deteriorating system to an improving system.  In this analysis, seven total systems 
displayed trend changes (00208, 01155, 01159, 01161, 02134, 02206, and 04081).  This 
research referenced BUILDER® inventory data to determine if possible component-
section replacement efforts could account for the system improvement and ultimately 
found no information to suggest this.  If there were data to suggest component-section 
replacement affected the MTBF, this research could have assessed the systems fit to a 
NHPP after the replacements were made.  However due to the lack of data to suggest the 
change in trend was the cause of a replacement effort, this research could not reasonably 
exclude data prior to trend change.  Overall, of these seven systems only three (00208, 
02134 and 04081) pass the Cramer-von Mises test statistic suggesting that the remaining 
four systems do not follow a NHPP. 
Appendix F displays the remainder of the Duane plots for the systems analyzed 
by this research.  The majority of these plots either display no linear trend or comprise of 
only 2-3 data points, thus making it difficult to make a declaration as to the visual fit of 
the system.  Table 14 displays the parameters and goodness of fit results for all 40 
systems analyzed.  Of the 40 systems only 20 pass the Cramer-von Mises test statistic 
satisfying the null hypothesis that the HVAC systems analyzed fit a NHPP.  Due to this 
low level of agreement, this research concludes that fitting HVAC systems to a NHPP 
with power-law intensity is not effective for estimating the MTBF, thus could not 
accurately calculate a measure of system reliability via this method. 
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Figure 53: Duane plots displaying good fit 
 90 
Figure 54: Duane plots displaying changing trends 
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Table 14: Parameter and Goodness of Fit Results 
Bldg System Age N(t) ࢼ෡ ࢼഥ ࣅ෠ ۱ۻ૛ ۱ۻ૛ 	܋ܚ MTBF(t) 
128 13 12 1.417 1.299 7.82E-05 0.033 0.169 268.278 
158 12 17 1.916 1.804 1.94E-06 0.048 0.171 128.849 
724 5 13 1.417 1.308 3.60E-04 0.060 0.169 89.184 
575 11 7 2.084 1.786 2.39E-07 0.061 0.165 262.762 
300 17 16 1.939 1.818 7.52E-07 0.061 0.171 194.156 
2370 6 3 2.272 1.515 9.39E-08 0.071 0.155 294.492 
777 3 2 1.917 0.959 4.22E-06 0.086 0.162 237.946 
2371 4 3 3.599 2.400 1.98E-11 0.089 0.155 118.308 
1435 5 7 2.299 1.971 2.83E-07 0.089 0.165 102.058 
4609 2 2 1.251 0.626 7.50E-04 0.095 0.162 218.762 
2134 20 10 0.911 0.820 3.10E-03 0.105 0.167 781.339 
4605 4 6 1.324 1.103 4.60E-04 0.107 0.162 160.858 
848 3 5 1.735 1.388 3.66E-05 0.113 0.160 105.209 
2220 12 2 2.306 1.153 8.80E-09 0.122 0.162 909.937 
4081 18 7 0.754 0.646 9.45E-03 0.136 0.165 1209.951 
4607 3 5 2.890 2.312 1.39E-08 0.136 0.160 63.153 
234 4 2 2.088 1.044 6.53E-07 0.137 0.162 305.903 
4606 3 6 1.741 1.451 4.22E-05 0.147 0.162 87.370 
2320 19 5 0.905 0.724 1.72E-03 0.147 0.160 1492.994 
208 21 25 0.689 0.661 5.37E-02 0.162 0.172 434.557 
4624 3 11 1.807 1.643 4.92E-05 0.170 0.169 45.907
850 9 3 1.819 1.212 1.34E-06 0.186 0.154 568.615 
251 20 2 0.578 0.289 1.19E-02 0.188 0.162 6157.626 
2379 5 4 5.512 4.134 7.57E-18 0.219 0.155 74.499 
1275 2 3 2.450 1.633 5.87E-07 0.221 0.154 74.492 
4623 2 6 4.003 3.336 6.53E-11 0.359 0.162 22.793 
4619 2 4 5.880 4.410 3.16E-16 0.384 0.155 23.277 
4620 2 5 5.816 4.653 5.93E-16 0.385 0.160 18.828 
1161 17 19 0.516 0.488 2.14E-01 0.425 0.171 614.809 
356 19 9 0.477 0.424 1.34E-01 0.618 0.167 1572.643 
1155 20 39 1.043 1.016 3.75E-03 0.629 0.172 174.994 
1159 20 31 0.703 0.681 6.06E-02 0.832 0.172 326.508 
355 18 20 0.446 0.424 4.02E-01 0.988 0.171 716.364 
2206 21 34 0.767 0.744 3.64E-02 1.197 0.172 287.061 
278 5 1 * Only a single failure for the given system.  Parameter 
estimation/goodness of fit not computed. 307 6 1 
1825 6 1 
4082 18 1 
173 6 1 
1824 6 1 
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Summary 
This chapter presented results and analysis associated with the performance of the 
Probability of Failure (PoF) model and the BUILDER® SCI model.  Some findings 
associated with the two models indicate that different systems may possess different 
reliability thresholds.  Additionally, the analysis shows that both models present a high 
number of false negatives when assessed for statistical significance via contingency 
analysis.  Initially, this research attempted to utilize an accepted method for calculating 
reliability for repairable systems as a means to determine the accuracy of both models.  
However, given amount of false negatives this research attempted to present an 
Availability Growth Model using the Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) as an 
alternate to the PoF and SCI model.  Ultimately the research concluded that a NHPP 
model was not effective for assessing HVAC systems and was unable to construct an 
Availability Growth Model. 
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V.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a discussion of the results of this research and answers the 
research questions presented in Chapter I.  The chapter then discusses limitations 
associated with the research effort.  Further, this chapter places the findings within the 
context of infrastructure asset management within the Air Force.  Lastly, this chapter 
presents recommendations for future research efforts. 
Discussion 
The PoF Model 
When considering the PoF model, there is evidence to suggest that different 
systems have different reliability thresholds.  As displayed in Figure 19 the model 
prediction for the plumbing system shows statistically significant agreement between the 
truth state and the model results at a reliability range of 70-85.  Additionally, Figure 18 
displays the same agreement for the fire protection system at a threshold of 50.  These 
results suggest that a single reliability threshold of 37 may not be applicable for all 
systems.  If using the PoF model to predict failure, infrastructure managers should expect 
to see system failures for plumbing systems when the system has a calculated reliability 
between 70-85.  Similarly, infrastructure managers should expect to see system failures 
for fire protection at calculated reliability of 50.  Unfortunately, this research can not 
make any assertions with respect to an appropriate reliability threshold for the electrical 
system based on the PoF model.  Figure 17 displays the performance of the PoF model 
with respect to the electrical system.  While there are areas where the model prediction 
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does begin to show agreement with the truth state, it is not at the statistical significance 
necessary for this research.  At best, the PoF model displays a statistical significance of 
0.5 for the electrical system.  Indicating the dependence between the model state and 
truth state is roughly the equivalent of a coin toss. 
When analyzing the PoF model with respect to HVAC systems, the model 
displays no agreement with the truth state when considering small to medium-sized 
facilities.  However, the model does display agreement with the truth state at reliability 
thresholds of 35 and 77 when assessed against larger facilities (i.e. ≥ 15,000 square feet, 
≥ 7 component-sections, ≥ 3 stories).  The model also displays agreement at thresholds of 
91.5 and 92.5 when assessed against system age.  However, because of the large number 
of false detections associated with thresholds of 35 and 92.5, this research deems 77 and 
91.5 as more likely reliability threshold for the PoF model.  This indicates that 
infrastructure managers should expect to see system failures when systems in larger 
facilities and systems in facilities 0-9 years old have calculated reliabilities of 77 and 91.5 
respectively. 
Overall, the agreement of the PoF model with the truth state is sporadic and 
displays a large number of false negative when assessed at lower thresholds.  The 
combination of the significant agreement at thresholds of 77 and 91.5 and the numerous 
false negative detections at lower thresholds lead this research to conclude that the PoF 
model is overestimating HVAC system reliability.  This research proposes three possible 
reasons for this: the Ordered Weighted Averaging method is not an appropriate method 
for “rolling-up” system reliability, the weights used to construct the model are incorrect, 
and the assumption made for selecting a distribution and parameters for these 
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distributions result in overestimated component reliability.  This research believes the 
latter of the three is most likely.  The PoF model uses an assumption of a “70-30” 
Weibull distribution for the component-sections.  This assumption parameterizes the 
distributions to have only a 30% reliability drop over the first 70% of the component-
section’s life.  This would account for somewhat aged component-sections retaining a 
fairly high reliability, resulting in a higher system level reliability.  Unfortunately, Air 
Force civil engineers are not currently collecting failure data at the detail necessary to fit 
failure distributions at the component-section level. 
The SCI Model 
Shifting attention to the SCI model performance with respect to HVAC systems, 
the SCI consistently displays statistically significant agreement with the truth state at a 
reliability threshold of 86.  This is well above the current reliability threshold of 37.  
When analyzed in a similar fashion to the PoF model, the SCI model also displays 
agreement at a threshold of 55 for larger facilities.  However, at this threshold the model 
displays a large proportion of false negatives.  The numerous false negatives combined 
with statistically significant agreement at 86 lead to the conclusion that the SCI model is 
also overestimating system reliability.  This research proposes two possible reasons for 
this: the “roll up” model using Current Replacement Value (CRV) is an inappropriate 
method for calculating higher reliabilities or the component-section condition assessment 
process is not accurate.  This research believes it is likely a combination of the two.   
In system reliability analysis, the system failure probability is a function of the 
system structure and system component reliability (Meeker & Escobar, 1998).  
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) and fault trees are often used to quantify the 
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relationships between system components in order to accurately model the system 
structure (Labi, 2014; Meeker & Escobar, 1998).  The SCI roll-up method is purely a cost 
model and does not quantify the relationships and interactions of lower level components 
and component-sections to the overall system.  Additionally, the majority of condition 
assessments completed by Air Force civil engineers are direct rating assessments.  While 
these assessments decrease the time and resources required to assess condition, they are 
inherently more subjective and may be unintentionally reporting an inflated component-
section condition.  This may lead to inaccurate measurements of lower level component 
reliability.  This research concludes that these two issues combined contribute to the 
overestimating of the SCI model.  
Shiny© Application and Data Analysis 
This research completed the above assessments of the PoF and SCI model through 
the use of Shiny©, a web application for R statistical software.  Constructed and 
customized specifically for this research effort, the Shiny© application allowed for the 
creation and manipulation of system attribute filters in order to determine if the models 
performed differently given a specific attribute.  The application also allowed for the 
adjustment of attribute values.  For instance, this research noted no agreement between 
the PoF model and truth state for HVAC systems over the entire range of facility sizes.  
However, when limited to facilities ≥ 15,000 square feet, the model displayed statistically 
significant agreement.  Using attribute data, this research developed attribute “filters” for 
facility size, facility age, system age, number of floors, and number of unique 
component-sections.  The capability to select and manipulate attribute data and receive 
graphical output was instrumental to the analysis in this research. 
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A fundamental benefit of Shiny© is that it pairs the data analytics and tools of R 
statistical software with a customizable, user friendly graphical user interface.  Users can 
decide what data to bring in and how to analyze it.  The output of the application is also 
customizable and can be tailored to meet the needs of the user.  Given a problem of 
interest, a data set, and an idea of how to obtain information from that data, users can 
perform instantaneous data analysis that meets their specific need.  Proving its utility in 
reliability analysis in this research, a Shiny© application could be tailored to meet the 
needs of almost any data analysis or data presentation needs. 
Alternative Reliability Model 
Finally, this research attempted to employ an alternative method of measuring 
reliability with the intention of assessing the accuracy of both the PoF and SCI model 
output.  While the method did not prove effective for the systems analyzed, this research 
believes future efforts should focus on modeling system reliability via a stochastic 
process using failure data.  This research shows that both the PoF and SCI model 
overestimate HVAC system level reliability and cannot accurately assess the probability 
of a system being in a failed state.  
System Reliability Theory, as discussed by Høyland and Rausand (1994), presents 
statistical models to calculate system reliability using failure data.  One such model is the 
Markov process which estimates the probability of a system being in a particular state by 
modeling the transitions from state to state (Høland & Rausand, 1994).  In a Markov 
process, the assumption is that all transitions follow an exponential distribution (Meeker 
& Escobar, 1998).  This research achieved preliminary reliability calculations using a 
finite state Semi-Markov process (SMP) as discussed by Warr (n.d.).  SMPs relax the 
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exponential transition state assumption, allowing modelers to assess the fit of other 
distributions.  Because of the preliminary nature of these results, this research did not 
present them in Chapter IV.  Readers may view an overview of the SMP method and 
preliminary results in Appendix G.  
Review of Research Questions 
The primary purpose of reliability analysis is to provide information for use in 
decision making.  The decision application can vary from risk and safety analysis, 
maintenance and operation analysis, to engineering design (Høland & Rausand, 1994).  
Alley (2015) developed the PoF model in an attempt to improve the SCI model and 
improve the decision making capability of Air Force civil engineers with respect to 
Infrastructure Asset Management.  This research attempted to validate and improve the 
PoF model by answering the following questions: 
1. What assumptions associated with the original research effort can be reduced or 
eliminated through data collection and analysis? 
 
a. Is the assumption that a reliability threshold of 37 valid for the systems analyzed?  
If not, does the model indicate a reliability threshold for these systems?  
 
Of the systems analyzed with the PoF model, HVAC systems displayed possible 
reliability thresholds at 77 and 91.5.  With the combination of these large values and 
numerous false negative detections, this research posits that the PoF model may be 
overestimating HVAC system reliability.  However, PoF model did suggest that different 
systems have different reliability thresholds.  The results suggest the plumbing system 
and fire protection system have reliability thresholds of 70 and 50 respectively based on 
the statistically significant agreement between the failed state model predictive state.  
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This indicates that system failures should be noticed when a system has calculated 
reliability at or near their respective threshold. 
Additionally, when analyzing the SCI model, this research suggests that using a 
reliability threshold of 37 for HVAC systems is not appropriate for the current model 
configuration.  With its current configuration, the SCI model displays a reliability 
threshold of 86 for all HVAC systems based on the statistically significant agreement 
between the failed state and model predictive state.  Similar to thresholds discussed 
above, system failures should be noticed when a system has calculated reliability at or 
near this threshold. 
 
b. Can probabilistic distributions and associated parameters be estimated for 
system components? 
 
Yes, understanding component probabilistic distributions along with system 
structure is a general requirement for understanding system reliability (Meeker & 
Escobar, 1998).  The aircraft, automotive, electronic, and many other sectors collect 
multiple levels of failure data to improve the reliability of their systems or products. 
Unfortunately, the Air Force does not currently collect data at the level of detail 
necessary to obtain failure data below the system level.  The Air Force currently collects 
condition data at the component-section level as a means to estimate the reliability of 
those component-sections.  If the Air Force desires to more accurately assess reliability 
using stochastic processes, it must collect more detailed component-section data. 
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2. After further model validation, does the model still present statistical significance 
for predicting the probability of failure at the system level? 
 
Yes, both the PoF and SCI model output present statistical significant agreement 
with the truth state.  However, statistical significance alone does not indicate sound 
model performance.  Both models display signs of overestimating system reliability. 
3. After further model validation, does the model accurately predict the probability 
of failure at the system level? 
 
Although this research was unable to precisely assess the accuracy of the PoF and 
SCI model via comparison to a stochastic model, it is able to make some declarations 
about the accuracy of the models.  Both models predicted a large number of false 
negatives and show signs of overestimating, leading this research to conclude that each 
model is producing inaccurate results for some systems.   
4. Can alternative methods be used to assess system reliability for Air Force civil 
infrastructure systems? 
 
Yes.  The use of availability as a measure for reliability for repairable systems 
remains a viable method as annotated by reliability literature (Høland & Rausand, 1994; 
Limnios, 2011; Meeker & Escobar, 1998).  Additionally, Labi (2014) and Meeker and 
Escobar (1998) discuss the use of system structure diagrams combined with component 
reliability calculations as a method for calculating system reliability.  While the 
development of an Availability Growth Model using a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process 
was not an effective method for the systems considered in this research, this research 
achieved preliminary results using a finite state Semi Markov Process (SMP).  The SMP 
method could be employed with reliability methods discussed in the literature to calculate 
system reliability for Air Force civil infrastructure systems. 
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Research Limitations 
This research focused on providing an objective assessment of current and 
available methods for calculating the reliability of Air Force civil infrastructure systems.  
As with any research effort, it is important to consider the results presented in 
conjunction with the limitations of the research.  This section focuses on limitations 
associated with method selection, data, and applicability of results. 
With respect to the method selected, the Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process 
(NHPP) required an assumption that the systems under consideration received “as bad as 
old” maintenance when a failure was observed.  Prior to data analysis, this research 
deemed this assumption valid with respect to the maintenance strategy for the systems 
considered.  After analyzing the data, this assumption appeared to lose its validity as 
repair actions were noted to improve the performance of some systems.  While a 
limitation of this research, highlighting that this assumption and the NHPP process are 
not effective for analyzing HVAC systems eliminates a method of analysis and narrows 
the focus of future research. 
With respect to the data selected, this research aspired to obtain objective, 
representative data.  Considering failure data, the Air Force does not actively collect 
system failure data but, however, does collect civil infrastructure repair work order (WO) 
data.  Based on indicators in the WO data, this research made assumptions as to which 
WOs represented a system level failure.  The research focused on being as objective as 
possible when identifying failures, however some subjectivity is present when 
determining which WOs indicated a system level failure.  Developing an objective way to 
identify and quantify system failure in Air Force civil infrastructure is offered as a focus 
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for future research.  Having access to such data will only improve efforts to understand 
civil infrastructure reliability. 
Shifting focus to obtaining representative data, based on the detail of data 
collected, this research was not able to determine if the non-failed samples for the 
electrical, fire protection, and plumbing systems were a representation of the non-failed 
population.  This presents a limitation when applying the results of the analysis for those 
systems. 
Lastly, the intent of this research was to improve the understanding of reliability 
for civil systems across the population of the Air Force infrastructure.  A limitation 
associated with this research was the availability of BUILDER® data.  BUILDER® 
inventory data was fundamental to this research.  This research selected installations for 
data collection based on the quality and availability of their BUILDER® inventory data.  
The result of this selection was a sample of installations in hot and humid and hot and dry 
climates and thus the results are more applicable to systems in these environments.  To 
improve the applicability of these results, a more representative sample of installations 
should be selected. 
Implications for Air Force Asset Management 
Air Force civil engineers currently utilize the BUILDER® model to assess risk 
associated with the Air Forces civil infrastructure and prioritize resources according the 
assessed risk.  The fundamental elements of risk are: identifying a possible hazard, 
understanding the consequences of the hazard, and understanding the likelihood of the 
hazard (Ezell, Farr, & Wiese, 2000; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Singh et al., 2007).  
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Remembering that reliability is the mathematical compliment of the probability of failure, 
BUILDER® quantifies the probability of failure in the Air Force Asset Management risk 
model (Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), 2015). 
 
Figure 55: Air Force Risk Model Example (Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), 
2015) 
 
Unfortunately, this research concludes that the BUILDER® model may not be 
providing an accurate assessment of the probability of failure at the system level.  Air 
Force civil engineers are directed to manage their assets in a way that effectively support 
the Air Force mission and minimize asset life cycle cost (Office of the Secretary of the 
Air Force, 2010).  The achievement of these two directives relies heavily on being able to 
accurately quantify the probability of failure for a given asset.  Air Force civil engineers 
cannot understand how effectively an asset is supporting the mission if they cannot 
accurately quantify reliability.  Additionally, Air Force civil engineers cannot effectively 
manage life-cycle spending if the model used to allocate resources relies on an inaccurate 
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reliability calculation.  Given their current asset management methods, asset reliability 
calculation is something Air Force civil engineers cannot afford to get wrong. 
In order to improve the accuracy of Air Force civil engineer reliability analysis, 
this research believes Air Force civil engineers need to establish and quantify the 
relationship between the BUILDER® condition indices and asset failure.  Traditional 
reliability analysis focuses on preventing failures (Høland & Rausand, 1994).  The first 
step to preventing a failure is to identify it and then seek to understand how and why it 
occurred; after which, reliability analysts can assess the effectiveness of improvement 
efforts and provide reliability calculations based on the failure data collected.  Air Force 
civil engineers are not collecting failure data at the detail necessary to make accurate 
reliability calculations.  Collecting more detailed failure data would allow engineers to do 
two things: (1) understand the relationship between asset condition and asset failure and 
(2) use the data to construct more accurate stochastic based reliability models.  The 
discussion of failure data and stochastic based reliability models lends as a useful 
transition to recommendations for future research. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
This section will present topics for future research in civil infrastructure 
reliability.  While not an exhaustive list, this research regards data and methods as 
important focus areas for improving system reliability calculations for Air Force civil 
infrastructure.  This section discusses the use of failure mode and effects analysis as 
possible way to improve failure data and understating.  Additionally, this section 
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introduces finite state Semi Markov Processes as an alternative method for calculating 
repairable system reliability. 
Failure Data 
How would Air Force civil engineers begin to understand failure and collect 
failure data?  One approach is failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA).  FMEA was 
one the first organized techniques for failure analysis and serves as a basis for 
quantitative reliability and availability analysis (Høland & Rausand, 1994).  FMEA is a 
detailed analysis that reliability analysts can use at the system, subsystem, or component 
levels to identify the modes (or events) which cause an asset’s functional failure.  This 
level of analysis could prove a daunting task as a single asset can have numerous failure 
modes (Moubray, 1997).  However, Moubray (1997) argues that daily maintenance is 
managed at the failure mode level.  That is to say, that work orders logged into the 
interim work order management system (IWIMS) are the result of a failure mode.  To 
begin collecting data against these failure modes requires only working through the 
FMEA process.  Having access to the detailed data that would result from a FMEA would 
greatly enhance the accuracy of Air Force civil engineer reliability analysis.  For an 
introduction and detailed overview of the FMEA process, see Høland and Rausand 
(1994) and Moubray (1997) respectively. 
Stochastic Reliability Models 
The second phase of this research attempted to construct a stochastic reliability 
model using a NHPP.  The NHPP method did not prove effective to the systems 
analyzed.  However, this research posits that assessing reliability via a stochastic process 
will yield the most accurate reliability calculations for Air Force civil systems.  This 
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research began preliminary reliability analysis using a finite state Semi-Markov process 
(SMP).  This method used data to model inter arrival times between failures and calculate 
reliability estimates using an algorithm developed by Freels and Warr (2015).  Appendix 
G provides a methodological overview and preliminary results.  Based on the initial 
success of the SMP method, this research believes that further analysis is warranted to 
assess its applicability in Air Force civil engineering reliability analysis. 
Conclusions 
Air Force civil engineers are focused on providing civil infrastructure that both 
effectively supports the Air Force mission and provides service at the lowest life cycle 
cost.  With emphasis on effective mission support, Air Force civil engineers have 
implemented a measure of reliability through BUILDER® to monitor and predict 
infrastructure performance.  The intent of this research was to validate reliability models 
currently used and available to Air Force civil engineers and further the field of reliability 
analysis with respect to repairable civil infrastructure systems.  Ultimately focusing on 
HVAC systems, this research determined that both the PoF and SCI models frequently 
over estimate system reliability, resulting in a larger proportion of false negative 
detections.  This result suggests that Air Force civil engineers cannot accurately asses the 
reliability and performance of some systems.  This impairs their ability to effectively 
manage civil infrastructure that provides effective mission support at the lowest life cycle 
cost.   
In an attempt to improve reliability calculations for repairable civil systems, this 
research proposed the use of an Availability Growth Model using a Nonhomogeneous 
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Poisson Process (NHPP).  However, the NHPP method proved ineffective for modeling 
HVAC systems.  Nevertheless, this research recommends exploration of other stochastic 
methods to assess civil system reliability.  There are numerous methods available in 
reliability analysis.  Given the right application, these methods have the potential to 
improve reliability calculations for Air Force civil engineers and help them more 
effectively manage their civil infrastructure assets. 
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Appendix A. PoF Model Calculation Output 
Barksdale AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1955 81 0.420 0.580 3435 93 0.806 0.194
2914 75 0.634 0.366 3722 72 0.564 0.436
2945 83 0.481 0.519 3725 87 0.843 0.157
3433 85 0.487 0.513 3800 92 0.700 0.300
3578 93 0.786 0.214 4030 85 0.280 0.720
3723 90 0.998 0.002 4168 74 0.467 0.533
4145 78 0.642 0.358 4173 49 0.362 0.638
4161 95 0.946 0.054 4186 80 0.578 0.422
4221 51 0.120 0.880 4359 88 0.354 0.646
4223 85 0.579 0.421 4543 72 0.788 0.212
4351 78 0.836 0.164 4549 87 0.886 0.114
4560 36 0.661 0.339 4631 86 0.705 0.295
4565 92 0.615 0.385 5755 92 0.590 0.410
4714 76 0.704 0.296 5821 23 0.000 1.000
5141 86 0.522 0.478 5821 86 0.763 0.237
5155 87 0.944 0.056 5822 86 0.720 0.280
5441 84 0.879 0.121 6064 48 0.569 0.431
5650 84 0.504 0.496 6200 93 0.842 0.158
5999 93 0.510 0.490 6249 69 0.567 0.433
6067 85 0.419 0.581 6442 93 0.306 0.694
6225 93 0.847 0.153 6626 78 0.600 0.400
6238 91 0.913 0.087 6803 93 0.619 0.381
6402 92 0.899 0.101 6803 55 0.573 0.427
6412 95 0.520 0.480 6824 61 0.215 0.785
6413 90 0.854 0.146 6824 89 0.652 0.348
6603 93 0.949 0.051 6825 84 0.529 0.471
6604 94 0.442 0.558 682 90 0.572 0.428
6809 88 0.863 0.137 6830 88 0.633 0.367
6815 93 0.737 0.263 6836 90 0.817 0.183
6819 91 0.539 0.461 7236 90 0.344 0.656
7251 96 0.793 0.207 7243 98 0.986 0.014
7282 84 0.635 0.365 7274 50 0.464 0.536
7305 91 0.676 0.324 7280 51 0.349 0.651
7306 92 0.725 0.275 7297 90 0.546 0.454
7332 94 0.428 0.572 7574 92 0.734 0.266
7700 86 0.628 0.372 7625 87 0.503 0.497
7710 83 0.407 0.593 18383 86 0.437 0.563
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Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
2914 81 0.620 0.380 1080 94 0.955 0.045
2945 77 0.446 0.554 3435 92 1.000 0.000
3900 94 0.757 0.243 6215 90 0.765 0.235
5546 94 1.000 0.000 6809 90 0.855 0.145
6067 85 0.646 0.354 6810 62 0.149 0.851
6628 88 0.778 0.222 6830 48 0.268 0.732
7236 90 0.536 0.464 6836 87 0.783 0.217
7306 90 0.704 0.296 7332 64 0.471 0.529
7445 94 0.778 0.222 7411 10 0.084 0.916
Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
* Facility Data not available for failed systems 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
4565 92 0.688 0.312 5155 91 0.990 0.010
2914 78 0.698 0.302 6604 93 0.773 0.227
4631 91 0.831 0.169 5224 89 0.879 0.121
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Cannon AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1 85 0.3300 0.6700 9 77 0.6785 0.3215 
22 82 0.4559 0.5441 10 77 0.7035 0.2965 
54 87 0.3426 0.6574 74 89 0.5433 0.4567 
58 85 0.7979 0.2021 75 87 0.4332 0.5668 
60 76 0.9664 0.0336 78 87 0.9789 0.0211 
70 83 0.4867 0.5133 79 66 0.1663 0.8337 
76 83 0.5862 0.4138 106 86 0.2275 0.7725 
77 78 0.6181 0.3819 109 80 0.4578 0.5422 
102 86 0.8191 0.1809 124 90 0.5643 0.4357 
119 85 0.5620 0.4380 125 83 0.6848 0.3152 
122 85 0.4107 0.5893 128 88 0.9002 0.0998 
123 84 0.6477 0.3523 135 83 0.6544 0.3456 
126 81 0.5406 0.4594 173 93 0.9573 0.0427 
130 86 0.4450 0.5550 174 93 0.9659 0.0341 
133 86 0.5068 0.4932 192 93 0.7758 0.2242 
150 86 0.9071 0.0929 204 82 0.6903 0.3097 
155 91 0.7918 0.2082 206 87 0.6765 0.3235 
158 85 0.8335 0.1665 209 84 0.0891 0.9109 
160 86 0.8140 0.1860 212 86 0.4195 0.5805 
164 84 0.4768 0.5232 214 85 0.5943 0.4057 
186 83 0.9375 0.0625 215 86 0.8068 0.1932 
190 84 0.5627 0.4373 226 86 0.2001 0.7999 
194 91 0.6270 0.3730 229 92 0.9153 0.0847 
195 93 0.9170 0.0830 230 100 0.9987 0.0013 
196 91 0.6249 0.3751 250 92 0.9951 0.0049 
197 84 0.4243 0.5757 251 85 0.5472 0.4528 
198 75 0.7784 0.2216 252 72 0.6135 0.3865 
199 86 0.3759 0.6241 253 93 0.6026 0.3974 
208 90 0.9608 0.0392 269 93 0.9921 0.0079 
216 88 0.4974 0.5026 307 93 0.9875 0.0125 
219 85 0.2936 0.7064 317 93 0.9747 0.0253 
234 86 0.9982 0.0018 326 90 0.7104 0.2896 
300 86 0.6835 0.3165 337 79 0.1393 0.8607 
335 74 0.3570 0.6430 356 86 0.6880 0.3120 
379 88 0.3484 0.6516 368 67 0.7269 0.2731 
444 91 0.6593 0.3407 370 93 0.9963 0.0037 
550 86 0.4323 0.5677 374 56 0.6785 0.3215 
555 85 0.7626 0.2374 375 88 0.3234 0.6766 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
593 87 0.9542 0.0458 442 77 0.0000 1.0000 
620 89 0.9511 0.0489 494 86 0.4609 0.5391 
622 86 0.9897 0.0103 575 74 0.8792 0.1208 
680 77 0.5383 0.4617 600 84 0.3997 0.6003 
684 84 0.7920 0.2080 622 86 0.9879 0.0121 
724 97 0.9975 0.0025 624 83 0.2922 0.7078 
777 100 0.9998 0.0002 626 78 0.6510 0.3490 
780 80 0.8880 0.1120 728 88 0.4908 0.5092 
785 88 0.4440 0.5560 772 81 0.6407 0.3593 
790 85 0.8075 0.1925 799 49 0.1882 0.8118 
850 92 0.9542 0.0458 1202 85 0.4115 0.5885 
1111 83 0.4903 0.5097 1265 100 0.9995 0.0005 
1155 84 0.7740 0.2260 1398 86 0.0550 0.9450 
1156 89 0.6342 0.3658 1825 93 0.9820 0.0180 
1159 87 0.9046 0.0954 1898 86 0.0460 0.9540 
1161 86 0.7995 0.2005 2112 83 0.1094 0.8906 
1208 86 0.4737 0.5263 2123 83 0.4080 0.5920 
1225 91 0.9874 0.0126 2207 86 0.0550 0.9450 
1254 86 0.3960 0.6040 2209 100 0.9977 0.0023 
1275 100 1.0000 0.0000 2214 86 0.2240 0.7760 
1404 77 0.3245 0.6755 2220 76 0.8525 0.1475 
1435 99 0.9959 0.0041 2280 67 0.0004 0.9996 
1812 81 0.5859 0.4141 2302 82 0.6316 0.3684 
1816 86 0.4987 0.5013 2304 85 0.0892 0.9108 
1818 86 0.5548 0.4452 2306 94 0.9977 0.0023 
1819 87 0.6042 0.3958 2311 92 0.9153 0.0847 
1820 85 0.6193 0.3807 2315 84 0.5709 0.4291 
1824 93 0.9859 0.0141 2332 84 0.0001 0.9999 
1900 81 0.5657 0.4343 2347 93 0.9921 0.0079 
2110 86 0.1354 0.8646 2348 93 0.9859 0.0141 
2132 86 0.5014 0.4986 2349 97 0.9956 0.0044 
2206 83 0.4354 0.5646 2371 92 0.9977 0.0023 
2320 81 0.5234 0.4766 2372 90 0.9908 0.0092 
2328 96 0.9910 0.0090 2380 100 1.0000 0.0000 
2370 89 0.9803 0.0197 3107 86 0.0177 0.9823 
2379 93 0.9989 0.0011 3252 93 0.9859 0.0141 
4081 90 0.3295 0.6705 4082 90 0.5188 0.4812 
4605 93 0.9980 0.0020 4083 94 0.0321 0.9679 
4606 97 0.9997 0.0003 4619 100 1.0000 0.0000 
4607 100 0.9995 0.0005 4620 98 1.0000 0.0000 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
4609 100 1.0000 0.0000 355 84 0.7699 0.2301 
4623 100 1.0000 0.0000 2300 78 0.5243 0.4757 
4624 100 0.9997 0.0003 2318 76 0.5201 0.4799 
Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
196 92 0.6063 0.3937 103 93 0.9867 0.0133 
444 92 0.5687 0.4313 122 92 0.3613 0.6387 
679 91 0.3976 0.6024 197 93 0.3911 0.6089 
680 77 0.1705 0.8295 214 93 0.7336 0.2664 
772 87 0.8551 0.1449 326 94 0.5147 0.4853 
1275 100 1.0000 0.0000 356 92 0.5972 0.4028 
2209 99 0.9317 0.0683 374 93 0.2932 0.7068 
2300 86 0.4820 0.5180 1156 86 0.7755 0.2245 
2379 93 0.9940 0.0060 2220 92 0.9003 0.0997 
Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
4081 100 0.9999 0.0001 10 83 0.9416 0.0584 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
126 77 0.8340 0.1660 102 94 0.984 0.016 
130 94 0.9316 0.0684 123 90 0.700 0.300 
684 92 0.6856 0.3144 124 87 0.735 0.265 
785 86 0.8741 0.1259 206 91 0.973 0.027 
799 89 0.7018 0.2982 356 94 0.783 0.217 
850 92 0.9470 0.0530 371 94 0.996 0.004 
1435 99 0.9948 0.0052 442 92 0.992 0.008 
2328 99 0.9982 0.0018 4607 100 1.000 0.000 
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Davis Monthan AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
63 78 0.4037 0.5963 38 95 0.3582 0.6418 
70 75 0.8243 0.1757 73 40 0.5633 0.4367 
74 79 0.8058 0.1942 79 76 0.2001 0.7999 
75 66 0.7209 0.2791 129 61 0.5599 0.4401 
96 78 0.4710 0.5290 137 95 0.4757 0.5243 
113 66 0.2639 0.7361 142 73 0.3542 0.6458 
211 84 0.1370 0.8630 165 71 0.9964 0.0036 
220 89 0.8617 0.1383 171 95 0.9720 0.0280 
265 93 0.9936 0.0064 173 84 0.9594 0.0406 
304 95 0.8525 0.1475 182 90 0.0000 1.0000 
306 64 0.4899 0.5101 184 95 0.2294 0.7706 
404 99 0.9594 0.0406 186 10 0.6785 0.3215 
415 100 0.9996 0.0004 208 61 0.4998 0.5002 
1226 98 0.9859 0.0141 253 87 0.9170 0.0830 
1246 73 0.9397 0.0603 254 87 0.9170 0.0830 
1358 75 0.4188 0.5812 269 85 0.9831 0.0169 
1440 85 0.7831 0.2169 1446 88 0.8525 0.1475 
1444 78 0.9977 0.0023 1712 89 0.6980 0.3020 
1550 82 0.8892 0.1108 1740 93 0.8064 0.1936 
1619 86 0.9122 0.0878 2300 74 0.5090 0.4910 
1630 78 0.6630 0.3370 2356 99 0.9814 0.0186 
1631 90 0.8378 0.1622 2402 87 0.9568 0.0432 
1632 88 0.8827 0.1173 2520 94 0.2023 0.7977 
2301 79 0.8174 0.1826 2555 94 0.9410 0.0590 
2505 79 0.5651 0.4349 4065 72 0.7038 0.2962 
2525 77 0.6103 0.3897 4153 70 0.5750 0.4250 
2550 75 0.4082 0.5918 4201 65 0.6573 0.3427 
2612 84 0.8612 0.1388 4455 74 0.8228 0.1772 
2614 73 0.7206 0.2794 4531 69 0.4455 0.5545 
3205 42 0.3844 0.6156 4555 89 0.6682 0.3318 
3208 66 0.5377 0.4623 4710 78 0.6918 0.3082 
3219 63 0.4347 0.5653 4713 78 0.7086 0.2914 
3500 86 0.9302 0.0698 4750 95 0.5536 0.4464 
3501 28 0.2655 0.7345 4818 70 0.6917 0.3083 
4211 76 0.6354 0.3646 4819 37 0.2646 0.7354 
4224 52 0.5861 0.4139 4853 87 0.6146 0.3854 
4300 64 0.5146 0.4854 5010 68 0.7313 0.2687 
4400 84 0.9698 0.0302 5111 59 0.3569 0.6431 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
4413 72 0.7704 0.2296 5126 77 0.4190 0.5810 
4414 76 0.5364 0.4636 5251 77 0.4570 0.5430 
4701 100 0.9073 0.0927 5258 89 0.4247 0.5753 
4800 81 0.8770 0.1230 5301 59 0.2001 0.7999 
4809 82 0.8617 0.1383 5303 93 0.7696 0.2304 
4815 79 0.4663 0.5337 5314 58 0.1960 0.8040 
4820 70 0.3204 0.6796 5315 60 0.5007 0.4993 
4824 80 0.8128 0.1872 5405 70 0.9594 0.0406 
4826 86 0.4024 0.5976 5423 64 0.5850 0.4150 
4832 94 0.9972 0.0028 5434 59 0.6678 0.3322 
4838 93 0.9899 0.0101 7230 78 0.3295 0.6705 
4859 86 0.9415 0.0585 7236 10 0.0705 0.9295 
4885 96 0.9994 0.0006 7323 82 0.9030 0.0970 
4889 99 1.0000 0.0000 7328 69 0.6227 0.3773 
5129 68 0.6844 0.3156 7391 87 0.9302 0.0698 
5247 87 0.8797 0.1203 7405 89 0.4510 0.5490 
5256 73 0.7048 0.2952 7406 89 0.6621 0.3379 
5420 82 0.8893 0.1107 7410 70 0.8525 0.1475 
5500 84 0.9822 0.0178 7421 70 0.9153 0.0847 
5600 92 0.9646 0.0354 7427 95 0.6785 0.3215 
5607 82 0.9070 0.0930 7431 85 0.4081 0.5919 
6000 77 0.7529 0.2471 7454 90 0.6585 0.3415 
6006 90 0.9757 0.0243 7455 69 0.7269 0.2731 
7439 80 0.6001 0.3999 7513 67 0.6452 0.3548 
7514 76 0.5845 0.4155 7830 90 0.9594 0.0406 
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Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
12 91 0.4974 0.5026 290 60 0.6240 0.3760 
184 95 0.7481 0.2519 1447 73 0.4586 0.5414 
188 95 0.6864 0.3136 2352 90 0.9046 0.0954 
220 90 0.8916 0.1084 2353 90 0.9046 0.0954 
1632 78 0.5607 0.4393 5607 75 0.5103 0.4897 
2521 94 0.4351 0.5649 7104 96 0.6923 0.3077 
4413 76 0.6930 0.3070 7109 95 0.3946 0.6054 
4701 92 0.4890 0.5110 7333 93 0.8746 0.1254 
4707 91 0.6885 0.3115 7432 86 0.5422 0.4578 
4800 91 0.3796 0.6204 7433 95 0.8525 0.1475 
5230 86 0.9192 0.0808 7440 90 0.5677 0.4323 
5430 83 0.2588 0.7412 7506 92 0.4490 0.5510 
Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
129 64 0.3686 0.6314 5111 48 0.2600 0.7400 
183 78 0.8376 0.1624 5010 11 0.6563 0.3437 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
130 65 0.6076 0.3924 7232 95 0.8466 0.1534 
2350 84 0.8897 0.1103 4820 75 0.8678 0.1322 
96 87 0.7686 0.2314 5420 72 0.5310 0.4690 
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Keesler AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
404 98 0.9893 0.0107 222 91 0.7335 0.2665 
470 92 0.6529 0.3471 233 83 0.6329 0.3671 
1203 85 0.5644 0.4356 237 93 0.9981 0.0019 
1906 92 0.8255 0.1745 414 84 0.3942 0.6058 
2004 36 0.4679 0.5321 417 97 0.9352 0.0648 
2306 100 0.9968 0.0032 2818 87 0.6482 0.3518 
2505 72 0.6800 0.3200 2901 90 0.4636 0.5364 
2801 62 0.8135 0.1865 3101 87 0.8575 0.1425 
2804 93 0.7230 0.2770 3518 98 0.9864 0.0136 
2816 92 0.3847 0.6153 3823 91 0.6349 0.3651 
2902 89 0.3931 0.6069 3945 92 0.7622 0.2378 
3501 83 0.6300 0.3700 4002 84 0.6020 0.3980 
3903 80 0.2747 0.7253 4204 89 0.7792 0.2208 
4106 91 0.7848 0.2152 4213 92 0.8918 0.1082 
4263 84 0.9090 0.0910 4281 94 0.9397 0.0603 
4266 84 0.8698 0.1302 4309 90 0.5626 0.4374 
4301 84 0.5011 0.4989 4330 72 0.6480 0.3520 
4605 84 0.4509 0.5491 4408 97 0.9877 0.0123 
4707 82 0.9588 0.0412 4609 99 0.9859 0.0141 
5745 92 0.8421 0.1579 5025 98 0.9739 0.0261 
5904 92 0.6820 0.3180 6902 76 0.5504 0.4496 
6950 45 0.6781 0.3219 6903 57 0.3701 0.6299 
7320 51 0.7065 0.2935 7408 89 0.3519 0.6481 
7701 92 0.5041 0.4959 7409 86 0.5122 0.4878 
7704 79 0.3352 0.6648 7712 91 0.6911 0.3089 
Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1101 90 0.9950 0.0050 308 93 0.7980 0.2020 
3501 79 0.5626 0.4374 1203 84 0.5465 0.4535 
4106 93 0.7653 0.2347 2004 83 0.7734 0.2266 
4221 99 0.9833 0.0167 4213 93 0.8749 0.1251 
4301 74 0.1981 0.8019 4225 99 0.9840 0.0160 
4329 93 0.5126 0.4874 4266 93 0.8402 0.1598 
6734 84 0.9684 0.0316 4331 83 0.9156 0.0844 
6965 90 0.8531 0.1469 5904 83 0.8653 0.1347 
7315 90 0.8140 0.1860 2902 80 0.7611 0.2389 
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Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1101 52 0.8466 0.1534 1704 24 0.4291 0.5709 
1201 87 1.0000 0.0000 4004 87 0.5533 0.4467 
1510 94 0.9674 0.0326 4213 87 0.8830 0.1170 
3101 5 0.6725 0.3275 4247 92 0.8652 0.1348 
4410 76 0.4598 0.5402 4278 93 0.8909 0.1091 
4432 4 0.7003 0.2997 4408 97 0.9957 0.0043 
7404 80 0.4611 0.5389 6732 96 0.9113 0.0887 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
*Facility data not available for failed systems 
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Patrick AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
6 90 0.3868 0.6132 204 81 0.9807 0.0193 
206 81 0.9722 0.0278 205 81 0.9773 0.0227 
253 92 0.9354 0.0646 236 92 0.9404 0.0596 
265 76 0.6790 0.3210 255 87 0.7129 0.2871 
308 85 0.8123 0.1877 264 90 0.4785 0.5215 
312 83 0.9078 0.0922 335 89 0.6033 0.3967 
313 87 0.7830 0.2170 345 92 0.6663 0.3337 
319 18 0.2000 0.8000 401 86 0.4498 0.5502 
350 82 0.5550 0.4450 432 88 0.5878 0.4122 
352 85 0.7936 0.2064 505 90 0.9770 0.0230 
402 92 0.8314 0.1686 511 78 0.8515 0.1485 
404 81 0.3442 0.6558 513 91 0.4709 0.5291 
415 84 0.8607 0.1393 521 92 0.8657 0.1343 
423 82 0.7331 0.2669 523 86 0.7551 0.2449 
424 83 0.6928 0.3072 530 83 0.6754 0.3246 
425 82 0.4021 0.5979 534 91 0.7254 0.2746 
431 90 0.6381 0.3619 535 93 0.5023 0.4977 
502 68 0.3964 0.6036 537 83 0.5759 0.4241 
533 92 0.3901 0.6099 561 68 0.0254 0.9746 
543 91 0.9996 0.0004 606 53 0.1817 0.8183 
545 83 0.5488 0.4512 657 92 0.9594 0.0406 
546 83 0.5152 0.4848 673 84 0.4819 0.5181 
550 78 0.7468 0.2532 676 87 0.7628 0.2372 
556 83 0.9275 0.0725 689 89 0.9901 0.0099 
559 91 0.7598 0.2402 692 92 0.9397 0.0603 
560 83 0.5408 0.4592 700 93 0.7725 0.2275 
577 92 0.9837 0.0163 708 80 0.0550 0.9450 
629 91 0.9421 0.0579 818 81 0.7725 0.2275 
654 84 1.0000 0.0000 912 88 0.5230 0.4770 
671 87 0.8093 0.1907 917 93 0.8525 0.1475 
681 91 0.9048 0.0952 953 91 0.9859 0.0141 
698 45 0.5948 0.4052 957 91 0.9893 0.0107 
702 87 0.7036 0.2964 960 92 0.8862 0.1138 
710 82 0.8755 0.1245 1343 90 0.8371 0.1629 
720 83 0.7725 0.2275 1365 90 0.7181 0.2819 
721 93 0.8145 0.1855 1366 91 0.9272 0.0728 
722 90 0.6451 0.3549 1371 80 0.6415 0.3585 
732 89 0.9002 0.0998 1374 44 0.6415 0.3585 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
750 53 0.8113 0.1887 1376 88 0.9977 0.0023 
751 92 0.8882 0.1118 1388 91 0.9595 0.0405 
810 81 0.7532 0.2468 1390 82 0.3683 0.6317 
820 82 0.7317 0.2683 1392 93 0.7269 0.2731 
821 85 0.7161 0.2839 1399 92 0.6785 0.3215 
822 87 0.4594 0.5406 1433 80 0.0321 0.9679 
910 85 0.9138 0.0862 1435 84 0.1370 0.8630 
935 91 0.9773 0.0227 1440 93 0.1370 0.8630 
938 93 0.8195 0.1805 1475 82 0.8297 0.1703 
945 84 0.4078 0.5922 1493 92 0.8023 0.1977 
961 83 0.5539 0.4461 1498 90 0.2784 0.7216 
967 91 0.8993 0.1007 1373 92 0.9594 0.0406 
969 91 0.6925 0.3075 1432 84 0.1370 0.8630 
978 92 0.8862 0.1138 610 32 0.1370 0.8630 
981 84 0.6836 0.3164 699 92 0.9397 0.0603 
984 79 0.6306 0.3694 306 88 0.8147 0.1853 
985 92 0.7632 0.2368 925 91 0.4984 0.5016 
986 88 0.9612 0.0388 1437 93 0.1370 0.8630 
988 79 0.5039 0.4961 997 91 0.9734 0.0266 
989 81 0.5447 0.4553 679 30 0.4337 0.5663 
991 87 0.6953 0.3047 884 1 0.5760 0.4240 
992 91 0.9934 0.0066 1372 87 0.7855 0.2145 
993 82 0.7695 0.2305 605 68 0.2784 0.7216 
994 91 0.8699 0.1301 503 70 0.3964 0.6036 
996 99 0.9872 0.0128 691 33 0.2242 0.7758 
998 83 0.8432 0.1568 1502 92 0.8862 0.1138 
1000 97 0.9696 0.0304 1060 92 0.6028 0.3972 
1317 89 0.7402 0.2598 9001 92 0.9747 0.0253 
1319 92 0.9364 0.0636 891 78 0.5309 0.4691 
1337 92 0.9594 0.0406 653 93 0.9193 0.0807 
1350 86 0.6486 0.3514 1401 66 0.0550 0.9450 
1358 91 0.9934 0.0066 266 83 0.8862 0.1138 
1364 81 0.5437 0.4563 3650 82 0.9397 0.0603 
1368 93 0.9198 0.0802 990 33 0.5425 0.4575 
1369 88 0.7155 0.2845 1361 30 0.8377 0.1623 
1379 100 0.9996 0.0004 647 91 0.6438 0.3562 
1391 90 0.7140 0.2860 882 92 0.8862 0.1138 
1402 93 0.8755 0.1245 407 84 0.5760 0.4240 
1500 92 0.8830 0.1170 453 79 0.9996 0.0004 
3656 73 0.9059 0.0941 337 87 0.6667 0.3333 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
3659 84 0.7308 0.2692 1470 87 0.0387 0.9613 
5101 75 0.8177 0.1823 408 92 0.8527 0.1473 
5105 81 0.8110 0.1890 819 91 0.7725 0.2275 
Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
550 93 0.9913 0.0087 264 94 0.9773 0.0227 
661 93 1.0000 0.0000 556 92 0.9260 0.0740 
692 92 0.9397 0.0603 561 85 0.7827 0.2173 
750 70 0.8941 0.1059 605 85 0.8116 0.1884 
821 93 0.8437 0.1563 606 91 0.9994 0.0006 
822 89 0.8416 0.1584 635 85 0.9352 0.0648 
989 92 0.6433 0.3567 676 85 0.9594 0.0406 
1475 86 0.7363 0.2637 708 94 0.8525 0.1475 
3656 91 0.9863 0.0137 721 85 0.7725 0.2275 
 
Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
306 99 0.8980 0.1020 29 75 0.8533 0.1467 
313 44 0.0790 0.9210 236 9 0.6540 0.3460 
350 96 0.9743 0.0257 251 96 0.6551 0.3449 
352 99 0.9951 0.0049 308 98 0.8980 0.1020 
502 10 0.6540 0.3460 311 67 0.9055 0.0945 
503 83 0.4618 0.5382 345 82 0.5411 0.4589 
545 3 0.1008 0.8992 415 78 0.8638 0.1362 
698 88 0.8749 0.1251 511 43 0.7538 0.2462 
750 89 0.4867 0.5133 522 44 0.7559 0.2441 
810 49 0.7552 0.2448 533 28 0.6540 0.3460 
821 99 0.9939 0.0061 546 11 0.1254 0.8746 
822 97 0.8963 0.1037 561 89 0.9651 0.0349 
967 59 0.7671 0.2329 624 91 0.7204 0.2796 
985 15 0.4731 0.5269 629 75 0.6930 0.3070 
986 12 0.3253 0.6747 630 76 0.9161 0.0839 
996 90 0.5856 0.4144 632 89 0.7821 0.2179 
1000 100 0.9906 0.0094 651 87 0.8376 0.1624 
1319 98 0.9791 0.0209 671 88 0.8537 0.1463 
1391 27 0.3470 0.6530 672 90 0.8376 0.1624 
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Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1433 88 0.8698 0.1302 980 80 0.9069 0.0931 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
986 88 0.8109 0.1891 533 92 0.9608 0.0392 
439 85 0.4468 0.5532 530 85 0.4393 0.5607 
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Scott AFB 
HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
3 65 0.5981 0.4019 5 92 0.6973 0.3027 
8 92 0.9694 0.0306 6 73 0.6256 0.3744 
10 95 0.9412 0.0588 44 15 0.3955 0.6045 
40 52 0.7009 0.2991 54 83 0.7356 0.2644 
43 86 0.6923 0.3077 150 83 0.8981 0.1019 
50 67 0.6600 0.3400 352 92 0.8499 0.1501 
52 87 0.9127 0.0873 386 72 0.7286 0.2714 
56 90 0.8415 0.1585 464 92 0.8358 0.1642 
57 84 0.7377 0.2623 468 93 0.9397 0.0603 
60 93 0.7469 0.2531 513 87 0.3863 0.6137 
61 93 0.6648 0.3352 514 80 0.5324 0.4676 
382 91 0.9953 0.0047 516 93 0.6432 0.3568 
433 84 0.5972 0.4028 517 72 0.6012 0.3988 
450 91 0.4473 0.5527 528 92 0.8588 0.1412 
460 93 0.7058 0.2942 531 93 0.7836 0.2164 
470 96 0.9784 0.0216 549 88 0.6957 0.3043 
506 87 0.9995 0.0005 742 85 0.6402 0.3598 
548 87 0.8225 0.1775 750 84 0.5275 0.4725 
555 93 0.5007 0.4993 755 91 0.9801 0.0199 
700 82 0.4329 0.5671 859 92 0.7868 0.2132 
861 48 0.2650 0.7350 1089 99 0.9951 0.0049 
864 93 0.8724 0.1276 1191 93 0.6705 0.3295 
868 57 0.4866 0.5134 1420 75 0.9575 0.0425 
1192 83 0.7175 0.2825 1425 98 0.9859 0.0141 
1422 82 0.8215 0.1785 1426 82 0.9575 0.0425 
1423 98 0.9994 0.0006 1427 98 0.9859 0.0141 
1424 83 0.9575 0.0425 1428 82 0.9575 0.0425 
1441 92 0.5452 0.4548 1430 84 0.7407 0.2593 
1510 60 0.2899 0.7101 1443 78 0.7407 0.2593 
1513 38 0.3197 0.6803 1515 92 0.9738 0.0262 
1521 89 0.9995 0.0005 1529 83 0.5383 0.4617 
1533 93 0.4629 0.5371 1530 79 0.4108 0.5892 
1560 94 0.8645 0.1355 1534 91 0.8909 0.1091 
1600 42 0.6588 0.3412 1575 68 0.4586 0.5414 
1620 78 0.6881 0.3119 1601 35 0.0869 0.9131 
1650 93 0.9261 0.0739 1907 72 0.7040 0.2960 
1670 85 0.4995 0.5005 1980 77 0.5491 0.4509 
1700 88 0.6753 0.3247 1981 77 0.9193 0.0807 
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HVAC Failed HVAC Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
1800 72 0.9693 0.0307 3272 38 0.2053 0.7947 
1805 71 0.7097 0.2903 3284 93 0.9200 0.0800 
1807 86 0.9831 0.0169 3285 65 0.6759 0.3241 
1820 95 0.8169 0.1831 3292 47 0.0200 0.9800 
1830 65 0.5688 0.4312 3300 99 0.8408 0.1592 
1850 91 0.9772 0.0228 3301 24 0.1204 0.8796 
1900 92 0.7408 0.2592 3307 0 0.0000 1.0000 
1906 64 0.8494 0.1506 3600 93 0.5080 0.4920 
1930 77 0.7233 0.2767 3651 89 0.6404 0.3596 
1934 50 0.3278 0.6722 3652 84 0.7120 0.2880 
1940 93 0.8130 0.1870 3677 92 0.5505 0.4495 
1948 78 0.8276 0.1724 3901 87 0.8400 0.1600 
1961 78 0.7903 0.2097 4010 67 0.7668 0.2332 
1981 78 0.9193 0.0807 4020 82 0.8327 0.1673 
1987 70 0.7845 0.2155 4022 78 0.8073 0.1927 
1989 55 0.6061 0.3939 4024 92 0.9107 0.0893 
3189 63 0.4559 0.5441 4030 93 0.8702 0.1298 
3192 93 0.6700 0.3300 4032 92 0.8834 0.1166 
3650 86 0.6596 0.3404 4036 93 0.9457 0.0543 
3689 2 0.4420 0.5580 5000 79 0.7977 0.2023 
3900 84 0.6994 0.3006 5008 78 0.7983 0.2017 
4001 87 0.8621 0.1379 5022 80 0.7742 0.2258 
4560 93 0.6348 0.3652 5046 91 0.6483 0.3517 
4780 93 0.7703 0.2297 5048 77 0.9805 0.0195 
5713 90 0.9237 0.0763 5498 35 0.6356 0.3644 
 
Electric Failed Electric Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
40 92 0.9942 0.0058 382 92 0.9918 0.0082 
352 93 0.7820 0.2180 460 92 0.8837 0.1163 
57 92 0.6346 0.3654 861 81 0.4736 0.5264 
433 88 0.6069 0.3931 1510 88 0.7604 0.2396 
533 52 0.1993 0.8007 1620 93 0.7226 0.2774 
859 92 0.7601 0.2399 1807 87 0.9856 0.0144 
1515 93 0.9783 0.0217 1900 90 0.3332 0.6668 
1521 91 0.9189 0.0811 3284 93 0.8994 0.1006 
1530 86 0.8633 0.1367 3289 41 0.4172 0.5828 
4001 94 0.4716 0.5284 3650 94 0.5033 0.4967 
4024 93 0.9299 0.0701 3900 87 0.5800 0.4200 
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Fire Protection Failed Fire Protection Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
506 85 0.9939 0.0061 750 10 0.7856 0.2144 
1948 93 0.7784 0.2216 861 93 0.8045 0.1955 
Plumbing Failed Plumbing Non-Failed 
Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) Fac Nmbr SCI R(t) Pf(t) 
3 92 0.3730 0.6270 1191 90 0.8425 0.1575 
1575 91 0.6043 0.3957 1807 93 0.9899 0.0101 
1700 88 0.7060 0.2940 1900 89 0.4852 0.5148 
3900 91 0.7360 0.2640 3189 80 0.7158 0.2842 
 
 
Note: SCI values were not calculated via the PoF model.  SCI values were pulled 
from BUILDER® for CY14. 
 
 
  
 125 
Appendix B.  R code for Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) model 
The below code represents the Ordered Weighted Average method to construct 
the Probabilistic Assessment of Failure (PoF) model. This research created an R function 
for the four major systems considered. Once created, a user needs only to input the 
component-section average age. 
Plumbing System (D20) 
D20 = function(bldg, 
               d211,d212,d213,d214,d215,d216,d217,d219, 
               d221,d222,d223,d224,d225,d229, 
               d231,d232,d233,d234,d235,d239, 
               d241,d242,d243,d244,d249, 
               d291,d292,d293,d294,d295,d299) { 
#Year of Data Being Pulled 
  yr =  
#Put into component vectors 
  i.21 = c(d211,d212,d213,d214,d215,d216,d217,d219) 
  i.22 = c(d221,d222,d223,d224,d225,d229) 
  i.23 = c(d231,d232,d233,d234,d235,d239) 
  i.24 = c(d241,d242,d243,d244,d249) 
  i.29 = c(d291,d292,d293,d294,d295,d299) 
#Return Logic Weight vectors 
  lg.21 = (as.logical(i.21)) 
  lg.22 = (as.logical(i.22)) 
  lg.23 = (as.logical(i.23)) 
  lg.24 = (as.logical(i.24)) 
  lg.29 = (as.logical(i.29)) 
#Assign C‐S Weights 
  w1.21 = c(.6375,.4067,.6500,.5375,1.0,1.0,.4933,1.0) 
  w1.22 = c(.3030,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0) 
  w1.23 = c(.4114,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,.4750) 
  w1.24 = c(1.0,.5475,.9014,1.0,1.0) 
  w1.29 = c(.4360,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,.5083) 
#Standardize the C‐S Weight cs 
  w.21 = w1.21*lg.21 
  w.22 = w1.22*lg.22 
  w.23 = w1.23*lg.23 
 126 
  w.24 = w1.24*lg.24 
  w.29 = w1.29*lg.29 
 
  w.21 = w.21[w.21 != 0 ] 
  w.22 = w.22[w.22 != 0 ] 
  w.23 = w.23[w.23 != 0 ] 
  w.24 = w.24[w.24 != 0 ] 
  w.29 = w.29[w.29 != 0 ] 
 
  w.21 = w.21/sum(w.21) 
  w.22 = w.22/sum(w.22) 
  w.23 = w.23/sum(w.23) 
  w.24 = w.24/sum(w.24) 
  w.29 = w.29/sum(w.29) 
#Assign Service Lives 
  l.21 = c(25,25,25,25,25,10,25,15) 
  l.22 = c(50,25,25,25,25,8) 
  l.23 = c(50,25,25,25,25,100) 
  l.24 = c(25,25,25,25,25) 
  l.29 = c(15,25,25,25,25,25) 
#Calculate t as a percentage of service life 
  t.21 = ((yr‐i.21)/l.21)*lg.21 
  t.22 = ((yr‐i.22)/l.22)*lg.22 
  t.23 = ((yr‐i.23)/l.23)*lg.23 
  t.24 = ((yr‐i.24)/l.24)*lg.24 
  t.29 = ((yr‐i.29)/l.29)*lg.29 
#Calculate PoF vector 
  pof.21 = c(); pof.22=c();pof.23=c();pof.24=c();pof.25=c();pof.26=c();pof.27=c();pof.29=c(
); 
  b = 1 
  a = 2.64  
  CI_t = .37 
  for(i in 1:length(t.21)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.21[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.21[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.22)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.22[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.22[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.23)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.23[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.23[i] = pof 
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  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.24)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.24[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.24[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.29)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.29[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.29[i] = pof 
  } 
#Sort PoF Vector 
  pof.21 = sort(pof.21, decreasing = T) 
  pof.22 = sort(pof.22, decreasing = T) 
  pof.23 = sort(pof.23, decreasing = T) 
  pof.24 = sort(pof.24, decreasing = T) 
  pof.29 = sort(pof.29, decreasing = T) 
#Assign CII Weights 
  if (sum(pof.21) == 0){c.21 = 0}else {c.21 = .4472} 
  if (sum(pof.22) == 0){c.22 = 0}else {c.22 = .5419} 
  if (sum(pof.23) == 0){c.23 = 0}else {c.23 = .6279} 
  if (sum(pof.24) == 0){c.24 = 0}else {c.24 = .5216} 
  if (sum(pof.29) == 0){c.29 = 0}else {c.29 = .3025} 
#Standardize CII Weights 
  sys.wt.2 = c(c.21,c.22,c.23,c.24,c.29) 
  sys.wt.2 = sys.wt.2[sys.wt.2 != 0 ] 
  sys.wt.2 = (sys.wt.2/(sum(sys.wt.2))) 
#Remove zeroes from PoF vectors 
  pof.21 = pof.21[pof.21 != 0 ] 
  pof.22 = pof.22[pof.22 != 0 ] 
  pof.23 = pof.23[pof.23 != 0 ] 
  pof.24 = pof.24[pof.24 != 0 ] 
  pof.29 = pof.29[pof.29 != 0 ] 
#Compute Compontent Level ORAND Operators 
  pofc.21 = crossprod(pof.21,w.21) 
  pofc.22 = crossprod(pof.22,w.22) 
  pofc.23 = crossprod(pof.23,w.23) 
  pofc.24 = crossprod(pof.24,w.24) 
  pofc.29 = crossprod(pof.29,w.29) 
  comp.op.2 = c(pofc.21,pofc.22,pofc.23,pofc.24,pofc.29) 
#Sort the Component level vector 
  comp.op.2 = comp.op.2[comp.op.2 != 0 ] 
  comp.op.2 = sort(comp.op.2, decreasing = T) 
#Calculate System PoF 
sys.pof.fail.2 = crossprod(sys.wt.2,comp.op.2) 
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sys.pof.fail.2 
} 
HVAC System (D30) 
D30 = function(bldg, 
               d311,d312,d313,d314,d315,d316,d317,d319, 
               d321,d322,d323,d324,d325,d329, 
               d331,d332,d339, 
               d341,d342,d343,d344,d345,d346,d347,d348,d349, 
               d351,d352,d353,d354,d355,d356,d359, 
               d361,d362,d363,d364,d365,d369, 
               d371,d372,d373,d379, 
               d391,d392,d399) { 
  yr =  
  #Put ages into component vectors 
  i.31 = c(d311,d312,d313,d314,d315,d316,d317,d319) 
  i.32 = c(d321,d322,d323,d324,d325,d329) 
  i.33 = c(d331,d332,d339) 
  i.34 = c(d341,d342,d343,d344,d345,d346,d347,d348,d349) 
  i.35 = c(d351,d352,d353,d354,d355,d356,d359) 
  i.36 = c(d361,d362,d363,d364,d365,d369) 
  i.37 = c(d371,d372,d373,d379) 
  i.39 = c(d391,d392,d399) 
  #Return Logic vectors 
  lg.31 = (as.logical(i.31)) 
  lg.32 = (as.logical(i.32)) 
  lg.33 = (as.logical(i.33)) 
  lg.34 = (as.logical(i.34)) 
  lg.35 = (as.logical(i.35)) 
  lg.36 = (as.logical(i.36)) 
  lg.37 = (as.logical(i.37)) 
  lg.39 = (as.logical(i.39)) 
  #Assign C‐S Weights 
  w1.31 = c(1.0,0.2,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0) 
  w1.32 = c(1.0,0.5265,.4247,.648,1.0,1.0) 
  w1.33 = c(1.0,1.0,0.09) 
  w1.34 = c(.31,.436,1.0,1.0,.2186,1.0,1.0,1.0,.1775) 
  w1.35 = c(1,1,1,.2640,.2725,1,.2718) 
  w1.36 = c(1,.5650,.5650,1,1,.4325) 
  w1.37 = c(1,1,1,1) 
  w1.39 = c(1,1,.2344) 
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#Standardize the C‐S Weight cs  
  w.31 = w1.31*lg.31 
  w.32 = w1.32*lg.32 
  w.33 = w1.33*lg.33  
  w.34 = w1.34*lg.34 
  w.35 = w1.35*lg.35 
  w.36 = w1.36*lg.36 
  w.37 = w1.37*lg.37 
  w.39 = w1.39*lg.39 
   
  w.31 = w.31[w.31 != 0 ] 
  w.32 = w.32[w.32 != 0 ] 
  w.33 = w.33[w.33 != 0 ] 
  w.34 = w.34[w.34 != 0 ] 
  w.35 = w.35[w.35 != 0 ] 
  w.36 = w.36[w.36 != 0 ] 
  w.37 = w.37[w.37 != 0 ] 
  w.39 = w.39[w.39 != 0 ] 
   
  w.31 = w.31/sum(w.31) 
  w.32 = w.32/sum(w.32) 
  w.33 = w.33/sum(w.33) 
  w.34 = w.34/sum(w.34) 
  w.35 = w.35/sum(w.35) 
  w.36 = w.36/sum(w.36) 
  w.37 = w.37/sum(w.37) 
  w.39 = w.39/sum(w.39) 
  #Assign Service Lives vectors 
  l.31 = c(20,50,20,20,25,20,20,20) 
  l.32 = c(30,15,25,20,20,20) 
  l.33 = c(20,20,15) 
  l.34 = c(20,30,20,20,30,20,10,15,30) 
  l.35 = c(20,25,15,30,25,20,25) 
  l.36 = c(20,10,10,25,20,10) 
  l.37 = c(20,20,20,20) 
  l.39 = c(20,20,20) 
  #Calculate t as a percentage of service life 
  t.31 = ((yr‐i.31)/l.31)*lg.31 
  t.32 = ((yr‐i.32)/l.32)*lg.32 
  t.33 = ((yr‐i.33)/l.33)*lg.33 
  t.34 = ((yr‐i.34)/l.34)*lg.34 
  t.35 = ((yr‐i.35)/l.35)*lg.35 
  t.36 = ((yr‐i.36)/l.36)*lg.36 
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  t.37 = ((yr‐i.37)/l.37)*lg.37 
  t.39 = ((yr‐i.39)/l.39)*lg.39 
#Calculate PoF vector 
pof.31 = c(); pof.32=c();pof.33=c();pof.34=c();pof.35=c();pof.36=c();pof.37=c();pof.39=c(); 
b = 1  
a = 2.64  
CI_t = .37 
for(i in 1:length(t.31)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.31[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.31[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.32)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.32[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.32[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.33)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.33[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.33[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.34)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.34[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.34[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.35)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.35[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.35[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.36)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.36[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.36[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.37)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.37[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.37[i] = pof 
} 
for(i in 1:length(t.39)){ 
  pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.39[i]/b)^a) 
  pof.39[i] = pof 
} 
#Sort PoF Vector 
pof.31 = sort(pof.31, decreasing = T) 
pof.32 = sort(pof.32, decreasing = T) 
pof.33 = sort(pof.33, decreasing = T) 
 131 
pof.34 = sort(pof.34, decreasing = T) 
pof.35 = sort(pof.35, decreasing = T) 
pof.36 = sort(pof.36, decreasing = T) 
pof.37 = sort(pof.37, decreasing = T) 
pof.39 = sort(pof.39, decreasing = T) 
#Assign CII Weights  
if (sum(pof.31) == 0){c.31 = 0} else {c.31 = .3163} 
if (sum(pof.32) == 0){c.32 = 0} else {c.32 = .6363} 
if (sum(pof.33) == 0){c.33 = 0} else {c.33 = .5755} 
if (sum(pof.34) == 0){c.34 = 0} else {c.34 = .4835} 
if (sum(pof.35) == 0){c.35 = 0} else {c.35 = .5836} 
if (sum(pof.36) == 0){c.36 = 0} else {c.36 = .5014} 
if (sum(pof.37) == 0){c.37 = 0} else {c.37 = .5168} 
if (sum(pof.39) == 0){c.39 = 0} else {c.39 = .3239} 
sys.wt = c(c.31,c.32,c.33,c.34,c.35,c.36,c.37,c.39) 
sys.wt = sys.wt[sys.wt != 0 ] 
sys.wt = (sys.wt/(sum(sys.wt))) 
#Remove zeroes from PoF vectors 
pof.31 = pof.31[pof.31 != 0 ] 
pof.32 = pof.32[pof.32 != 0 ] 
pof.33 = pof.33[pof.33 != 0 ] 
pof.34 = pof.34[pof.34 != 0 ] 
pof.35 = pof.35[pof.35 != 0 ] 
pof.36 = pof.36[pof.36 != 0 ] 
pof.37 = pof.37[pof.37 != 0 ] 
pof.39 = pof.39[pof.39 != 0 ] 
# Compute Compontent Level ORAND Operators 
pofc.31 = crossprod(pof.31,w.31) 
pofc.32 = crossprod(pof.32,w.32) 
pofc.33 = crossprod(pof.33,w.33) 
pofc.34 = crossprod(pof.34,w.34) 
pofc.35 = crossprod(pof.35,w.35) 
pofc.36 = crossprod(pof.36,w.36) 
pofc.37 = crossprod(pof.37,w.37) 
pofc.39 = crossprod(pof.39,w.39) 
comp.op = c(pofc.31,pofc.32,pofc.33,pofc.34,pofc.35,pofc.36,pofc.37,pofc.39) 
#Sort the Component level vector 
comp.op = comp.op[comp.op != 0 ] 
comp.op = sort(comp.op, decreasing = T) 
#Calculate System PoF 
sys.pof.fail = crossprod(sys.wt,comp.op) 
sys.pof.fail 
} 
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Fire Protection System (D40) 
D40 = function(bldg, 
               d411,d412, 
               d421,d422, 
               d431, 
               d441,d442, 
               d451, 
               d491,d492,d494,d494,d499) { 
#Year of Data Being Pulled 
  yr =  
#Put into component vectors 
  i.41 = c(d411,d412) 
  i.42 = c(d411,d412) 
  i.43 = c(d431) 
  i.44 = c(d441,d442) 
  i.45 = c(d451) 
  i.49 = c(d491,d492,d493,d494,d499) 
#Return Logic Weight vectors 
  lg.41 = (as.logical(i.41)) 
  lg.42 = (as.logical(i.42)) 
  lg.43 = (as.logical(i.43)) 
  lg.44 = (as.logical(i.44)) 
  lg.45 = (as.logical(i.45)) 
  lg.49 = (as.logical(i.49)) 
#Assign C‐S Weights 
  w1.41 = c(1.0,0.3613) 
  w1.42 = c(1.0,1.0) 
  w1.43 = c(.2114) 
  w1.44 = c(.3150,.3150) 
  w1.45 = c(1.0) 
  w1.49 = c(.4700,1.0,1.0,.4700,1.0) 
#Standardize the C‐S Weight cs 
  w.41 = w1.41*lg.41 
  w.42 = w1.42*lg.42 
  w.43 = w1.43*lg.43  
  w.44 = w1.44*lg.44 
  w.45 = w1.45*lg.45 
  w.49 = w1.49*lg.49 
   
  w.41 = w.41[w.41 != 0 ] 
  w.42 = w.42[w.42 != 0 ] 
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  w.43 = w.43[w.43 != 0 ] 
  w.44 = w.44[w.44 != 0 ] 
  w.45 = w.45[w.45 != 0 ] 
  w.49 = w.49[w.49 != 0 ] 
   
  w.41 = w.41/sum(w.41) 
  w.42 = w.42/sum(w.42) 
  w.43 = w.43/sum(w.43) 
  w.44 = w.44/sum(w.44) 
  w.45 = w.45/sum(w.45) 
  w.49 = w.49/sum(w.49) 
#Assign Service Lives #Working# 
  l.41 = c(20,20) 
  l.42 = c(20,20) 
  l.43 = c(20) 
  l.44 = c(50,23) 
  l.45 = c(20) 
  l.49 = c(25,20,20,25,20) 
#Calculate t as a percentage of service life 
  t.41 = ((yr‐i.41)/l.41)*lg.41 
  t.42 = ((yr‐i.42)/l.42)*lg.42 
  t.43 = ((yr‐i.43)/l.43)*lg.43 
  t.44 = ((yr‐i.44)/l.44)*lg.44 
  t.45 = ((yr‐i.45)/l.45)*lg.45 
  t.49 = ((yr‐i.49)/l.49)*lg.49 
#Calculate PoF vector 
  pof.41 = c(); pof.42=c();pof.43=c();pof.44=c();pof.45=c();pof.49=c(); 
  b = 1  
  a = 2.64  
  CI_t = .37 
  for(i in 1:length(t.41)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.41[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.41[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.42)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.42[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.42[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.43)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.43[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.43[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.44)){ 
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    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.44[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.44[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.45)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.45[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.45[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.49)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.49[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.49[i] = pof 
  } 
  #Sort PoF Vector 
  pof.41 = sort(pof.41, decreasing = T) 
  pof.42 = sort(pof.42, decreasing = T) 
  pof.43 = sort(pof.43, decreasing = T) 
  pof.44 = sort(pof.44, decreasing = T) 
  pof.45 = sort(pof.45, decreasing = T) 
  pof.49 = sort(pof.49, decreasing = T) 
#Assign CII Weights  
  if (sum(pof.41) == 0){c.41 = 0}else {c.41 = .3070 } 
  if (sum(pof.42) == 0){c.42 = 0}else {c.42 = .3460} 
  if (sum(pof.43) == 0){c.43 = 0}else {c.43 = .3425} 
  if (sum(pof.44) == 0){c.44 = 0}else {c.44 = .2680} 
  if (sum(pof.45) == 0){c.45 = 0}else {c.45 = .3190} 
  if (sum(pof.49) == 0){c.49 = 0}else {c.49 = .2680}  
#Standardize CII Weights 
  sys.wt.4 = c(c.41,c.42,c.43,c.44,c.45,c.49) 
  sys.wt.4 = sys.wt.4[sys.wt.4 != 0 ] 
  sys.wt = (sys.wt.4/(sum(sys.wt.4))) 
#Remove zeroes from PoF vectors 
  pof.41 = pof.41[pof.41 != 0 ] 
  pof.42 = pof.42[pof.42 != 0 ] 
  pof.43 = pof.43[pof.43 != 0 ] 
  pof.44 = pof.44[pof.44 != 0 ] 
  pof.45 = pof.45[pof.45 != 0 ] 
  pof.49 = pof.49[pof.49 != 0 ] 
# Compute Compontent Level ORAND Operators 
  pofc.41 = crossprod(pof.41,w.41) 
  pofc.42 = crossprod(pof.42,w.42) 
  pofc.43 = crossprod(pof.43,w.43) 
  pofc.44 = crossprod(pof.44,w.44) 
  pofc.45 = crossprod(pof.45,w.45) 
  pofc.49 = crossprod(pof.49,w.49) 
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  comp.op.4 = c(pofc.41,pofc.42,pofc.43,pofc.44,pofc.45,pofc.49) 
#Sort the Component level vector 
  comp.op.4 = comp.op.4[comp.op.4 != 0 ] 
  comp.op.4 = sort(comp.op.4, decreasing = T) 
#Calculate System PoF 
sys.pof.fail.4 = crossprod(sys.wt.4,comp.op.4) 
sys.pof.fail.4 
} 
Electrical System (D50) 
D50 = function(bldg, 
               d511,d512,d513,d514,d515,d516,d519, 
               d521,d522,d529, 
               d531,d532,d533,d534,d535,d536,d537,d539, 
               d591,d592,d593,d594,d595,d596,d599){ 
#Year of Data Being Pulled 
  yr =  
#Put into component vectors 
  i.51 = c(d511,d512,d513,d514,d515,d516,d519) 
  i.52 = c(d521,d522,d529) 
  i.53 = c(d531,d532,d533,d534,d535,d536,d537,d539) 
  i.59 = c(d591,d592,d593,d594,d595,d596,d599) 
#Return Logic Weight vectors 
  lg.51 = (as.logical(i.51)) 
  lg.52 = (as.logical(i.52)) 
  lg.53 = (as.logical(i.53)) 
  lg.59 = (as.logical(i.59)) 
#Assign C‐S Weights 
  w1.51 = c(1.0,1.0,.4850,1.0,1.0,.3840,1.0) 
  w1.52 = c(.2357,.3014,.4300) 
  w1.53 = c(1.0,1.0,.3500,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,.3700) 
  w1.59 = c(1.0,1.0,.5250,.6100,1.0,1.0,.4225) 
 
#Standardize the C‐S Weight cs 
  w.51 = w1.51*lg.51 
  w.52 = w1.52*lg.52 
  w.53 = w1.53*lg.53  
  w.59 = w1.59*lg.59 
   
  w.51 = w.51[w.51 != 0] 
  w.52 = w.52[w.52 != 0] 
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  w.53 = w.53[w.53 != 0] 
  w.59 = w.59[w.59 != 0] 
   
  w.51 = w.51/sum(w.51) 
  w.52 = w.52/sum(w.52) 
  w.53 = w.53/sum(w.53) 
  w.59 = w.59/sum(w.59) 
#Assign Service Lives #Working# 
  l.51 = c(20,20,30,50,50,40,25) 
  l.52 = c(60,20,15) 
  l.53 = c(20,20,15,20,20,20,20,15) 
  l.59 = c(20,20,50,50,20,20,18) 
#Calculate t as a percentage of service life 
  t.51 = ((yr‐i.51)/l.51)*lg.51 
  t.52 = ((yr‐i.52)/l.52)*lg.52 
  t.53 = ((yr‐i.53)/l.53)*lg.53 
  t.59 = ((yr‐i.59)/l.59)*lg.59 
#Calculate PoF vector 
  pof.51 = c(); pof.52=c();pof.53=c();pof.59=c(); 
  b = 1  
  a = 2.64  
  CI_t = .37 
  for(i in 1:length(t.51)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.51[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.51[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.52)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.52[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.52[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.53)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.53[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.53[i] = pof 
  } 
  for(i in 1:length(t.59)){ 
    pof = 1‐(1/CI_t)^(‐(t.59[i]/b)^a) 
    pof.59[i] = pof 
  } 
#Sort PoF Vector 
  pof.51 = sort(pof.51, decreasing = T) 
  pof.52 = sort(pof.52, decreasing = T) 
  pof.53 = sort(pof.53, decreasing = T) 
  pof.59 = sort(pof.59, decreasing = T) 
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#Assign CII Weights  
  if (sum(pof.51) == 0){c.51 = 0}else {c.51 = .6091} 
  if (sum(pof.52) == 0){c.52 = 0}else {c.52 = .6708} 
  if (sum(pof.53) == 0){c.53 = 0}else {c.53 = .3362} 
  if (sum(pof.59) == 0){c.59 = 0}else {c.59 = .3826} 
#Standardize CII Weights   
  sys.wt.5 = c(c.51,c.52,c.53,c.59) 
  sys.wt.5 = sys.wt.5[sys.wt.5 != 0 ] 
  sys.wt.5 = (sys.wt.5/(sum(sys.wt.5))) 
#Remove zeroes from PoF vectors 
  pof.51 = pof.51[pof.51 != 0 ] 
  pof.52 = pof.52[pof.52 != 0 ] 
  pof.53 = pof.53[pof.53 != 0 ] 
  pof.59 = pof.59[pof.59 != 0 ]   
#Compute Compontent Level ORAND Operators 
  pofc.51 = crossprod(pof.51,w.51) 
  pofc.52 = crossprod(pof.52,w.52) 
  pofc.53 = crossprod(pof.53,w.53) 
  pofc.59 = crossprod(pof.59,w.59) 
  comp.op.5 = c(pofc.51,pofc.52,pofc.53,pofc.59) 
#Sort the Component level vector 
  comp.op.5 = comp.op.5[comp.op.5 != 0 ] 
  comp.op.5 = sort(comp.op.5, decreasing = T)   
#Calculate System PoF 
sys.pof.fail.5 = crossprod(sys.wt.5,comp.op.5) 
sys.pof.fail.5 
} 
With the above functions created, this research was able to import tables of 
component-section average ages and calculate the probability of failure for each system. 
The system probability of failure was then output as a seperate data file via the code 
below. The "SystOWA" package called in line two of the below code is the package 
created with the code above for the four major systems. 
library(XLConnect) 
library(SystOWA) 
#The data file pulled in needs to be a table of component‐section average ages.  This will 
produce a results workbook for each bases failed and non‐failed data set 
data = loadWorkbook("/Users/deeringpatrick/Documents/AFIT/1. Thesis/Model Validati
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on/Data Files/Raw Data/Cannon_NoFail.xls") 
 
HVAC = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "HVAC") 
ELEC = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "ELEC") 
FIRE = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "FIRE") 
PLUMB = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "PLUMB") 
 
output = matrix(nrow = nrow(HVAC), ncol = 4, byrow = T ) 
output2 = matrix(nrow = nrow(PLUMB), ncol = 4, byrow = T) 
output3 = matrix(nrow = nrow(ELEC), ncol = 4, byrow = T) 
output4 = matrix(nrow = nrow(FIRE), ncol = 4, byrow = T) 
 
for(i in 1:nrow(HVAC)){ 
  SCI = HVAC[i,1] 
  bldg = HVAC[i,2]; 
  d311=HVAC[i,3];d312=HVAC[i,4];d313=HVAC[i,5];d314=HVAC[i,6];d315=HVAC[i,7];d31
6=HVAC[i,8];d317=HVAC[i,9];d319=HVAC[i,10]; 
  d321=HVAC[i,11];d322=HVAC[i,12];d323=HVAC[i,13];d324=HVAC[i,14];d325=HVAC[i,15
];d329=HVAC[i,16]; 
  d331=HVAC[i,17];d332=HVAC[i,18];d339=HVAC[i,19]; 
  d341=HVAC[i,20];d342=HVAC[i,21];d343=HVAC[i,22];d344=HVAC[i,23];d345=HVAC[i,24
];d346=HVAC[i,25];d347=HVAC[i,26];d348=HVAC[i,27];d349=HVAC[i,28]; 
  d351=HVAC[i,29];d352=HVAC[i,30];d353=HVAC[i,31];d354=HVAC[i,32];d355=HVAC[i,33
];d356=HVAC[i,34];d359=HVAC[i,35]; 
  d361=HVAC[i,36];d362=HVAC[i,37];d363=HVAC[i,38];d364=HVAC[i,39];d365=HVAC[i,40
];d369=HVAC[i,41]; 
  d371=HVAC[i,42];d372=HVAC[i,43];d373=HVAC[i,44];d379=HVAC[i,45]; 
  d391=HVAC[i,46];d392=HVAC[i,47];d399=HVAC[i,48] 
  sys.pof.fail.h = D30(bldg,d311,d312,d313,d314,d315,d316,d317,d319,d321,d322,d323,
d324,d325,d329,d331,d332,d339,d341,d342,d343,d344,d345,d346,d347,d348,d349,d35
1,d352,d353,d354,d355,d356,d359,d361,d362,d363,d364,d365,d369,d371,d372,d373,d
379,d391,d392,d399) 
output[i,]= c(bldg,as.numeric(SCI),as.numeric(1‐sys.pof.fail.h),as.numeric(sys.pof.fail.h)) 
} 
 
rm(list=setdiff(ls(), c("data","output","output2","output3","output4","FIRE","HVAC","PL
UMB","ELEC"))) 
 
for(i in 1:nrow(PLUMB)){ 
  SCI=PLUMB[i,1];bldg=PLUMB[i,2]; 
  d211=PLUMB[i,3];d212=PLUMB[i,4];d213=PLUMB[i,5];d214=PLUMB[i,6];d215=PLUMB[
i,7];d216=PLUMB[i,8];d217=PLUMB[i,9];d219=PLUMB[i,10]; 
  d221=PLUMB[i,11];d222=PLUMB[i,12];d223=PLUMB[i,13];d224=PLUMB[i,14];d225=PL
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UMB[i,15];d229=PLUMB[i,16]; 
  d231=PLUMB[i,17];d232=PLUMB[i,18];d233=PLUMB[i,19];d234=PLUMB[i,20];d235=PL
UMB[i,21];d239=PLUMB[i,22]; 
  d241=PLUMB[i,23];d242=PLUMB[i,24];d243=PLUMB[i,25];d244=PLUMB[i,26];d249=PL
UMB[i,27]; 
  d291=PLUMB[i,28];d292=PLUMB[i,29];d293=PLUMB[i,30];d294=PLUMB[i,31];d295=PL
UMB[i,31];d299=PLUMB[i,32] 
  sys.pof.fail.p = D20(bldg,d211,d212,d213,d214,d215,d216,d217,d219,d221,d222,d223,
d224,d225,d229,d231,d232,d233,d234,d235,d239,d241,d242,d243,d244,d249,d291,d29
2,d293,d294,d295,d299)              
  output2[i,]= c(bldg,as.numeric(SCI),as.numeric(1‐sys.pof.fail.p),as.numeric(sys.pof.fail.
p)) 
}  
 
rm(list=setdiff(ls(), c("data","output","output2","output3","output4","FIRE","HVAC","PL
UMB","ELEC"))) 
 
 
for(i in 1:nrow(ELEC)){ 
  SCI=ELEC[i,1];bldg=ELEC[i,2]; 
  d511=ELEC[i,3];d512=ELEC[i,4];d513=ELEC[i,5];d514=ELEC[i,6];d515=ELEC[i,7];d516=EL
EC[i,8];d519=ELEC[i,9]; 
  d521=ELEC[i,10];d522=ELEC[i,11];d529=ELEC[i,12]; 
  d531=ELEC[i,13];d532=ELEC[i,14];d533=ELEC[i,15];d534=ELEC[i,16];d535=ELEC[i,17];d5
36=ELEC[i,18];d537=ELEC[i,19];d539=ELEC[i,20]; 
  d591=ELEC[i,21];d592=ELEC[i,22];d593=ELEC[i,23];d594=ELEC[i,24];d595=ELEC[i,25];d5
96=ELEC[i,26];d599=ELEC[i,27]; 
  sys.pof.fail.e = D50(bldg,d511,d512,d513,d514,d515,d516,d519,d521,d522,d529,d531,
d532,d533,d534,d535,d536,d537,d539,d591,d592,d593,d594,d595,d596,d599)              
  output3[i,]= c(bldg,as.numeric(SCI),as.numeric(1‐sys.pof.fail.e),as.numeric(sys.pof.fail.
e)) 
} 
 
rm(list=setdiff(ls(), c("data","output","output2","output3","output4","FIRE","HVAC","PL
UMB","ELEC"))) 
 
for(i in 1:nrow(FIRE)){ 
  SCI=FIRE[i,1];bldg=FIRE[i,2]; 
  d411=FIRE[i,3];d412=FIRE[i,4]; 
  d421=FIRE[i,5];d422=FIRE[i,6]; 
  d431=FIRE[i,7]; 
  d441=FIRE[i,8];d442=FIRE[i,9]; 
  d451=FIRE[i,10]; 
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  d491=FIRE[i,11];d492=FIRE[i,12];d493=FIRE[i,13];d494=FIRE[i,14];d499=FIRE[i,15]; 
  sys.pof.fail.f = D40(bldg,d411,d412,d421,d422,d431,d441,d442,d451,d491,d492,d493,
d494,d499)              
  output4[i,]= c(bldg,as.numeric(SCI),as.numeric(1‐sys.pof.fail.f),as.numeric(sys.pof.fail.f
)) 
}   
 
rm(list=setdiff(ls(), c("data","output","output2","output3","output4","FIRE","HVAC","PL
UMB","ELEC"))) 
 
wb = loadWorkbook("Cannon_NoFail_Pull2.xls", create = T) 
createSheet(wb, name = "HVAC") 
writeWorksheet(wb, output, sheet = "HVAC") 
createSheet(wb, name = "PLUMB") 
writeWorksheet(wb, output2, sheet = "PLUMB") 
createSheet(wb, name = "FIRE") 
writeWorksheet(wb, output4, sheet = "FIRE") 
createSheet(wb, name = "ELEC") 
writeWorksheet(wb, output3, sheet = "ELEC") 
saveWorkbook(wb) 
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Appendix C.  R code for contingency analysis and plot output 
The below code used the output from the code presented in Appendix B to 
perform a contingency analysis and plot the associated p values and odds ratios for a 
given system over all possible values of a reliability threshold. 
library(XLConnect) 
data = loadWorkbook("/Users/deeringpatrick/Documents/AFIT/1. Thesis/Model Validati
on/Data Files/Results Data/Threshold Data Files/Consolidated Results_By System.xlsx") 
 
HVAC.Fail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "Fail", startRow = 97, endRow = 446, startCol 
= 4, endCol = 4, header = FALSE) 
PLUMB.Fail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "Fail", startRow = 447, endRow = 466, startC
ol = 4, endCol =4, header = FALSE) 
FIRE.Fail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "Fail", startRow = 61, endRow = 96, startCol = 4
, endCol = 4, header = FALSE) 
ELEC.Fail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "Fail", startRow = 2, endRow = 60, startCol = 4, 
endCol =4, header = FALSE) 
 
 
HVAC.NoFail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "NoFail", startRow = 97, endRow = 446, sta
rtCol = 4, endCol = 4, header = FALSE) 
PLUMB.NoFail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "NoFail", startRow = 447, endRow = 466, 
startCol = 4, endCol =4, header = FALSE) 
FIRE.NoFail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "NoFail", startRow = 61, endRow = 96, startC
ol = 4, endCol = 4, header = FALSE) 
ELEC.NoFail = readWorksheet(data, sheet = "NoFail", startRow = 2, endRow = 60, startC
ol = 4, endCol =4, header = FALSE) 
 
output = NULL 
x = 0 
 
for(a in 0:200){ 
FF = sum(HVAC.Fail<=x) 
FN = sum(HVAC.Fail>x) 
NF = sum(HVAC.NoFail<=x) 
NN = sum(HVAC.NoFail>x) 
 
c.test = matrix(c(FF,NF,FN,NN), nrow = 2, ncol = 2, byrow = F) 
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f.test = fisher.test(c.test) 
 
p.val = f.test$p.value 
o.ratio = f.test$estimate 
output = rbind(output, data.frame(x, p.val, o.ratio)) 
x = x+0.5 
rm("FF","FN","NF","NN","c.test","f.test","p.val","o.ratio") 
} 
 
output2 = NULL 
x2 = 0 
 
for(a in 0:200){ 
  FF = sum(PLUMB.Fail<=x2) 
  FN = sum(PLUMB.Fail>x2) 
  NF = sum(PLUMB.NoFail<=x2) 
  NN = sum(PLUMB.NoFail>x2) 
   
  c.test2 = matrix(c(FF,NF,FN,NN), nrow = 2, ncol = 2, byrow = F) 
   
  f.test2 = fisher.test(c.test2) 
   
  p.val2 = f.test2$p.value 
  o.ratio2 = f.test2$estimate 
  output2 = rbind(output2, data.frame(x2, p.val2, o.ratio2)) 
  x2 = x2+0.5 
  rm("FF","FN","NF","NN","c.test2","f.test2","p.val2","o.ratio2") 
} 
 
output3 = NULL 
x3 = 0 
 
for(a in 0:200){ 
  FF = sum(FIRE.Fail<=x3) 
  FN = sum(FIRE.Fail>x3) 
  NF = sum(FIRE.NoFail<=x3) 
  NN = sum(FIRE.NoFail>x3) 
   
  c.test3 = matrix(c(FF,NF,FN,NN), nrow = 2, ncol = 2, byrow = F) 
   
  f.test3 = fisher.test(c.test3) 
   
  p.val3 = f.test3$p.value 
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  o.ratio3 = f.test3$estimate 
  output3 = rbind(output3, data.frame(x3, p.val3, o.ratio3)) 
  x3 = x3+0.5 
  rm("FF","FN","NF","NN","c.test3","f.test3","p.val3","o.ratio3") 
} 
 
output4 = NULL 
x4 = 0 
 
for(a in 0:200){ 
  FF = sum(ELEC.Fail<=x4) 
  FN = sum(ELEC.Fail>x4) 
  NF = sum(ELEC.NoFail<=x4) 
  NN = sum(ELEC.NoFail>x4) 
   
  c.test4 = matrix(c(FF,NF,FN,NN), nrow = 2, ncol = 2, byrow = F) 
   
  f.test4 = fisher.test(c.test4) 
   
  p.val4 = f.test4$p.value 
  o.ratio4 = f.test4$estimate 
  output4 = rbind(output4, data.frame(x4, p.val4, o.ratio4)) 
  x4 = x4+0.5 
  rm("FF","FN","NF","NN","c.test4","f.test4","p.val4","o.ratio4") 
} 
 
plot(output4$x4,output4$p.val4, type = "l", col="red", xlab = "", ylab = "", ylim = c(0,2)) 
par(new=TRUE) 
plot(output4$x4,output4$o.ratio4, type = "l", col = "green", xlab = "", ylab = "",ylim = c(0
,2)) 
title(main = "PoF Model Performance: ELEC System", ylab = "P‐Value/Odds Ratio", xlab = 
"Failure Threshold") 
 
plot(output3$x3,output3$p.val3, type = "l", col="red", xlab = "", ylab = "", ylim = c(0,3)) 
par(new=TRUE) 
plot(output3$x3,output3$o.ratio3, type = "l", col = "green", xlab = "", ylab = "",ylim = c(0
,3)) 
title(main = "PoF Model Performance: FIRE System", ylab = "P‐Value/Odds Ratio", xlab = 
"Failure Threshold") 
 
plot(output2$x2,output2$p.val2, type = "l", col="red", xlab = "", ylab = "", ylim = c(0,3)) 
par(new=TRUE) 
plot(output2$x2,output2$o.ratio2, type = "l", col = "green", xlab = "", ylab = "",ylim = c(0
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,3)) 
title(main = "PoF Model Performance: PLUM System", ylab = "P‐Value/Odds Ratio", xlab 
= "Failure Threshold") 
 
plot(output$x,output$p.val, type = "l", col="red", xlab = "", ylab = "", ylim = c(0,2)) 
par(new=TRUE) 
plot(output$x,output$o.ratio, type = "l", col = "green", xlab = "", ylab = "",ylim = c(0,2)) 
title(main = "PoF Model Performance: HVAC System", ylab = "P‐Value/Odds Ratio", xlab 
= "Failure Threshold") 
``` 
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Appendix D.  Cannon AFB HVAC failure data 
The data collected for this potion of the research required system lifetime failure 
data.  IWIMS data was only available from 1995-2015.  Therefore, this research did not 
consider failure data for facilities constructed prior to 1995.  Of the 175 HVAC systems 
in the BUILDER® inventory for Cannon AFB, 58 were commissioned on or after 1995.  
Of those 58 systems, this research found data in IWIMS for 40 of them.  The data 
presented below displays the data for those 40 systems. 
 
Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
00128 971 971 13 1 
00128 999 28 13 2 
00128 1346 347 13 3 
00128 1664 318 13 4 
00128 1868 204 13 5 
00128 2295 427 13 6 
00128 2590 295 13 7 
00128 3261 671 13 8 
00128 3367 106 13 9 
00128 3767 400 13 10 
00128 3856 89 13 11 
00128 4446 590 13 12 
00158 925 925 12 1 
00158 1257 332 12 2 
00158 1726 469 12 3 
00158 1728 2 12 4 
00158 1799 71 12 5 
00158 2182 383 12 6 
00158 2661 479 12 7 
00158 2805 144 12 8 
00158 2818 13 12 9 
00158 2853 35 12 10 
00158 3066 213 12 11 
00158 3148 82 12 12 
00158 3301 153 12 13 
00158 3640 339 12 14 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
00158 3808 168 12 15 
00158 3850 42 12 16 
00158 3939 89 12 17 
00173 3987 3987 6 1 
00208 354 354 21 1 
00208 362 8 21 2 
00208 366 4 21 3 
00208 382 16 21 4 
00208 431 49 21 5 
00208 568 137 21 6 
00208 589 21 21 7 
00208 596 7 21 8 
00208 910 314 21 9 
00208 1075 165 21 10 
00208 1727 652 21 11 
00208 1752 25 21 12 
00208 1893 141 21 13 
00208 2216 323 21 14 
00208 2384 168 21 15 
00208 2430 46 21 16 
00208 5182 2752 21 17 
00208 5203 21 21 18 
00208 5226 23 21 19 
00208 5434 208 21 20 
00208 5486 52 21 21 
00208 6946 1460 21 22 
00208 7093 147 21 23 
00208 7255 162 21 24 
00208 7352 97 21 25 
00234 719 719 4 1 
00234 871 152 4 2 
00251 1253 1253 20 1 
00251 1270 17 20 2 
00278 897 897 5 1 
00300 913 913 17 1 
00300 1321 408 17 2 
00300 2377 1056 17 3 
00300 2460 83 17 4 
00300 3552 1092 17 5 
00300 3860 308 17 6 
00300 3910 50 17 7 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
00300 4003 93 17 8 
00300 4161 158 17 9 
00300 4196 35 17 10 
00300 4910 714 17 11 
00300 5310 400 17 12 
00300 5614 304 17 13 
00300 5744 130 17 14 
00300 5850 106 17 15 
00300 6003 153 17 16 
00307 2056 2056 6 1 
00355 155 155 18 1 
00355 355 200 18 2 
00355 361 6 18 3 
00355 523 162 18 4 
00355 525 2 18 5 
00355 544 19 18 6 
00355 546 2 18 7 
00355 557 11 18 8 
00355 567 10 18 9 
00355 574 7 18 10 
00355 585 11 18 11 
00355 592 7 18 12 
00355 733 141 18 13 
00355 762 29 18 14 
00355 916 154 18 15 
00355 981 65 18 16 
00355 1075 94 18 17 
00355 1419 344 18 18 
00355 1660 241 18 19 
00355 3255 1595 18 20 
00356 544 544 19 1 
00356 601 57 19 2 
00356 709 108 19 3 
00356 799 90 19 4 
00356 875 76 19 5 
00356 904 29 19 6 
00356 1007 103 19 7 
00356 1126 119 19 8 
00356 1127 1 19 9 
00575 1481 1481 11 1 
00575 1857 376 11 2 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
00575 2082 225 11 3 
00575 2158 76 11 4 
00575 3078 920 11 5 
00575 3117 39 11 6 
00575 3560 443 11 7 
00724 150 150 5 1 
00724 338 188 5 2 
00724 367 29 5 3 
00724 716 349 5 4 
00724 884 168 5 5 
00724 888 4 5 6 
00724 996 108 5 7 
00724 1040 44 5 8 
00724 1104 64 5 9 
00724 1412 308 5 10 
00724 1473 61 5 11 
00724 1488 15 5 12 
00724 1770 282 5 13 
00777 370 370 3 1 
00777 793 423 3 2 
00848 258 258 3 1 
00848 489 231 3 2 
00848 636 147 3 3 
00848 658 22 3 4 
00848 671 13 3 5 
00850 709 709 9 1 
00850 2818 2109 9 2 
00850 2872 54 9 3 
01155 294 294 20 1 
01155 854 560 20 2 
01155 896 42 20 3 
01155 1225 329 20 4 
01155 1232 7 20 5 
01155 1278 46 20 6 
01155 1324 46 20 7 
01155 1414 90 20 8 
01155 1450 36 20 9 
01155 1463 13 20 10 
01155 1466 3 20 11 
01155 1470 4 20 12 
01155 1471 1 20 13 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
01155 1478 7 20 14 
01155 1488 10 20 15 
01155 1491 3 20 16 
01155 1492 1 20 17 
01155 1498 6 20 18 
01155 1522 24 20 19 
01155 3158 1636 20 20 
01155 3272 114 20 21 
01155 3607 335 20 22 
01155 4167 560 20 23 
01155 4551 384 20 24 
01155 5810 1259 20 25 
01155 5971 161 20 26 
01155 6008 37 20 27 
01155 6143 135 20 28 
01155 6597 454 20 29 
01155 6713 116 20 30 
01155 6764 51 20 31 
01155 6825 61 20 32 
01155 6948 123 20 33 
01155 6993 45 20 34 
01155 6996 3 20 35 
01155 7063 67 20 36 
01155 7098 35 20 37 
01155 7210 112 20 38 
01155 7218 8 20 39 
01159 238 238 20 1 
01159 905 667 20 2 
01159 1051 146 20 3 
01159 1075 24 20 4 
01159 1087 12 20 5 
01159 1088 1 20 6 
01159 1092 4 20 7 
01159 1100 8 20 8 
01159 1108 8 20 9 
01159 1117 9 20 10 
01159 1122 5 20 11 
01159 1123 1 20 12 
01159 1134 11 20 13 
01159 1148 14 20 14 
01159 1225 77 20 15 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
01159 1232 7 20 16 
01159 1233 1 20 17 
01159 1269 36 20 18 
01159 1302 33 20 19 
01159 1436 134 20 20 
01159 1519 83 20 21 
01159 1838 319 20 22 
01159 2271 433 20 23 
01159 4547 2276 20 24 
01159 4643 96 20 25 
01159 4650 7 20 26 
01159 4938 288 20 27 
01159 5082 144 20 28 
01159 7158 2076 20 29 
01159 7210 52 20 30 
01159 7564 354 20 31 
01161 166 166 17 1 
01161 216 50 17 2 
01161 270 54 17 3 
01161 290 20 17 4 
01161 501 211 17 5 
01161 507 6 17 6 
01161 636 129 17 7 
01161 803 167 17 8 
01161 850 47 17 9 
01161 874 24 17 10 
01161 892 18 17 11 
01161 942 50 17 12 
01161 962 20 17 13 
01161 971 9 17 14 
01161 1180 209 17 15 
01161 2329 1149 17 16 
01161 3953 1624 17 17 
01161 5274 1321 17 18 
01161 5316 42 17 19 
01275 176 176 2 1 
01275 523 347 2 2 
01275 524 1 2 3 
01435 453 453 5 1 
01435 720 267 5 2 
01435 1067 347 5 3 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
01435 1236 169 5 4 
01435 1277 41 5 5 
01435 1614 337 5 6 
01435 1732 118 5 7 
01824 1721 1721 6 1 
01825 1949 1949 6 1 
02134 876 876 20 1 
02134 1218 342 20 2 
02134 1235 17 20 3 
02134 1443 208 20 4 
02134 1624 181 20 5 
02134 2045 421 20 6 
02134 4106 2061 20 7 
02134 5510 1404 20 8 
02134 5645 135 20 9 
02134 7065 1420 20 10 
02206 855 855 21 1 
02206 883 28 21 2 
02206 1065 182 21 3 
02206 1138 73 21 4 
02206 1297 159 21 5 
02206 1437 140 21 6 
02206 1440 3 21 7 
02206 1443 3 21 8 
02206 1451 8 21 9 
02206 1452 1 21 10 
02206 1538 86 21 11 
02206 1600 62 21 12 
02206 1618 18 21 13 
02206 1642 24 21 14 
02206 1663 21 21 15 
02206 1696 33 21 16 
02206 1717 21 21 17 
02206 1740 23 21 18 
02206 1766 26 21 19 
02206 1800 34 21 20 
02206 1850 50 21 21 
02206 1927 77 21 22 
02206 2017 90 21 23 
02206 2019 2 21 24 
02206 2115 96 21 25 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
02206 2213 98 21 26 
02206 2347 134 21 27 
02206 2361 14 21 28 
02206 4960 2599 21 29 
02206 5302 342 21 30 
02206 5456 154 21 31 
02206 7247 1791 21 32 
02206 7477 230 21 33 
02206 7484 7 21 34 
02220 1748 1748 12 1 
02220 4235 2487 12 2 
02320 1070 1070 19 1 
02320 1077 7 19 2 
02320 1218 141 19 3 
02320 6095 4877 19 4 
02320 6524 429 19 5 
02370 993 993 6 1 
02370 1330 337 6 2 
02370 1636 306 6 3 
02371 736 736 4 3 
02371 1101 365 4 1 
02371 1118 17 4 2 
02379 1006 1006 5 1 
02379 1263 257 5 2 
02379 1626 363 5 3 
02379 1705 79 5 4 
04081 610 610 18 1 
04081 840 230 18 2 
04081 972 132 18 3 
04081 1281 309 18 4 
04081 1734 453 18 5 
04081 5881 4147 18 6 
04081 6208 327 18 7 
04082 543 543 18 1 
04605 136 136 4 1 
04605 351 215 4 2 
04605 824 473 4 3 
04605 1038 214 4 4 
04605 1046 8 4 5 
04605 1094 48 4 6 
04606 316 316 3 2 
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Building 
Number 
Time to 
Failure 
Time Between 
Failures 
System Age 
(yrs) 
Failure 
Number 
04606 477 161 3 3 
04606 520 43 3 4 
04606 538 18 3 5 
04606 598 60 3 6 
04606 729 131 3 1 
04607 499 499 3 4 
04607 566 67 3 5 
04607 728 162 3 1 
04607 736 8 3 2 
04607 741 5 3 3 
04609 125 125 2 1 
04609 485 360 2 2 
04619 371 371 2 1 
04619 387 16 2 2 
04619 540 153 2 3 
04619 587 47 2 4 
04620 387 387 2 1 
04620 400 13 2 2 
04620 418 18 2 3 
04620 552 134 2 4 
04620 583 31 2 5 
04623 362 362 2 1 
04623 364 2 2 2 
04623 372 8 2 3 
04623 376 4 2 4 
04623 561 185 2 5 
04623 582 21 2 6 
04624 223 223 3 1 
04624 234 11 3 2 
04624 237 3 3 3 
04624 527 290 3 4 
04624 615 88 3 5 
04624 622 7 3 6 
04624 636 14 3 7 
04624 639 3 3 8 
04624 876 237 3 9 
04624 919 43 3 10 
04624 1017 98 3 11 
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Appendix E. Duane Plots by Installation 
 
Figure E-1: Barksdale AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure E-2: Cannon AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure E-3: Davis Monthan AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure E-4: Keesler AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure E-5: Patrick AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure E-6: Scott AFB HVAC Duane Plot 
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Appendix F. Cannon AFB HVAC System Duane Plots 
 
 
Figure F-1:  Building 128 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-2: Building 158 HVAC Duane Plot 
 158 
 
Figure F-3: Building 208 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-4: Building 234 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-5: Building 251 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-6: Building 300 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-7: Building 355 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-8: Building 356 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-9: Building 575 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-10: Building 724 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-11: Building 777 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-12: Building 848 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-13: Building 850 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-14: Building 1155 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-15: Building 1159 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-16: Building 1161 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-17: Building 1275 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-18: Building 1435 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-19: Building 2134 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-20: Building 2206 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-21: Building 2220 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-22: Building 2320 HVAC Duane Plot
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Figure F-23: Building 2370 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-24: Building 2371 HVAC Duane Plot
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Figure F-25: Building 2379 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-26: Building 4081 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-27: Building 4605 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
 
Figure F-28: Building 4606 HVAC Duane Plot
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Figure F-29: Building 4607 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-30: Building 4609 HVAC Duane Plot 
 172 
 
Figure F-31: Building 4619 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-32: Building 4620 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Figure F-33: Building 4623 HVAC Duane Plot 
 
Figure F-34: Building 4624 HVAC Duane Plot 
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Appendix G: Method and preliminary results for Semi-Markov Process 
 
To serve as stimuli for follow on research, this appendix demonstrates and 
alternative method for evaluating civil system reliability via a finite state Semi-Markov 
Process.  The below method is adapted from Warr (n.d.) in which the author simplifies 
the Semi-Markov process.  The reliability results calculated use the data collected from 
Cannon AFB HVAC systems as presented in Appendix D.  The calculated results are the 
output of the R statistical software code developed by Freels and Warr (2015).  Due to 
the time constraints of this thesis effort, this research was unable to holistically evaluate 
the proposed method.   However, based on preliminary results, this research deems the 
below method worthy of further analysis to determine its effectiveness in providing 
accurate reliability calculations for repairable civil systems. 
Finite State Semi-Markov Process (SMP) 
Semi-Markov Processes (SMP) is a stochastic process used to understand 
statistical properties in survival analysis, reliability analysis, DNA analysis, and other 
transition or “state” type processes.  Despite their general applicability, Warr (n.d.) 
discusses that practitioners don’t widely use SMPs.  Moreover, Warr (n.d) also 
summarizes the straightforward nature of solving SMPs.  Using the data from Appendix 
D, this research employed Warr’s method to calculate a measure of reliability for 
Heating, Ventilation, and Cooling (HVAC) systems given a systems age in order assess 
the accuracy of the PoF model and SCI model for HVAC systems.  
This research will model the reliability of a systems using SMP with a finite 
number of failure states.  A section discussing these states and their properties will be 
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offered later in this appendix.  The below sections introduces statistical quantities that can 
be obtained when employing SMPs.  Subsequent sections will explain how to solve these 
quantities and how they relate to a measurement of reliability. 
Figure G-1 displays a simple example of a finite state SMP.  State 1 represents a 
“working” state, state 2 an “under repair” state, and state 3 an “unrepairable” state.  Fij(x) 
and pij are notations for cumulative distribution function (CDF) of transition time and 
probability of transitioning from state i to state j, respectively.  Ultimately, Figure G-1 
highlights the three necessary pieces of information to define an SMP: 1) the number of 
states, n; 2) the CDF of the waiting time distribution from state i to state j, Fij(x); and 3) 
the probability that the next state in the process is j, given the process entered state i 
(Warr, n.d.).  These three pieces of information will enable the use of the SMP to 
calculate statistical quantities of interest.  Table G-1 displays the statistical quantities 
available via a SMP.  This research will utilize Pij(t) to calculate a measure of system 
reliability (Warr, n.d.). 
 
Table G-1: Statistical Quantities available through SMP 
Notation Description 
Pij(t) The probability the process is in state j (as a function of time). 
Gij(t) The first passage distribution of the time to reach state j. 
vij(k;t) The probability of reaching a state j, k number of times (as a function of 
time). 
Vij(k;t) The probability of reaching a state j, k or fewer times (as a function of 
time). 
Mij(t) The expected number of times the process has been in state j at time t 
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Figure G-1: semi-Markov Process Example (adapted from Warr, n.d.) 
 
Notation Convention 
This section will explain some of the basic notations associated with SMPs.  This 
method will utilize cumulative probability distributions (CDFs) of the waiting time with 
basic form Fij(x)  and basic transition probabilities pij.  From these values and statistical 
quantities identified in Table G-1, the following notations are presented: 
 
௜݂௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ܨ௜௝ሺݔሻ ݀݀ݔ 
 
(28) 
 ݃௜௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ܩ௜௝ሺݔሻ ݀݀ݔ 
 
(29) 
 ݍ௜௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ݌௜௝ ௜݂௝ሺݔሻ (30) 
 ߜ௜௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ൜0 ݂݅ ݅ ് ݆1 ݂݅ ݅ ൌ ݆ 
(31) 
 
݄௜௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ߜ௜௝෍ݍ௜௝ሺݔሻ
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
 
(32) 
Additionally, SMPs involve some basic matrix algebra.  Many of the values listed 
in equations 28-32 will populate a matrix with similar notation.  Therefore, this research 
will represent matrices in boldfaced print.  For example, matrix F(x) represents the 
matrix containing Fij(x) for all i and j.  Lastly, SMPs utilize Laplace transforms to 
simplify calculations.  This research will represent the Laplace transform of a generic 
1 
݌ଶଵܨଶଵሺݔሻ 
ܨଵଶ ሺݔሻ ݌ଶଷܨଶଷሺݔሻ
3 2 
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function F(x) with a tilde as such, ܨ෨(s).  Similarly, a matrix containing transformed 
functions is represented with boldfaced text and a tilde, i.e. ࡲ෩(s) (Warr, n.d.). 
Laplace Transforms 
Matrix operations combined with statistical distributions can result in very 
complicated calculations.  For simplicity SMPS use Laplace transformations to make 
calculations similar to solving a system of linear equations (Warr, n.d.).  Given a generic 
function F(t), its Laplace transform ܨ෨(s) is: 
ܨ෨ሺݏሻ ൌ 	න ݁ି௦௧ܨሺݐሻ݀ݐ
ஶ
଴
 
 
(33) 
Once a function is transformed, matrix operations are completed in the transform 
domain to compute functions of the statistical quantity of interest.  After functions are 
computed in the transform domain, they must be inversed back to the time domain.  For a 
function F(t) and its Laplace transform ܨ෨(s), the inversion is: 
ܨሺݐሻ ൎ 	෍ሺെ1ሻ௝
ே
௝ୀ଴
௝ܴ߱݁ ൤ܨ෨ ൬ܣ2ݐ ൅
݆ߨ
݅ݐ ൰൨ 
 
(34) 
where Re[] is the real portion of the function and ௝߱is a weight associated with each 
term.  N, A, and ௝߱ control the accuracy of the approximation (Warr, n.d.).  Due to the 
complex nature of Laplace transforms and their inversions, this research will employ the 
R statistical software in conjunction with the code developed by Freels and Warr (2015) 
to compute the Laplace transforms and inversions for all statistical distributions. 
Time-Dependent State Probabilities 
Table G-1 presented statistical quantities this research can compute using a SMP.  
The primary statistical quantity of interest to this research is the time-dependent state 
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probability.  This quantity provides the probability that a SMP is in a particular state at 
time, t.  Equation 35 shows the formula necessary to find these probabilities, 
ࡼ෩ሺݏሻ ൌ 1ݏ ൫ࡵ െ ࢗ෥ሺݏሻ൯
ିଵ ቀࡵ െ ࢎ෩ሺݏሻቁ (35) 
where I is the identity matrix (Warr, n.d.).  Given the matrix ࡼ෩(s) in the transform 
domain, equation 34 inverses the functions in this matrix back into the time domain.  
Once in the time domain, this research will input a given systems age to determine the 
individual state probabilities for each state. 
Future researchers must define the state space, E, in a manner that lends itself to 
the desired reliability calculations.  During this preliminary analysis, this research 
focused on calculating the state probability for a given system.  E consisted of multiple 
sequential states with individual transition CDFs.  If E is the number of failures a system 
has encountered, this preliminary analysis calculated the probability that a system has 
seen 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, …etc. failures in a given time, t. 
In contrast to strict failure state probabilities, future research may focus on 
availability as introduced by Høland and Rausand (1994) as a more appropriate measure 
for assessing the probability that a repairable system will be in a operational state at time 
t.  Limnious (2011) employs a method for calculating availability from general state 
SMPs.  In this method, Limnious (2011) classifies states into two general categories: 
failed, D, or operational, U.  Given failed and operational states, availability at time t, 
A(t), is calculated as: 
ܣሺݐሻ ∶ൌ ࡼሺܼ௧ ∈ ܷሻ (36) 
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Defining the transition probabilities 
Transition probabilities pij define the probability that the next state in the SMP is 
j, given that the process is currently in state i (Warr, n.d.).  The transition probabilities for 
this preliminary analysis was simple and required no data collection.  Because E was 
defined as sequential failure states, the transitional probability for the next state was 
always pij = 1.0. 
Defining the transition CDFs 
This analysis used the HVAC failure data from Cannon Air Force Base in 
Appendix D to determine the failure time distributions for each state.  The goodness of fit 
tests displayed that the failure time distributions fit both the Weibull and Lognormal 
distributions.  Table G-2 displays the goodness of fit results for both distributions.  In 
addition to the goodness of fit results, this table displays a decreasing trend in the meant 
time between failures, an intuitive assumption for repairable systems.  Future research 
should focus on data collection to improve the fit of failure time distributions for higher-
count system failures. 
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Table G-2: State transition time CDF parameters and goodness of fit 
State n 
Weibull 
scale 
Weibull 
shape 
A.D. 
test 
A.D. 
result 
Log-
normal 
mean 
Log-
normal 
std dev 
A.D. 
test 
A.D. 
result 
1 33 774.086 1.421 0.392 
not 
rejected 6.265 0.789 0.403 
not 
rejected 
2 29 287.268 0.709 0.784 rejected 4.865 1.695 1.152 rejected 
3 24 164.942 0.742 0.295 
not 
rejected 4.298 1.768 0.686 rejected 
4 21 133.967 0.964 0.452 
not 
rejected 4.258 1.422 0.704 rejected 
5 19 173.316 0.755 0.362 
not 
rejected 4.442 1.445 0.330 
not 
rejected 
6 17 176.528 0.516 0.361 
not 
rejected 4.158 2.057 0.293 
not 
rejected 
7 15 192.991 0.638 0.225 
not 
rejected 4.415 1.751 0.271 
not 
rejected 
8 12 137.891 0.571 0.370 
not 
rejected 3.972 1.935 0.432 
not 
rejected 
9 12 84.030 0.803 0.216 
not 
rejected 3.680 1.634 0.362 
not 
rejected 
10 11 128.280 0.561 0.317 
not 
rejected 3.900 1.934 0.231 
not 
rejected 
11 10 148.836 0.678 0.311 
not 
rejected 4.165 1.747 0.350 
not 
rejected 
12 9 90.137 0.599 0.227 
not 
rejected 3.570 1.923 0.203 
not 
rejected 
13 8 96.023 0.708 0.443 
not 
rejected 3.703 1.861 0.450 
not 
rejected 
 
State Probability Results 
Given the transition CDFs displayed in Table G-2, this analysis determined both 
the Weibull and Lognormal distributions effectively represent the transition distributions 
for successive failures.  With these distributions and the R statistical software code 
developed by Freels and Warr (2015), this analysis calculated reliability measures for the 
HVAC systems at Cannon AFB.  The state space defined is a simple 3 state system, 
depicted in Figure G-2. 
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Figure G-2: HVAC System Failure State Space 
 
The states defined represent a HVAC system having zero, one, and two failures as 
its current state.  The specific state probabilities displayed in Table G-3 provide a 
probability for a system in a specific state, what is the probability that the system will 
remain in that state over the next 365 days.  Additionally, Table G-3 displays the 
probability, give a system is currently in State 1, what is the probability it will stay in 
state 1 or transition to States 2 and 3 in 365 days. 
 
Table G-3: Cannon AFB HVAC Reliability Calculations, t = 365 days 
Specific State Probabilities 
  Lognormal Weibull 
State 1 0.6753 0.7092 
State 2 0.2793 0.3057 
State 3 0.1848 0.1648 
Probability of Reaching a state: Given current state = State 1 
State 1 0.6753 0.7092 
State 2 0.1804 0.1620 
State 3 0.0702 0.0637 
 
The results of this analysis show realistic reliability calculations and are 
representative of what should be expected for a repairable system.  The results show that 
as systems begin to accumulate failures, the probability of seeing a successive failure 
1 
݌ଵଶܨଵଶ ሺݔሻ ݌ଶଷܨଶଷሺݔሻ
3 2 
Zero Fails One Fail Two Fails 
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increases.  Additionally, based on the nature of the failure documented (Emergency and 
Urgent), the method displays realistic calculations for seeing an event of that magnitude 
multiple times in a single year.  These preliminary results display that SMPs are a viable 
tool for reliability analysis of repairable systems.  The results and methods above provide 
a general framework for reliability analysis using SMPs.  However, further research is 
required to determine the legitimacy of this method for use with repairable civil systems 
and its application to Air Force civil systems. 
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